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ABSTRACT 
In recent years, a significant volume of industrial and academic research has been 
directed towards understanding the evolution and development of ERP systems and 
their associated applications. However, the associated technological and social 
changes are significant, and although many corporations have successfully 
implemented ERP, there have also been many reported cases of failed implementation. 
This has led several researchers to examine in detail the causes of these failures, in an 
effort to identify critical success factors associated with successful implementation. 
This dissertation reports on an action research study that arose from an initiative 
designed to improve the likelihood of success when implementing a particular UK- 
developed ERP system in China, namely `System 21' from JBA International. The 
project in which this research is embedded was a joint venture between JBA and a 
leading US beverage company, Pepsi Cola. 
The dissertation initially focuses on the analysis of underlying reasons for pilot 
project failures in this joint venture. This draws upon qualitative data from managers, 
consultants and other stakeholders involved in the ERP implementation at three 
geographically dispersed sites. The research then turns to an examination of ERP 
implementation methodology in the context of joint venture collaboration and 
associated issues such as change management and business process (re)engineering. 
This is grounded in a literature review of several approaches adopted by the major 
ERP solution providers. 
The literature review phase is followed by the design and distribution of a detailed 
questionnaire aimed at identifying, and subsequently addressing, the concerns of 
various customer stakeholders in a number of Hong Kong based businesses spanning 
a range of industrial sectors. Its aim was to secure the necessary improvements in 
methodology required to underpin the successful implementation in future Pepsi Joint 
Venture projects in China. Ultimately, this led to a set of recommendations in the 
form of a strategic framework for implementing ERP systems in China. 
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In summary, a key deliverable arising from the research was the production of a 
business model for the achievement of success when implementing joint venture ERP 
systems in China. A second related deliverable is the improvement of the generic 
implementation methodology currently available to customers of `System 21'. This 
has been achieved by developing a framework evolved from an adaptive approach to 
the implementation of ERP systems. To a great extent, the findings and 
recommendations are also applicable to other multinational companies who are 
operating in China and keen on implementing ERP systems within this particular 
setting, with its associated cultural and other restrictions. 
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Introduction 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, a significant volume of industrial research work has been 
conducted describing the evolution and development of ERP systems. Based upon a 
general assumption that enterprise software provides a highly effective `back-office' 
application for supporting `front-office' business operations, more and more new 
functionality has been incorporated. Hence applications such as customer relationship 
management (CRM), sales force automation (SFA) and electronic commerce (EC) 
have helped to make ERP a comprehensive survival tool for doing business in the 
current climate. 
Success in moving from monolithic inventory and financial applications to full-suite 
ERP systems was a direct result of the general acceptance of initiatives aimed at 
improving efficiency by integrating various diverse sub-systems into a holistic, closed 
loop application. Rapid change in technology has also impacted the use of enterprise 
systems in many large corporations and even medium-sized companies looking for 
improved efficiency and reduced operational costs. 
The emergence of Internet computing and electronic commerce has also brought these 
enterprise systems to a new horizon where they are seen to provide a key strategic 
competitive edge. However, although many corporations have successfully 
implemented their ERP systems, there have also been several reported failures of 
implementation. Consequently, many researchers have started to look critically into 
these failures in order to find out what to avoid, but also to identify the critical success 
factors (CSFs) for implementation of ERP systems. 
Competition is fierce in the ERP market and ERP vendors are forced to differentiate 
their products, for example, in terms of functionality and focus on specific vertical 
markets. Some ERP vendors like JBA International came to develop their products 
for niche markets such as the Automotive, Style and Drinks industries, while others 
have focused on more generic applications. However, functionality is not really a 
significant consideration, given that any particular application, e. g. Sales Ledger, in 
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two ERP packages should have broadly similar functions. The real issue is rather a 
matter of how we should customise the business processes and the implementation 
programmes to suit a particular requirement. The problem stems from difficulties 
experienced in the adaptation of the supplied implementation methodology, since this 
is not readily modifiable. Hence the implementation of ERP systems appears to be 
cumbersome and, in most cases, takes more effort to complete, than is expected or 
acceptable. This is mainly due to the fact that ERP consultants are reluctant to change 
the way in which they are trained to perform implementations, while at the same time 
companies, in general, have difficulty in fully accommodating the arrangements 
thereby imposed. 
Founded in the early 1980s, JBA International, with its head office based in 
Birmingham UK, started its core business in the design, development and support of 
its ERP package - System 21 (formerly called Business/400). This was aimed at 
midsize companies involved in the manufacture, supply and service of industrial and 
domestic goods. In the early 1990s JBA had more than one and a half thousand 
consultants dedicated to providing its customers all over the world with 
implementation support and consulting services. Prior to its acquisition by Geac 
Computers in 1999, the largest software supplier in Canada, JBA International had 
already sold its software package to a total of 4,400 customers across 50 countries in 
Europe, Asia Pacific and the Americas. In 1999, JBA employed 3,100 people world- 
wide, working out of 46 offices around the world. 
The System 21 package consists of hundreds of integrated commercial applications 
for a number of key modules including Financial, Customer Services and 
Manufacturing. By the mid 1990s, the package itself had evolved into two major 
variants, namely `Style' and `Drinks'. These products support the Garment and 
Beverage industries respectively. Both variants were ranked top in their respective 
areas in terms of functionality for mid-range computers. 
Alongside System 21, JBA International originally developed a tailored 
implementation methodology, known as the Structured Implementation Program or 
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simply SIP. More recently, this has been replaced by a more sophisticated 
methodology called JBA Advantage. This new methodology is more scalable, 
although to a certain extent, it is also quite cumbersome. Some implementation 
consultants from within Hong Kong started moving across to adopt JBA Advantage 
shortly after SIP had proved to be a failure for Pepsi Cola. However, experience with 
JBA Advantage suggested that it still could not guarantee total success. Nor was it 
reliable enough for effective implementation. Pepsi Cola in China was a customer of 
JBA International. 
The fundamental objective of initially undertaking this research was, therefore, to 
improve the chance of success for subsequent implementations using JBA Advantage 
in China and subsequently to identify a generic framework for securing the success of 
ERP implementations more generally in this complex business domain. The research 
first reviewed the academic literatures on ERP critical success factors and other 
prominent implementation issues. It also reviewed the reasons behind 
implementation failures, focusing in particular on JBA-led implementation projects 
and business-led projects in other prestigious corporations such as Chubb Security in 
Hong Kong. Chubb Security was the world's leading security provider also based in 
the UK with a yearly turnover of $3 billion in 2003. For the sake of validating the 
problem solving process at Pepsi Cola in relation to the implementation issues, Chubb 
Security in Hong Kong was explicitly referenced, since the company was also 
implementing an ERP package. The author initially worked at JBA International and 
moved to Chubb Security at the later stage of research. It also elaborates on 
comments from other companies who have been prepared and able to share their ERP 
experience. This allows comparison of JBA Advantage with other implementation 
methodologies available from major rival ERP vendors. 
In short, the research question asks whether JBA Advantage and similar systems can 
be made more effective by incorporating further changes and additional components. 
To address this issue, the research methodology chosen was Action Research, 
whereby joint effort was deployed in resolving the implementation issues as faced by 
Page 3 of 239 
Introduction 
Pepsi and JBA. The aim is to explore the extent to which their experience could be 
realised and transformed into a generic approach for implementing ERP systems. 
Action Research was clearly favoured amongst the contending options. Whilst case 
studies can be used for solving management problems, they do not necessarily involve 
joint effort and/or mutual agreement and control. Longitudinal or ethnographic 
research methods are also inapplicable to this particular aspect of management 
research, as their objectives are rather conceptual and predictive respectively. Nor is 
the approach of a true or classical experiment, which enables the researcher to test 
theories and hypotheses systematically under laboratory conditions, deemed to be 
suitable. Since the evaluation of ERP implementation is rooted in real-life problems in 
a management context, the undertaking of joint diagnosis and a collaborative action 
plan is critical to solving such problems. This is exactly what action research deals 
with, which explains why it was adopted as a primary research methodology for the 
research. 
Rapoport (1970) defines the aims of action research as `contributing both to the 
practical concern of people in an immediate problematic situation and to the goals of 
social science by joint collaboration within a mutually acceptable, ethical framework'. 
Similar definitions are given by Lau (1997), Hult & Lennung (1978) and Susman and 
Evered (1978). Specific applications of action research have also been elaborated and 
documented by Lau, (1999), and by Baskerville and Wood-Harper, (1996). In action 
research, the client or researcher initially presents a problem and both parties then 
undertake joint diagnosis and production of an action plan (Gill 1982). Mutual 
control is maintained throughout. This contrasts with `Pure' research, in which the 
researcher presents a problem, defines goals, carries out expert diagnosis and reports 
back to the client on what has been learned. 
Action research can also be described as a process of a cyclical and iterative nature, 
encapsulating a learning spiral. Diagnosis of a problematic situation comes as an 
initial stage of the learning spiral, followed by a development plan that precedes the 
actual intervention. This then leads to the evaluation of consequences of the action, 
which in turn triggers a period of reflection leading to a final process of internalised 
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or externalised learning. The process is repetitive and continues until a suitable exit 
point is attained. 
In the case of Pepsi, Action Research was deemed to be a good fit for this research, 
which is aimed at exploring and making public the reasons behind its initial project 
failure in China, thereby cultivating, as a result, a framework whereby successful ERP 
implementation can be secured. Evaluation of action is also crucial, as 
implementation would extend into other facility locations. This leads to reflection 
and learning from the failure of initial projects, as a result of which, similar problems 
in subsequent projects can be avoided or tackled in a more efficient manner. 
Based on the research findings, a thorough analysis and discussion is presented, 
focusing on methods for improving the implementation process through its various 
stages including managing customer expectation, improving the communication 
mechanisms, choosing the right partners, consideration and application of selective 
outsourcing, adoption of integrating technology and processes, cultivation of 
organisational change and assurance of overall implementation quality. 
To conclude this research, a framework embracing a business model was developed, 
in association with JBA Advantage, which aimed to reduce the risk of failure and 
hence secure the chance of achieving success when implementing ERP systems in 
China. 
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2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Amongst the various contending options available for answering the central research 
question, as defined above, Participative Action Research emerged as the favoured 
choice, through a process of elimination. Pure case studies were one of the options 
considered as these can prove useful for solving particular management problems. 
However, they do not necessarily involve joint effort and/or mutual agreement and 
control. Longitudinal or ethnographic research methods were also considered but 
these were also considered to be inapplicable to this particular situation as their 
objectives are rather more conceptual and predictive respectively, that was required 
here. Nor was the classical experiment, which enables the researcher to test theories 
and hypotheses systematically under laboratory conditions, deemed to be suitable. 
It was therefore concluded that since the evaluation of ERP implementation is rooted 
in real-life problems in a management context, the situation demanded joint diagnosis 
and a collaborative action plan. This is considered critical to solving such problems. 
However, this is exactly the domain that action research deals with. For this reason it 
was adopted as the overarching methodology for this research programme. 
2.1. Action Research Principles 
Rapoport (1970) defines the aims of action research as `contributing both to the 
practical concern of people in an immediate problematic situation and to the goals of 
social science by joint collaboration within a mutually acceptable, ethical framework'. 
Similar definitions are given by Lau (1997), Hult & Lennung (1978) and Susman and 
Evered (1978). Specific applications of action research have also been elaborated and 
documented by Lau, (1999), and by Baskerville and Wood-Harper, (1996). In action 
research, the client or researcher initially presents a problem and both parties then 
undertake joint diagnosis and production of an action plan (Gill 1982). Mutual 
control is maintained throughout. This contrasts with `Pure' research, in which the 
researcher presents a problem, defines goals, carries out expert diagnosis and reports 
back to the client on what has been learned. 
Page 6 of 239 
Research Methodology 
Action research can also be described as a process of a cyclical and iterative nature, 
encapsulating a learning spiral. Diagnosis of a problematic situation comes as an 
initial stage of the learning spiral, followed by a development plan that precedes the 
actual intervention. This then leads to the evaluation of consequences of the action, 
which in turn triggers a period of reflection leading to a final process of internalised 
or externalised learning. The process is repetitive and continues until a suitable exit 
point is attained. 
In the case of Pepsi, Action Research was deemed to be a good fit since it offers the 
opportunity to explore and make public the reasons behind its initial project failure in 
China. Another key output following the cultivation of observations in the research is 
the production of a validated framework whereby successful ERP implementation can 
be secured. Evaluation of action is also crucial, as implementation would extend into 
other facility locations. This leads to reflection and learning from the failure of initial 
projects, as a result of which, similar problems in subsequent projects can be avoided 
or tackled in a more effective manner. 
2.2. Action Research at Pepsi 
Obviously, classical experiments, where researchers are able to manipulate the 
incidence of one or more independent variables and observe any consequent changes 
in the dependent variables were impractical in this situation. Since the Pepsi Cola 
company was at the centre of the research and its senior business executives had 
decided to solve the implementation problems for themselves in collaboration with 
JBA International. For the reasons discussed above, Action Research was adopted as 
a valuable variant of the quasi-experiment. 
As Lau (1997) explains, in participatory action research participants solve problems 
for themselves by setting their own research agenda, collecting and analysing the data 
and controlling overuse of the findings. In the research, reported here, core members 
of the implementation project team and consultants from JBA International were 
heavily involved in conducting the research within a setting to which the research 
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findings are directly applicable. Observation was therefore important to understanding 
what went wrong with the operations and what should be improved. 
The research schedule, as depicted in Figure 2.1, comprised three main phases of 
action research. The first of these has been titled Problem Identification and Theory 
Exploration. Following some preliminary observations including the identification of 
problems outstanding and the fundamental research question as outlined above 
(broadly categorised as diagnosis) the research moves to an extensive review of the 
literature. This focuses on ERP development and its relevant subject areas, such as 
the critical success factors for ERP implementation, change management and business 
process (re)engineering. This phase also involved observations and meetings with 
consultants from other ERP suppliers who provided another major source of data. 
Following evaluation of the concepts revealed in phase 1 and reflection upon their 
consequences for this research, the second cycle of investigation was initiated. This 
took the form of a series of three linked case studies based on interviews with the BU 
project managers. The research examined the likely reasons underpinning the project 
failures that had been experienced at the pilot site of Pepsi Cola in China. 
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Figure 2.1 Action Research Cycle at Pepsi 
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Experiences from the first two cycles around the Action Research spiral were then 
used to formulate a questionnaire which was then deployed in a wider survey of 
potential stakeholders (Phase 3). This was then used for the purposes of validating 
the interview comments leading to the postulation of a revised framework for the 
implementation of System 21. The changes primarily dealt with managing customer 
expectation, incorporating the use of prototyping and simulation, and integrating BPR 
to facilitate organisational readiness for the ERP implementation. 
The overall schedule of the work for Pepsi is depicted in the form of a project 
management bar chart in Figure 2.2. 
Figure 2.2 Schedule of Action Research Programme 
To conclude the action research, the model or framework as proposed was 
implemented and validated against the expected effectiveness. This led to a final 
stage of overall reflection on the implications of the research for the companies 
involved and for the wider research community. 
Page 9 of 239 
Literature Review 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter gives a brief understanding of what ERP actually stands for, including a 
review of the history of ERP. The functionality of a typical ERP system is elaborated. 
The general benefits and pitfalls are explained. It also identifies who the market 
leaders are and where their respective markets reside. With reference to the IDC Asia 
Pacific and AMR Research, ERP's growth and development through to 2003 is 
explained. 
To recap, International Data Corporation (IDC) is among the global market 
intelligence and advisory firms competing in the information technology and 
telecommunications industry. AMR Research is an independent research analyst firm 
that is committed to providing unbiased, frank analysis of enterprise software 
applications and infrastructure including ERP, SCM and CRM. 
Most of the literature review focuses on the elaboration of critical success factors for 
the implementation of ERP systems. It starts with a review of a typical 
implementation cycle, drawing on a number of recent articles that account for 
acknowledged success factors. Finally, likely future trends in ERP systems are 
elaborated upon. 
3.1. Overview and Definition of ERP 
Evolving in the manufacturing industry, Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) was first 
introduced by the Gartner Group in the early 1990s, as an extended version of the 
well-established Manufacturing Resource Planning (MRPII) technologies. The 
original ERP systems ran on mainframes and IBM AS/400 systems, and included 
mainframe products such as SAP R/2 and MAPICS from SAP AG and Mapics Inc. 
respectively. Other AS/400 based packages included `Systems Software Associates' 
BPCS and `JD Edwards's One World'. Since then, enterprise applications have 
evolved dramatically, becoming survival tools for companies needing to improve 
operational efficiency. Increasing competitive pressures induced by globalisation, 
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technical advances in IT and communications, and internal pressures arising from 
business process reengineering have forced many organisations to invest heavily in 
ERP systems. 
The evolution of ERP is based upon pressure to introduce aggressive cost control 
initiatives, including a need to analyse costs and revenues on a product or customer 
basis, flexibility to respond to changing business requirements, more informed 
management decision making, and changes in ways of doing business. 
A typical ERP system is functionally rich, including a complete set of activity support 
such as accounts receivable and payable, sales order processing, sales analysis, 
transport planning, inventory control and warehousing, production planning and 
control, EDI, human resource management and customer relationship management. 
More recently, ERP systems have come to offer a wide variety of new capabilities 
such as supply chain management, workflow management, product data management 
and electronic commerce. However, no matter how hard ERP vendors work on 
improving their software, none of the ERP systems is perfect and there are always 
some limitations from a user perspective in regard to functionality and application. 
Also, from a business point of view, ERP systems only become really worthwhile 
when they prove capable of achieving the target benefits enumerated above. 
3.2. The Evolution of Enterprise Application Systems 
The history of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) can be traced back to the 1960s 
with its inception as an inventory control system basically combining information 
technology and business processes for maintaining the appropriate level of stock in 
the warehouse. Since then, it went through two more evolutionary stages (i. e., MRP 
and MRPII) before it was strategically expanded and finally positioned as an 
enterprise solution that is today, commonly called, ERP. 
Evolving directly from an inventory system in 1970s, MRP utilises software 
application for scheduling production processes. It generates schedules for raw 
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material purchases and the operations based upon the production requirements of 
finished goods, the bill of materials and the current inventories levels. Taking a 
simple functional view, it is defined as an application which calculates what materials 
were needed, when they were needed and in what optimal quantities (Ptak and 
Schragenheim, 2000). In a more specific view, MRP was originally designed for 
coordinating manufacturing processes from product planning, parts purchasing, 
inventory control to product distribution. With regard to business functions, MRP 
encompassed master scheduling, rough cut capacity planning, detailed capacity 
planning and shop floor control. 
Entering the 1980s, MRP continued to evolve and was further expanded to include a 
financial interface, sales and operations planning, and simulation as part of the system 
(Wallace and Kremzar, 2001). However, it was still a stand-alone application system. 
With a business need to further optimise the entire plant production process and 
improve the profitability and customer satisfaction, MRPII was extended to embrace 
new functions such as finance, forecasting, sales order processing, sales analysis and 
reporting and monitoring tools. In the 1990s, ERP appeared, as a result of integrating 
other business activities across functional departments, from product planning, parts 
purchasing, inventory, product distribution, and fulfilment to order tracking. A 
typical ERP system now includes accounting and controlling functions (with report 
generator), sales and distribution, materials and production management, quality 
management, plant maintenance, human resources and project management. Recently, 
many ERP systems also integrate with SCM and CRM functions. 
3.2.1. A different Evolution Path for ERP Implementation in China 
While the ERP evolution in western countries is generally considered as a natural 
development, ERP development in China took another path. Research and 
development of ERP started in 1988 and went through three stages: accounting 
software, financial software and ERP ("ERP Application Guide", 2002). The 
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accounting software included accounting management reporting payment calculation, 
asset calculation, material calculation and sales calculation. 
Notably, in China, the enactment of the China Financial Software Data Interface 
Standard by the China Financial Software Association enhanced and encouraged the 
development of Chinese financial software (Xue et al., 2004). In other words, the 
Chinese government fostered the first two stages of the development as many 
companies implemented accounting software or financial software in response to the 
government's advocacy. Hence starting in the mid 1990s, accounting software 
development shifted its strategic focus to financial software development which could 
better support business decision making. New functions included financial analysis, 
financial prediction, financial control and planning were included, in addition to 
inventory management. 
Toward the millennium, the China software industry started to reposition its financial 
software development which expanded to cover production, supply chain, human 
resources and customer service functions. This gave birth to ERP which again 
covered the cross-functional coordination and integration in support of the production 
process. 
3.3. Recent Developments in The Evolution of ERP Systems 
The ERP market, including services, has grown rapidly in recent years and is 
predicted to increase from $20 million in 2001 to $31 million in 2006, according to 
AMR Research Inc. -a Boston-based consulting firm (Konicki, 2002). Earlier AMR 
Research predicted, as shown in Figure 3- 1, that ERP growth in the Asia Pacific 
market, including professional services, would reach $20.2 billion and $66.6 billion in 
1999 and 2003 respectively. At that time the compound growth rate was believed to 
be 32%. 
Strategic use of enterprise systems for automating back-office operations was 
generally the priority in 1999. An estimated 70% of Fortune 1000 companies have 
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either begun implementing ERP systems or plan to do so in the coming years. 
According to AMR Research, the spending for 1999 on enterprise application 
accounted for some 40% of the total corporate budget in both large and medium-sized 
companies, whereas only 10% to 20% was spent on supply chain management and 
about 18% on manufacturing software. 
Figure 3.1 ERP Growth in Asia Pacific 
Source: AMR Research (1998) 
However, due to the influx of other forms of enterprise software such as CRM, SCM 
and ERM, and the prevailing world-wide economic turmoil, ERP market growth 
proved to be difficult and slower than expected. While ERP spending made up 47% of 
the entire enterprise software market in 2001, it was expected to shrink to 27% by 
2006. However, a steady growth can still be seen (Konicki, 2002). 
Within the overall market for ERP, considerable segmentation is also apparent. With 
32% of the market share, SAP AG, in reporting annual revenue of $5,01 I million, 
ranked as the top market leader in ERP systems in 1999. Other market leaders 
included Oracle Corp., PeopleSoft Inc., JD Edwards & Co. and Baan Co. N. V. 
Together with JBA International, these constituted another 33.6% of the total market 
share. 
In 2002, SAP AG accounted for 25.1 % of software license revenue, while Oracle 
Corp. and PeopleSoft Inc. made up 7.0% and 6.5% respectively (Pettey, 2003). In 
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May 2001, AMR Research predicted that total ERP company revenues would grow at 
14 percent compound annual growth rate, improving to $36 billion in 2005 (Romeo, 
2001). IDC Asia-Pacific also reported that the Asia Pacific ERP market grew by 
about 27% in value and was worth $685 million in 1999 and a forecasted $860 
million in 2000, with China being one of the three hottest countries with around 22% 
growth rate each year. 
In recent years, ERP vendors such as SAP and Oracle have been keen on integrating 
new capabilities that include one or more of the following: 
" Supply Chain Management (SCM) 
" Customer Relationship Management (CRM) 
" Enterprise Performance Management (EPM) 
" Human Capital Management (HCM) 
" Sales Force Automation (SFA) 
" Electronic Commerce (EC) 
" Business Information Warehousing (BW) 
As well as integrating the enterprise functions above, ERP systems have also 
extended further into third party software integration to help process information 
more efficiently using especially advanced graphical interfaces. Investment in Web- 
enabled ERP systems is therefore another, and probably the most recent development 
program of the major ERP vendors. For example, PeopleSoft has entirely rewritten 
its applications for the Internet and SAP has developed its XML technology to 
facilitate cross-application integration and Web-based data exchange. Most recently, 
SAP has also announced plans to release an updated version of its e-commerce 
applications (Gilbert, 2003). 
3.4. Major ERP Vendors and Their Challenges 
In addition to the major suppliers identified earlier, there are also several smaller ERP 
vendors who compete with one another in certain specific market segments. Hence, 
Page 15 of 239 
11 
Literature Review 
due to strong competition, no two ERP vendors are evolving in exactly the same way. 
Consequently they continuously attempt to differentiate their products by, for 
example, introducing more generic functions and features or focusing on selected 
vertical markets. 
It is well known that all ERP systems offer a wide variety of capabilities that are 
highly integrated to provide closed loop solutions to business support. However, each 
major supplier of ERP has entered the industry with its own particular strategy. For 
example, Oracle specialised in relational database management systems before 
moving into ERP, while SAP originally appeared with a sophisticated product in 
manufacturing automation, prior to developing into full ERP. PeopleSoft has been 
consistently seen as a market leader in providing human resources applications as a 
major part of its ERP system. This implies that no single ERP system can optimally 
fit all requirements. For example, GM selected SAP as its world-wide supplier of 
accounting functionality and PeopleSoft for its human resources functions. However, 
this presents another substantial challenge for most ERP vendors if and when they are 
called on to integrate their products with other vendors' ERP systems (a point that is 
followed up later). 
In addition to pursuing distinctive competency, ERP vendors are also differentiated in 
terms of flexibility. Krasner (1999) contends that the Oracle ERP product is among 
the most flexible while SAP is among the least flexible. Hence differentiation of 
products has again emerged as a strategic imperative. For example, JBA International 
focuses on developing new functionality and marketing programmes for the apparel 
industry. Its `Style' product has been ranked top amongst others in the mid-market 
segment, according to AMR Research in 1997. 
Following continual decline in ERP sales in the late 1990s, SAP, Oracle Corp, 
PeopleSoft, JBA International and other major ERP vendors have all moved into front 
office operation, by targeting newer applications such as customer relationship 
management and e-commerce. In particular, e-commerce is among the hottest 
development projects for larger ERP vendors. 
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Time based competition is also an important potential strategy in today's business 
world, as there is always an urgent need for faster implementation of ERP systems. 
Under virtually no circumstance can companies afford the luxury of taking a few 
years to implement technology solutions. Fastart implementations, considered by 
many to be an essential component of competitive advantage (Gibson et al., 1999), 
are required for companies of any size and nature. From a vendor's standpoint, 
lengthy implementation leaves a `window of opportunity' for other competitors to 
take over valuable market share. 
From a customer's perspective, risk is a further potential strategic parameter 
associated with purchased software. Many of the risks relate to the vendor's stability, 
and the impact of mergers, acquisitions and poor performance. Organisational issues 
such as software modifications, training requirements, budgeting considerations and 
conformance with installation standards can also raise significant risk factors. 
Other challenges associated with implementing ERP systems are diverse and complex, 
depending upon the particular situation but generally reflecting issues such as the size 
of the user population and the functions, features, and degree of customisation 
required. More specifically, these include the following: 
" Functional complexity, which comes from deployment of a huge number 
of modules and the inclusion of front-office applications in a `big bang' 
approach. In general, front-office applications such as `Cognos 
PowerPlay' and mobile data capture tools are third party software that 
require some sort of interfacing and exhaustive levels of testing before 
they can be secured in place with confidence. 
Managing people: this is particularly difficult when individuals with 
different expectations are involved in the implementation. 
Multiple sites across multiple countries: this is fairly common in ERP 
implementations. More people are involved and more technical and 
cultural problems are likely to arise. Hence, appropriate infrastructure 
often needs to be put in place to help drive the project forward to success. 
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" Over-customisation: many companies underestimate the downstream 
impacts of this. If there is a lot of customisation work, upgrading the 
software becomes costly and even risky. For example, synchronisation of 
standard and custom programs presents one such risk. 
3.5. Particular Issues with implementing ERP systems in China 
With a particular reference to implementing ERP systems for joint ventures in China, 
there are many challenges facing any ERP vendor. These arise from differences in 
basic infrastructure conditions, labour availability and quality of life considerations, 
government policy flexibility, economic law and the associated legal system, market 
potential and supportive service facilities. All of these have significant impacts on 
joint venture development in China (Yang & Lee, 2002). 
Chinese and Western behavioural differences in the areas of communication practices, 
initiative taking, respect for authority and treatment of information also represent 
major hurdles to the ERP implementation (O'Keefe and O'Keefe, 1997). These 
factors are elaborated on, in sequence as follows. 
With regard to communication practices, the Chinese tend to be passive and polite. 
However, the communication process can then become very one-way and 
occasionally, Westerners may become upset when they realise that they have been 
misled by a false sense of progress. Conversely, in many cases, Westerners, although 
seeing themselves as effective communicators, `straight dealers' and quick to the 
point, may appear to the Chinese, in the context of work and performance issues, as 
offensive and abrasive in their directness. 
On initiative taking, Chinese tend to be negative. They believe that it is better to live 
with the known status quo, rather than initiate a new and possibly disconcerting 
situation. While they view themselves as actively maintaining harmony and peace, 
Westerners may see them as being inattentive and disposed towards the avoidance of 
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responsibility. Furthermore, they often view the Chinese as behaving in a reactive 
manner: failing to think ahead in order to anticipate, and thereby avoid, problems. 
When dealing with authority figures, the Chinese generally fulfil their obligations to 
authority by being obedient. They see themselves as following the correct protocol 
and demonstrating the correct behaviour in ways that have been clearly proscribed by 
Confucian principles. Westerners, on the other hand, see their Chinese co-workers as 
being over-dependent on authority figures and unable to function as individuals. 
Moreover, they can sometimes become frustrated when they realise that they 
themselves are seen as the ultimate authority on a particular issue. 
With respect to the treatment of information, Westerners typically accept information 
as input to the decision-making process and seek to verify its validity independently 
before applying it. Conversely, the Chinese tend to accept information uncritically, 
even if it is invalid. As a result, the Chinese are sometimes viewed as making poor 
decisions, especially in `soft' areas such as marketing. 
Motivating employees also presents some particular challenges in China, since the 
cultural values are different from those of Western countries (Jackson & Bak, 1998). 
Child (1994) believes that the way Chinese enterprises motivate employees can be 
understood within Katz and Kahn's (1978) model comprising `rule enforcement', 
`external rewards' and `internalised motivation'. 
The cultural dimension is therefore deemed to be critical and has a significant impact 
to the ERP implementation given China and the western countries are in much 
difference regarding the ways they do things. This critical issue will be further 
discussed in the Case Study chapter. 
Rule enforcement includes responsibility, goal setting and appraisal, pressure, 
punishment and praise. External rewards refer to money, bonuses and welfare 
packages. Internalised motivation consists of identification with the company, 
training, setting a good example and participation in staff outings. Hence, Jackson 
and Bak (1998) argue that organisational rules and procedures should be well 
documented and communicated in order to reduce risk and ambiguity. Informing 
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employees of expected rules of conduct and structural reward systems should also be 
deployed in a way that promotes loyalty and inculcates belongingness whilst 
simultaneously reflecting the role of seniority. 
Furthermore, a strong corporate identify should be fostered by the development of 
effective induction programmes which draw the new employee closer to the company. 
Subsequent training programmes should also reflect the way things are done in the 
organisation. Finally, it is particularly important to provide employees in China with 
personal development programmes that help them to develop specific attributes such 
as soft skills and a sense of integrity. 
Implementing ERP systems always requires a good level of communication among 
groups of participants and a high degree of proactiveness, while most of the native 
Chinese labour market in the mid-level working class still do not have these kinds of 
skills. 
3.6. Benefits and Pitfalls of ERP Systems 
It is often claimed that ERP is a `must-have' solution within organisations, especially 
where there is a dominant trend towards adopting a `buy, not build' philosophy. 
Among the greatest value that vendors proclaim is the integration of individual 
applications across the enterprise. Obviously, implementing ERP was considered 
particularly promising for addressing the year 2000 issue in the late 1990s, and this 
transpired to be a very lucrative market at that time for ERP vendors. ERP promised 
reduced maintenance costs underpinning radical change to business models, but many 
have subsequently been less favourably impressed with their new systems than they 
might have hoped (Appleton, 1997). 
As ERP systems have continued to evolve and expand, mirroring intensified business 
demands, it has become evident that there are many more areas in which ERP can 
positively contribute, due to its capability to: 
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" Facilitate company-wide, integrated information systems covering all 
functional areas, 
" Perform core corporate activities and increase customer service, thereby 
augmenting the corporate image, 
" Help close the information gap across the organisation, 
" Provide solutions for better project management, 
" Enable automatic introduction of the latest technologies, 
" Eliminate many business problems such as poor stock control (inaccurate 
stock levels) and duplication of customer records, 
" Address current business requirements whilst simultaneously providing an 
opportunity to continually improve and refine business processes, 
" Provide business intelligence tools such as decision support systems, 
executive information system, and data mining to enable better decision- 
making. 
Although ERP's emphasis has traditionally been on transaction handling, it has also 
been suggested that a major potential strength of enterprise systems is their ability to 
support individual and multi-participant decision-making (Holsapple and Sena, 1999). 
For example, Holsapple and Whinston (1996) identify some potential decision 
support benefits, as outlined below: 
" Extending the decision maker's ability to process information and 
knowledge; 
" Extending the decision maker's ability to tackle large scale, time 
consuming and complex problems; 
" Shortening the time associated with making a decision; 
" Improving the reliability of a decision process or outcome; 
" Encouraging exploration or discovery on the part of the decision maker; 
" Revealing or stimulating new approaches to thinking about a problem 
space or decision context; 
" Generating new evidence in support of a decision or confirmation of 
existing assumptions; 
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" Creating a strategic or competitive advantage over competing 
organisations. 
In addition, other major benefits include enhancing communication among 
participants involved in joint decision-making (Udo and Guimares, 1994), improving 
co-ordination of tasks performed by participants in jointly making a decision 
(DeSanctis and Gallupe, 1987) and improving satisfaction with decision processes 
and outcomes (Udo and Guimares, 1994). 
While the claimed benefits of ERP include improvement of competitiveness, 
reduction of decision costs and the ability to make decisions more quickly, Holsapple 
and Sena (2001) suggest that managers perceive ERP systems as having a particularly 
positive impact on competitiveness. They also list the top three decision-support 
benefits as improving the processing of knowledge, improving the reliability of 
decision making and facilitating the gathering of evidence in support of their 
decisions. 
The aforementioned benefits can potentially be achieved by all types of decision 
support systems, regardless of whether the decision-maker is an individual or a group 
of persons. Indeed, there are limitations to using ERP systems for decision support. 
Major concerns that have been identified include the inability to align with system 
objectives, insufficient capabilities or performance of software or hardware, resistance 
to change, unwillingness to share knowledge or collaborate, and incompatibility with 
rules, regulations, policies or organisational procedures. Clearly, most of the critical 
concerns are human-related, while the remaining problems can easily be resolved with 
additional hardware and procedural changes. Hence, Holsapple and Sena (2001) 
conclude that human issues are viewed as a significant potential obstacle to ERP 
implementation. 
For example, in 1999, Deloitte & Touche published the results of in-depth interviews 
with 164 individuals at 62 Fortune 500 companies (Chen, 2001), reporting that human 
obstacles constituted 62% of the failures identified. Conversely, information 
technology issues contributed only 12% of problems, of which only about 5% were 
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associated with software functionality (these obstacles appearing both before and after 
going live). 
In parallel with the benefits appearing under the decision support category, ERP 
systems have delivered a number of other benefits, according to companies like Nike, 
DHL, Tektronix, Fujitsu and Sun Microsystems (Falkowski, Pedigo, Smith and 
Swanson, 1998), some of which include: 
" Facilitating accounts payable personnel with increased control of invoicing 
and payment processing, resulting in a productivity boost and the elimination 
of excessive reliance on the human factor in these operations. 
" Reduced paper documentation due to the provision of on-line formats on 
screen, 
" Improved timeliness of information by permitting real-time posting of 
transactions, 
" Improved cost control, 
" Faster response and better follow up on customers, 
" More efficient cash collection, 
" Better monitoring and quicker resolution of queries, 
" Quicker response to change in business operations and market conditions, 
" Delivery of competitive advantage by improving business processes, 
" Improved supply-demand linkage with remote locations and branches in 
different countries, 
" Provision of a unified customer database usable by all applications, 
" Improved international operations due to provision of support in a variety of 
tax structures, multiple currencies, multiple period accounting and languages, 
" Improved information access and management throughout the enterprise, 
" Provision of solutions for one-off problems such as Y2K and the introduction 
of Euro currency. 
In contrast to these claims, it has also been observed, with respect to software 
selections, that when purchasing an integrated package, companies should be aware 
that many products are functionally `a mile wide, but an inch deep', (Hecht, 1997). 
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This implies that not many ERP packages can be easily interfaced with other legacy 
or third party systems, even though they claim to be rich in functionality. In addition, 
Dobrin (1999) spells out that choosing the right package is not easy, while choosing 
the wrong one can prove to be a costly disaster. In particular, he warns `Don't buy a 
make-to-stock [ERP package] if you're in the build-to-order business'. 
In conclusion, ERP systems positively contribute to solving business problems as long 
as they are properly selected and implemented. However, the reality is that not 
everyone using ERP systems really understands what they are doing. Implementing 
an integrated solution requires an unprecedented degree of teamwork, process 
expertise and business knowledge, as all of these may, to some degree, be missing or 
inadequate in many enterprises. 
3.7. Critical Success Factors When Implementing ERP Systems 
Given the perceived benefits of ERP systems, in the early 1990s, thousands of 
companies jumped into implementation with the common goal of improving business 
processes and addressing Y2K compliance issues. Since then, many negative stories 
have followed, with ERP vendors being the most frequent targets for blame. Although 
there have been some success stories, (for example, Cisco Systems managed to 
implement its ERP system for about USD$30 million in a timeframe of 9 months), 
specialist magazines such as Datamation and Information Week have consistently 
documented several other project failures (Cotteller et al., 1998). 
According to Trunick (1999) 40 percent of all ERP installations only achieve partial 
implementation and another 20 percent of attempted ERP adoptions are scrapped as 
total failures. Other studies have also suggested that the ERP failure rate may even be 
greater than 50 percent (Escalle et al., 1999). Furthermore, according to a 2001 
Gartner report, 40 percent of enterprises deploying ERP systems through 2004 will 
exceed their original time and cost estimates by at least 50 percent (Axam and Jerome, 
2003). Hence it is clear that many enterprises have suffered disappointment and even 
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spectacular project failures due to unplanned or under-planned implementation 
projects. 
From this literature review, it appears that from a technical point of view, many ERP 
projects have problems that fall into general categories as typified below: 
" Non-robust and incomplete ERP packages, 
" Complex and undefined ERP to legacy system interfaces, 
" Middleware technology bugs, 
" Poor customisation, 
" Poor system performance, 
However, perhaps surprisingly, technical challenges appear relatively insignificant. 
The biggest problems with implementing ERP systems appear to be business-related. 
In many cases, companies fail to align the use of ERP systems with business 
strategies. The failed implementations are thereby directly related back to 
management failures in planning and adapting to the running of complex ERP 
projects 
3.7.1. ERP Project Management Issues 
Since ERP systems are massive, complex and very expensive, ranging from USD$2 
million to USD$130 million, implementing an ERP package may take months to 
years to complete. Implementation is therefore most sensibly approached through a 
number of stages, as depicted in Figure 3.2. This shows that during a typical project 
cycle, up to 30% of the duration is dedicated to the Preparation stage, with 20% 
devoted to Design, 20% to Implementation and 30% to Sustainment. Preparation 
includes observation and examination of the problem area and is vital before moving 
forward to the Design of Solution stage. Implementation is concerned with putting 
the agreed solution in place, while Sustainment represents the maintenance of the 
system following implementation. 
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Breaking the implementation into phases also appears less risky and more realistic. 
This guarantees deliverables and milestones. Ensuring that each deliverable has a 
clear financial impact is a clear prerequisite to success. For example, General Motors 
successfully implemented SAP R/3 for USD$80 million over a period of three years 
by breaking the implementation down into smaller phases (Gibson, Holland and Light, 
1999). 
It is also important to note that many ERP systems are expensive to implement. 
According to AMR Research, ERP implementation usually takes nine to 12 months 
for small companies, 12-24 months for mid sized businesses, and three years or more 
for large, multidivisional organisations (Romeo, 2001). Additionally, achieving full 
integration with legacy systems and third party software is usually amongst the most 
costly aspects during the ERP implementation cycle. 
Figure 3.2 Typical Project Cycle 
13 Preparation 
  Design 
Q Implementation 
Q Sustainment 
Source: ComputerWorld (1999) 
Hence, the importance of sound project management techniques is readily apparent. 
The steps involved in a typical implementation cycle following the project `kick-off' 
meeting include: 
Project planning, 
Page 26 of 239 
Literature Review 
" Business and operational analysis, 
" Business process reengineering, 
" Installation and configuration, 
" Project team training, 
" Business requirement mapping, 
" Module configuration, 
" Design of system interfaces, 
" Data conversion, 
" Customisation, 
" Acceptance testing, 
" End user training, 
" Post implementation audit and support. 
In general, `go live' is taken to represent the completion of the project. However, this 
is not necessarily apparent when looked at from other angles. In fact, it is all too 
common to find that following the ERP system's `go-live', it will simply pass into yet 
another phase of difficulty, that of `post-implementation improvements'. 
3.7.2. Change Management Issues 
ERP implementation is closely associated with BPR and BPR itself is, according to 
many researchers, very closely related to change management. Hence, in recent years, 
an increasing number of researchers have attempted to explore the impacts of change 
management techniques on ERP implementation. From this, it has emerged that there 
is no doubt that implementing ERP systems calls for subtle human touches. Software 
itself does not determine the success of software implementation; people do. Without 
a structured change management program in place, the chance of achieving success 
from an ERP implementation is significantly reduced (Hooks, 2002). 
According to Koch's (2001) studies in Denmark, the central element of a BPR change 
program is the focus on realising crosscutting business processes. He attempts to 
relate BPR and ERP by defining BPR as a contextualised change program and claims 
that ERP can support BPR in three areas: scope, configurability and integrativeness. 
Drawing on a large sample, Koch shows that BPR is often followed by ERP, meaning 
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that this is the particular form of information technology that is deployed as the 
enabler for a process vision. Finally he concludes that BPR and ERP, although not 
necessarily complementary, can be designed to support each other. 
It is certainly not uncommon for mid level Management to sometimes resist the 
process changes that an ERP system requires or introduces. Process standardisation is 
a key design decision and business reengineering is considered a must for improving 
efficiency. However, midlevel employees, in particular, are often reluctant to make or 
accept changes in their jobs, since decentralisation of information poses a threat to the 
midlevel decision makers. Managing resistance as well as change is therefore crucial 
to successful ERP implementation. 
Change Management Defined 
Generally speaking, change management is defined as a structured process that will 
enable proposed changes to be implemented, thereby ensuring technical and business 
readiness for required developments. This should be conducted in a consistent 
manner that can be either relaxed or tightened to adjust to business needs and 
experiences. 
Dunleavy et al. (1998) define change management as a programme of effort taken to 
manage people through the emotional ups and downs that inevitably occur when an 
organisation is undergoing massive change. Alternatively, change may be understood 
as a process of negotiation coupled to a combination of a change programme and a 
coalition building process (Dunleavy et at, 1998). 
Change usually involves the introduction of new procedures, people or ways of 
working which have a direct impact on various stakeholders within an organisation. 
Nah et al. (2001) concur with Falkowski et al. (1998) that enterprise-wide cultural 
and structural change should be actively managed. A culture that supports shared 
values and common aims is conducive to success. Cultural change is therefore 
important to those organisations aimed at successful implementation of ERP systems. 
They need to be open to change. 
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Kotter (1996) further proposes that changing an organisation's culture can be viewed 
as an eight-step process: 
" Creating a sense of urgency, 
" Establishing the guiding coalition, 
" Developing a vision and strategy, 
" Communicating with employees to build broad-based action, 
" Generating short-term wins, 
" Consolidating gains and producing more change, and 
" Anchoring new approaches in the prevailing culture. 
Change Management in Action 
In addition to changing the organisation's culture, resistance can be dealt with through 
good planning and education, which has also been considered as a priority in the 
context of project management. Implementing ERP systems requires extremely 
careful planning. For example, Donovan (1999) identifies five reasons accounting for 
poor results, all linked to the planning issue: 
" The operating strategy did not drive business process design and deployment, 
" The implementation took much longer than expected, 
" Pre-implementation preparation activities were done poorly, if at all, 
" People were not well prepared to accept and operate the new system, 
" The cost to implement was much greater than anticipated. 
Suresh (2001) also suggested ways of dealing with changes or resistance by first 
breaking down the business into several categories, followed by applying specific 
questions to each of these categorised areas. He also refers to Gary Hamel's (1996) 
eight steps for a bottom-up revolution to deal with the resistance issue. Some of the 
steps thereby identified include writing a manifesto, creating a coalition, finding a 
translator and winning small and early successes. 
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Moreover, Stratman and Roth (1999) reveal that many implementation projects fail 
because of workers' resistance. Especially when implementing an ERP system, 
people are forced to change the way they do things. 
Aladwani (2001) therefore suggests that appropriate change management strategies 
play an important role in supporting the effective implementation of ERP system. 
These strategies are broken down into phases that include knowledge formulation, 
strategy implementation and project status evaluation, each of which is considered in 
further detail as follows. 
Knowledge formulation is concerned with identifying who the resisting individuals 
are, what their needs are, what benefits and values they have, and what their interests 
are. Strategy implementation involves overcoming resistance by setting up a 
communication strategy that gives a general description of how the implemented ERP 
system will work. This communication strategy also needs to be supported by the top 
management, who can then create more effective awareness of the ERP system by 
communicating its benefits to the workers. 
It was also suggested that teaching each of the various user groups how the ERP 
system works is important in creating awareness (Stratman and Roth, 1999). 
Therefore, training, that offers a good opportunity to help users adjust to the change 
that has been introduced by the ERP system, becomes a key part of the 
implementation strategy. 
Hence, it is seen that project failure is partly due to a lack of sound preparation of 
process and people. ERP systems are nothing magical, and prior to rolling out an 
implementation, everyone in the organisation should be informed of the reasons 
behind the implementation of the new system. Proper and appropriate training is 
therefore crucial to encouraging project success. For example, Intel's training 
program is massive and its budget exceeds $15 million. Similarly, experts at the 
Gartner Group of Stamford and the International Data Corporation of Framingham 
agree that at least 15% of an ERP implementation budget should be allocated to 
training people (Jacobi, 1996). The literature suggests that allocation of around 20% 
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of the budget to training is likely to guarantee success, while companies that spend 
15% of their budgets are only slightly more likely to avoid failure. 
Bingi et al. (1999) and Holland et al. (1999) also contend that users should be 
involved in the design and implementation of business processes and the ERP system. 
They insist that formal education and training should be provided throughout the ERP 
implementation as part of the change management program. Employees need 
adequate training to understand how the system will change the business process and 
affect the organisation. Failure to ensure that people understand what they should be 
doing almost certainly leads to ineffective implementation. In addition to training, 
Wee (2000) suggests that the provision of an effective support organisation is also 
critical to meeting user needs after installation. 
Since almost every ERP project is associated with changing the business processes, 
Clarke (1999) carried out a survey to identify key success factors in the project 
management of change. She identified four critical success factors, which are: 
" Communication throughout the project: 
Pardu (1996) cites lack of communication as having been the biggest reason 
for the failure of many change projects relative to their expectations. Lanfer 
et al. (1997) suggest that successful communication needs to be emphasised 
in order to manage uncertainty. 
" Clear objectives and scope: 
Randolph and Pesner (1994) suggest that scope and objectives are the 
guiding principles that direct the efforts of the project team. This is strongly 
supported by Ward (1995), who agrees that they would ultimately determine 
a project's success or failure. 
" Breaking the project into bite sized chunks: 
Breaking large projects into sub-projects or work packages is regarded as one 
of most important tasks in any IT project. It facilitates delegation of 
responsibilities and monitoring against objectives, communication of project 
progress, identification of problems up-front and the making of necessary 
modifications to the project. 
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0 Using project plans as working documents: 
Project requirements may change throughout the project life cycle, and this is 
particularly true for change projects. To ensure that a project is completed 
on budget and on time, project plans need to be updated regularly. Updating 
project plans is always time-consuming, and therefore Clarke (1999) 
suggests that keeping the plan simple, with the right level of detail, 
encourages the easy and regularly review of projects. 
In Clarke's research, she also attempted to illustrate, with examples, how the key 
success factors can be applied to solving the following problems in the context of 
project management: 
" Striving for unrealistic standardisation, 
" Perceived return from project management is poor, 
" Project management is regarded as a corporate reporting tool, 
" Inadequate formal completion of change projects, 
" Project overload syndrome, 
" Cultural and individual issues, 
" Motivation. 
From Clarke's point of view, clear objectives and scope conform to the importance of 
defining the project scope. This argument is well supported by many other claims; for 
example, Allen (1999) suggests that a well-structured implementation methodology 
should give enough priority to the definition of project scope. 
Clearly, successful ERP implementation requires a structured methodology that is 
strategy, people and process focused. Donovan, for example, provides a methodology 
that appears to cover all the basics. Notably, he strongly recommends that an 
evaluation of the company's business strategy and ERP plan should take place before 
committing to the software ordering and installation. 
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Ensuring a Business Perspective 
Equally as important as being perceived as strategy, people and process focused, ERP 
implementation should also be viewed as a business initiative rather than as a purely 
technical project. The engagement of senior executives within the process of 
education represents an effective way to ensure their commitment. Articulating 
expectation before implementation is equally important in convincing the 
stakeholders. A change document that includes a communication strategy and core 
business principles of the company gives managers an understanding of the reasons 
behind making changes. Encouraging users to change their job roles can be achieved 
through developing incentive programs and linking them into performance reviews. 
However, wherever possible, changes should be introduced incrementally and not too 
much at once. 
This process must start at the top. As long as ERP systems remain similar in terms of 
functions provided, Typanski (1999) suggests that certain priorities may be identified 
for senior executives. First, they must understand their information environments, not 
in detail, not at a technological level, and certainly not from a vendor perspective, but 
in a strategic sense. Hence, they must have a level of understanding that emphasises 
information resource management in the context of the fundamental objectives and 
responsibilities for their information environments. 
It must also be remembered that people are the organisation's most important resource. 
For an information environment to be truly effective, its resources must be managed 
so that they are in synchronisation with the overall organisational goals and strategies. 
Careful decisions must be pursued concerning adoption and use of new information 
technology and applications. Establishing the right information environment 
increases the likelihood of success and profitability. However, in many large 
corporations, there are separate and fragmented information services that introduce 
inefficiencies, especially at the functional boundaries. The goals and objectives of all 
information services within a company should therefore be in agreement with each 
other, especially where corporate information flow is concerned. 
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Again, proper planning regarding ERP's mission within the company, identification 
of the major resources of the information environment and determination of which 
ones are truly important to the company, all need to be integral parts of the change 
management process. 
In summary, with the creation of a responsive, effective company information 
environment, certain critical success factors must be addressed: 
" Know your company's business environment, 
" Determine what kinds of information service are needed, 
" Identify required information resources such as business activities and 
computing facilities, 
" Make it easy for information personnel to be successful by developing an 
appropriate planning and working environment, 
" Make available the data modelling frameworks and data directories in relation 
to the company business processes and functions, 
" Determine whether to build or buy information systems, 
" Determine appropriate use of technologies, 
" Create a highly intelligent information environment where companies have to 
strive to support the higher intelligence levels of deduction and judgement. 
Again, change can never be accomplished without commitment and involvement from 
the company leaders. However, it is more important to recognise that resistance, as 
previously elaborated upon, is the most complex entity that directly affects the 
outcomes of change. People fear change, but change, and to an extent the resistance 
that is often associated with it, can present an opportunity to improve and do more 
business. Hence ironically resistance may actually help implement appropriate 
change if it is well managed. For instance, if people can be encouraged to speak up 
and participate in developing new ways of doing things then human creativity may be 
released and resistance is half-way to being eliminated. This is particularly obvious in 
China, where resistance to change and lack of active participation are among the 
major risk factors. 
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3.7.3. Other Critical Success Factors to Observe 
In addition to the above academic reviews, Benesh, (cited in Martin and Sara, 2001), a 
principal consultant with Omega Point Consulting, summarised, from her own 
observations, five critical failure conditions associated with ERP implementation: 
" Lack of understanding of what integration means, 
" Inability to effectively manage communication, 
" Ineffective managers failing to understand the decision making process, 
" Lack of capability to test and manage the infrastructure, 
" Inappropriate ways of `living with' the ERP system. 
Similarly, Shupe Consulting (2000) produced a list of critical success factors for ERP 
implementation summarised as: 
" Plan, prepare and plan some more, 
" Add time to the implementation cycle when major business process change is 
part of the project, 
" Create a project war room containing work stations, web access, documentation, 
training material, white boards etc., where all project work is done, 
" Assess the corporate culture and review the previous projects, implementing 
project management procedures, as necessary, to deal with any negative cultural 
elements, 
" Put the right people, who have leadership abilities, learn quickly, and are willing 
to work hard, on the project team, 
" Ensure that the project has upper management support. 
3.7.4. Adopting an Holistic Approach 
Conversely, according to King (1996), none of the key success factors described 
above is uniquely responsible for ensuring a project's success; in fact, they are all 
inter-dependent and a holistic approach is required. Similarly, Clarke (1999) 
concludes that the success factors should not be considered independently of one 
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another. For example, failing to communicate is often cited as a reason for failure, 
but good communication systems depend on whether adequate and proper training is 
given and whether people are willing to take on further responsibility and roles. 
Clearly holism also implies that there is a chain of impacts if one key success factor is 
not properly managed. 
3.7.5. Risk Management Considerations 
While most critical success factors are related to the emergence and management of 
change, as illustrated above, risk management is usually associated with change 
management. Hence, all functional managers should own the project and speculate on 
any possible risks as well as their impacts to the project's success. It is also important 
that they should be credited for the project's success or blamed for its failure. A 
number of general points may be enumerated as follows, in order to avoid potential 
risks on a project: 
" Identify the benefits that will result from the project; then make sure that all 
project-related activities are directed towards achieving those benefits, 
" Set realistic dates and do not change them, 
" Keep the project under control in regard to schedule, 
" Designate a single project leader, 
" Seek long-term support from the software provider, 
" Keep functional managers accountable, 
" Make business objectives the primary drivers of the project, 
" Make sure that system users totally understand what is being explained, 
" Avoid over-modifications. 
Addressing the Inflexibility Issue: Customisation 
Another major risk associated with the ERP implementation is software customisation. 
Following on from the introduction of MRPII in 1979, which in turn had evolved 
from the emergence of MRP in 1965 (Chen, 2001), ERP is now extremely rich in 
terms of capabilities. However, we have still not arrived at a situation where ERP 
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systems are flexible enough to cover everything that may be required. Although 
tremendous effort has been directed towards this problem, customisation is still not 
generally recommended. However, a certain level of customisation is still necessary 
to allow ERP systems to deliver better value, given that business processes cannot 
always be changed to align with `industry best practice' as envisioned by ERP 
vendors, and subsequently embedded in their software. 
A `One size fits all' ERP system is the `drum that has been banged' for some time by 
the big Tier 1 ERP providers. The theory behind this is based on the Tier 1 vendor 
concept of a top-down system build - `We have all of these modules and together we 
will choose the ones that your business needs' (Frame, 2004). However, there are 
actually several on-going debates and arguments against this top down approach to 
implementation. The `one size fits all' approach is rather unfavourable for today's 
business models and requires some degree of adaptation, due to cultural, structural 
and strategy difference (Shenhar, 2004). Unless the ERP software itself is therefore 
highly configurable or customisable, adoption of a `one size fits all' approach may 
result in failure. 
It therefore appears that while the evolution of an industry best practice does not 
intend to resolve all the problems, it serves as a starter kit for the implementation of 
ERP systems on the condition that either there is no such practice in place within the 
organisation and nothing else similar is available, or a tremendous change of 
operation is being sought (Otey, 2001). 
Although the ability to readily configure systems in order to be able to make changes 
on an `as-needed and when needed basis' is likely to be the future direction in which 
ERP systems will evolve, software should, nevertheless, still only be modified when 
such modification is considered inevitable. Rosario (2000) suggests that modifications 
should be avoided in order to reduce errors and avoid inhibiting capability to take 
advantage of newer versions and releases. Similarly Holland et al. (1999) and Roberts 
and Barrar (1992) endorse the view that organisations should be willing to change 
their businesses to fit the software, thereby ensuring only minimal customisation to 
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the latter. Holland et al. (1999) further suggest that avoidance of such software 
change is made possible with contemporary process modelling tools. 
Other Risk Factors to Consider 
Schneider (1999) summarises, the issues that need to be considered in order to reduce 
risks when planning for ERP implementation as follows: 
" Which processes are most important now and why? 
" Does this system meet our needs or go beyond them? 
" Who will be the change champion? 
" Who are the stakeholders? 
" What is the business culture at our company and what are its strengths? 
" What subcultures do we have and what are their strengths? 
" How can we apply those strengths to business change? 
" What cultural attributes are weak and how will we address them? 
" Who will be responsible for change management? 
Similarly, Bryan (1999) attempts to put together a checklist of major errors to avoid 
during ERP implementation: 
" Insufficient change management and user training, 
" Inappropriate decisions on Business Process Reengineering initiatives, 
" Poor project planning, 
" Underestimating IT skills requirements, 
" Poor project management, 
" Failure to recognise the tremendous effort involved in customisation and 
integration of other software packages, 
" Low level of executive buy-in, 
" Underestimating resources required, 
" Insufficient software evaluation. 
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Selling Change 
From the above, change management is certainly a recurrent challenge that needs to 
be addressed in any case. A tactical area concerning change management is how to 
sell change. People need to be adequately convinced of the need to accept changes, 
especially if introducing new ways of doing business is considered part of the ERP 
implementation. Hammer (2001) suggests six steps to marketing success as follows: 
" There is no such thing as over-communication, 
" When dealing with employees, remember and apply `the rule of fifties' which 
says that the first 50 times you tell people something, they don't hear; the 
second 50 times, they don't believe or understand it, only during the third 50 
times you tell them do they begin to learn, 
" Benefits sell, features don't, 
" Make your pitch distinctive and vivid, 
" Segment your markets, 
" Never, ever lie; not even a little. 
He also emphasises that educating employees is indispensable to selling change, as 
people cannot support what they do not comprehend. Hence training is mostly 
concerned with helping people develop the skills to perform their jobs in the 
aftermath of the change. Romeo (2001) also advises that high quality training is a top 
priority. For him, the key word is high quality. He suggests that IT staff must be 
trained in the technical aspects of the software and how it will interface with other 
modules. 
3.7.6. Preparation and Readiness for Change 
Along with risk management, company readiness is equally important to the 
successful implementation of ERP. It has already been emphasised that a company 
needs to be ready in order to advance the ERP implementation project. It is also 
important that we should always try to consider `company readiness' as an integral 
part of the change management programme which largely facilitates ERP 
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implementation, although attempts to achieve company readiness might also cause 
resistance to the execution of changes. While change management is an on-going 
exercise throughout the entire implementation cycle, making sure the company is 
ready for the ERP implementation is a crucial part of the initial preparation. 
Preparation can make or break the success of an ERP implementation. 
Donovan (2001) summarises implementation failure as falling into one of three 
categories: loss of user confidence due to inaccurate data records, delays and 
frustrations due to poorly educated and trained users and inappropriate assumptions 
that application of ERP-based information technology will correct fundamental flaws 
in underlying business processes. If ERP is not correctly implemented, the results can 
be painful, costly and embarrassing. 
Regardless of the implementation methodology adopted, people are always the most 
critical success factor for the ERP implementation. In general, lack of organisational 
readiness to change, insufficient sponsorship, weak project teams, inadequate user 
involvement and confusion over job responsibilities are common examples of non- 
technical reasons for ERP system implementation failure. Furthermore, it is notable 
that all of these are human related. While Romeo (2001) promotes the idea of `Be 
prepared' to mark the opening steps for implementation, Donovan (2001) also reveals 
that most ERP system implementations have failed predominantly due to a lack of 
preparation of the process and people. 
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As identified above, the design and execution of high-quality training constitutes a 
significant part of the process of achieving readiness for change. The quality of 
training is even more important than the comprehensiveness of the training material. 
Training must be user friendly and must clearly show users the positive benefits and 
the impacts of the ERP implementation. Without proper and well-managed training, 
the likelihood of project success is low. Hence, the success of change management is 
closely related to the quality of the education and training programmes that are put in 
place. Rather than providing simple training, users should be trained in a wider sense. 
For example, training sessions should provide a valuable opportunity for people to 
communicate and influence each other. 
Defining a vision for ERP is also critically important, this being the primary 
responsibility of the sponsor and steering committee. Once agreed, this vision has to 
be cascaded down throughout the entire organisation. The most contributive value of 
a project team is to establish a framework where they define the business 
requirements in support of the company strategic goals, rather than just collecting the 
user requirements for software customisation. Beyond establishing sponsorship, 
identifying core and extended support team members is necessary before education 
can be effectively arranged. 
With respect to the preparation for ERP implementation, Murrin (2000) summaries 
the critical success factors in general as strong sponsorship, agreeable project vision, 
presentation of a relevant business case, excellent project leadership, adequate process 
focus, sound project management, ample change readiness, effective communication, 
comprehensive education and appropriate training. Among these success factors, 
Murrin rates change leadership as being of the highest importance, given the 
expectation that BPR will introduce major changes, thereby giving rise to resistance 
as ERP is introduced. Murrin (2000) also suggests change leadership actions that 
include establishing thorough and consistent communication mechanisms, conducting 
education and training in a cascaded approach, managing resistance, establishing 
feedback mechanisms and creating power users or mentors. Again, the role of the 
project sponsor is strongly emphasised: he or she must be committed and involved 
and should be prepared take up an active role in support of these changes. 
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Additionally, for utmost effectiveness, gaining the endorsement and support of 
influential individuals and opinion leaders is critical to successful implementation. 
Convincing group leaders to participate effectively in the implementation process and 
making them feel that they are key players will ensure their valuable commitment. 
Status evaluation procedures can be used to provide feedback information to top 
management, but it must be recognised that this feedback needs to be timely, accurate 
and systematic if the implementation is not to become ineffective or worse, a 
complete failure. 
3.7.7. Concluding Remarks on The Identified CSFs 
In conclusion, with reference to the academic review and industry analysis, it is 
apparent that a good portion of our critical success factors are concerned with people 
and how they are managed in order to ensure that they all strive for a common goal. 
Hence, this research is largely concerned with the preparation of people and process 
in a holistic sense. Admittedly, it is hard to incorporate every human issue into any 
methodology. However, the implementation methodology can at least be designed 
with the objective of guiding people through an implementation cycle that has the 
necessary change management components effectively embedded within it. 
Essentially, cultural influences, communication effectiveness and process change 
therefore emerge as key subject matter for this particular research. 
3.8. Historical and Expected Future Trends for ERP 
Early in 1999, AMR research forecasted that ERP sales would stabilise as companies 
wrapped up their Y2K bug fixes. However, the 2000 fourth quarter results from SAP 
AG and PeopleSoft, backed up by reports from JD Edwards and Oracle Corp., 
indicated that the market was on its way back up. 
According to International Data Corp. Asia Pacific (Legard, 1999), despite an overall 
global decline in ERP vendor performance, Asia would take a significant growth in 
Page 42 of 239 
Literature Review 
the sales of ERP solutions. As depicted in Figure 3.3, growth trend sales of ERP 
software in ASEAN were predicted to grow at an annual rate of 21.2%, up from 
USD$115 million in 1998 to USD$393 million by 2003. In Asia, the fastest growing 
region for ERP software sales was seen to be Greater China, comprising Mainland 
China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, which was predicted to grow at an annual rate of 
24.2%, up from USD$84.5 million in 1998 to USD$243.3 million by 2003. South 
Korea and India only contributed sales of USD$27.7 million and USD$42.9 million in 
1997 and 1998 respectively. The projected growth fell off in reality as the global 
economy slowed down from 1999 onwards following the collapse of US stocks in the 
New York Stock Exchange. 
Figure 3.3 ERP Predicted Future Trends 
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More recently, with respect to ERP enabling hardware, the Gartner Group (Onag, 
2000) predicted that IBM's AS/400 would remain a core strategic platform through 
2004, with 10% to 20% of revenue coming from new customers over the next five 
years. Furthermore, according to IBM, 70% of the markets in China are new 
customers, for whom scalability is strategically important as a factor in convincing 
them that they should buy an AS/400 'system (Onag, 2000). 
In terms of functionality, ERP systems are already rich, although software vendors 
continue to develop new modules to meet increasing customer expectations. However, 
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automation of back office operations is still on the priority list. According to AMR 
Research (Bingi, 1999) 70% of the Fortune 1000 companies had either begun 
implementing ERP systems or planned to do so in the coming years to fulfil back 
office requirements. Not until the back office system is in place is it possible to move 
on to front office automation. However, increasing demands for front-office 
applications such as SCM pose threats to the integration with back office applications 
as software and technology compatibility, and the availability of Middleware for 
integration are major concerns. 
Among the front-office applications, CRM (Customer Relationship Management) is 
rapidly becoming one of the hottest areas in enterprise applications, and will continue 
to spur significant mergers and acquisitions (Menconi, 1999). According to AMR 
Research, the total aggregate revenue of the CRM market was expected to grow from 
USD$1.2 billion in 1997 to USD$11.5 billion in 2002 (Dilger, 1999). The CRM 
market includes technology-assisted selling and customer service and field service 
software. AMR Research predicts that mid-market sales will continue to accelerate as 
smaller companies adopt CRM business practices and more vendors offer cost- 
effective products for price conscious mid-sized companies. 
3.9. Web Based Collaboration 
In addition, ERP systems will inevitably become web-enabled. Shankarnarayanan 
(1999) predicted that the Internet would represent the next major technological 
enabler, which would allow rapid supply chain management between multiple 
operations and trading partners. 
With the advent and general availability of Internet technology, most ERP suppliers, 
such as SAP and PeopleSoft, have already launched Internet versions of their ERP 
solutions to facilitate the so-called web-enabled collaboration function. These 
implementations can also be executed collaboratively with the strategic view of 
improving communication and hence reducing the chance of implementation failure. 
Unfortunately, there is little research available on adopting a collaborative approach 
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for implementing ERP systems (an issue that is addressed in more detail later in this 
research). The next release of ERP systems is therefore believed to be aimed at 
extending the coverage of new functional areas such as collaborative workflow 
management, finite scheduling and visual product configuration. 
Collaboration occurs only when companies work together for mutual benefit. Poor 
governance results in disjointed selection, deployment and use of collaborative 
infrastructure, which in turn leads to diminishing IT investment returns. Cain (1999) 
asserts that organisations must examine human capital management needs, core 
operational process requirements and project and cross business boundary activities in 
order to help identify repeatable patterns under which various collaborative services 
can best be exploited. Above all, Hammer (2000) recapitulates that collaborating 
companies leverage each other on an operational basis so that they perform better 
together than they did separately. He also suggests that the power of the Internet lets 
companies readily transact with each other and access each other's information, 
thereby making collaboration a reality. 
Gary (1989) further defines collaboration as `a process through which parties who see 
different aspects of a problem can constructively explore their differences and search 
for solutions that go beyond their own limited vision of what is possible'. 
Moreover, Borden and Perkins (1999) reiterate that many scholars have suggested that 
there are certain key features involved in the collaborative process. For instance, Ash 
(1989) emphasises the idea of specific factors and underpinning characteristics of 
inter-organisational relations. Others (e. g. Caplan, 1988; DelPizzo, 1990; Kull et al., 
1991) focus on central features or salient themes of partnership arrangements. Still 
others outline strategies that can assist collaborators when facing challenges and 
difficulties (Gomez, 1990; Otterburg & Timpane, 1986). 
Establishing a sense of knowledge sharing, learning and community across members 
with shared interests and behaviours represents another focus. This helps towards 
cross-team/workgroup, and cross-process / cross-business boundary interaction. 
In short, collaboration, by its nature, focuses on individuals, teams, and workgroups. 
It is also concerned with communication, media and a user environment that is 
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steadily becoming connected and intelligent. Its aims are the streamlining of tasks for 
efficiency gains and improved effectiveness of decision-making. 
Key Challenges Faced in Collaboration 
Implementation of ERP systems shares much with other types of project. However, 
its impact applies to the entire organisation and is thus very widespread. Sharing 
common beliefs and goals is commonly perceived as a pre-requisite to a successful 
and effective implementation. Since the whole process of implementation is 
concerned with people, the project should therefore be human-centric. A careful 
selection of portal technology for improved communication paves the way toward 
success, whilst shortfalls in control and monitoring are amongst the biggest problems 
that jeopardise implementation. Other challenges include people's limited 
understanding and ability to adapt to the concept of collaboration. There also remain 
technical constraints in applying complete collaboration to certain industries and 
working environments. Examples of technical constraints include limited availability 
of geographical networks, restricted speed of communications and insecure data 
transmission. This `collaboration gap' is significant, in that it leads to considerable 
difficulty in sharing best practices. 
Many companies recognise that face-to-face meetings will always be essential for 
community building and relationships and will never be completely replaced. Klein 
(1996) restates that face-to-face communication has a greater impact than any other 
single medium. One of the chief advantages of such a communication strategy is the 
ability of the participants to pick up non-verbal cues as the interaction unfolds. Rather 
than replace all face-to-face meetings, Cain et al. (2001) therefore proposes that 
collaboration technologies will need to provide additional interaction mechanisms that 
enrich existing distance-communication technologies. In time, these may selectively 
replace a subset of current in-person interactions. 
Finally, the hardest part of making collaboration work, as Hammer (2000) illustrates, 
revolves around cultural values and attitudes. Traditionally, people within companies 
often view outsiders with hostility and suspicion. That has to change, in the view of 
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Gotta (2001), who suggests that productivity strategies should now automatically 
include external parties in the search for more strategic impact. Inevitably, in today's 
world of collaboration, for any particular company-wide project, members are 
increasingly likely to come from different companies. 
3.10. The Changing Requirements of Implementing ERP Systems 
ERP in China began its journey in the late 1980's showing remarkable market growth 
from approximately US$70 million in 2000 to US$106 million in 2001. The Chinese 
ERP market was expected to show an additional annual growth rate of 25% from 
2002 to 2005 (Xue et al. 2004). Despite the global reputations of several providers 
only two foreign ERP vendors, SAP and Oracle, ranked in the top eight ERP vendors 
in China, these holding between them only 24.4% of the Chinese market as compared 
to their world market share of almost 70% (Liang et al., 2004). 
Currently there are basically two kinds of ERP vendors in China. Some are 
international giants such as SAP, ORACLE. Others are national vendors e. g. UFSoft 
and Kingdee. While international giants like SAP dominated only 30% market share 
with some 300 clients in China to date, the local vendors continued to gain good level 
of market share. Hence, since it appears that the foreign ERP vendors have not been 
able to capitalize on their financial strengths, expertise, advanced technology and 
experience to implement their ERP solutions in China, domestic ERP vendors like 
UFSoft and Kingdee continue to dominate the Chinese ERP market. 
Nearly 1000 companies in China have implemented MRP, MRPII or ERP systems 
since 1980 and the successful implementation rate is extremely low at only 10% (Zhu 
and Ma, 1999). Some common characteristics of ERP failure in China were identified 
by Martinsons, (2004). Firstly, ERP projects in China almost invariably failed to be 
completed within the scheduled time frame, although only rarely did they exceed the 
planned budget. Secondly, ERP projects rarely improved cycle times and customer 
satisfaction. The main focus remained reducing the unit labour costs and inventory 
levels. Finally, ERP projects led by general management are judged to be much more 
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successful than those led by IT managers. Other major failure reasons included 
inadequate management of business process change during the ERP implementation, 
lack of top management support and user involvement, inadequate level of education 
and training and oversight of cultural factors (Zhang et al., 2005). 
In particular, culture has always been an issue that needs to be properly addressed 
during system implementation. Culture is defined as a pattern of shared basic 
assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and 
internal integration that has worked well enough to be considered valid and therefore 
to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation 
to those problems (Schein, 1992). The impact of cultural issues on ERP 
implementation has attracted considerable attention from IS researchers (Davison, 
2002 and Soh et al., 2000). Different beliefs in providing access to information, 
miscommunication due to homonyms in the Chinese language and difficulties in 
reengineering organizational processes are typical of the cultural issues observed, in 
practice (Davison, 2002). Incompatibilities in data format, processing procedures and 
presentation format are also critical (Soh et at., 2000). Language barriers, the way 
business processes are redesigned, operational differences, customer support and the 
competency of the consulting companies are also considered as challenges when 
dealing with the issue of culture (Liang et al., 2004). 
Clearly their widespread uptake suggests that there are many benefits associated with 
implementing MRP/MRPII/ERP systems. Evolving from an initial primary aim of 
reducing stock and inventory levels, these systems developed to focus on achieving 
faster delivery time and a better control over the entire business. ERP continued to 
extend to cover more business functions such as accounting, cost control, order entry 
and processing, sales and distribution, service management, human resource 
management and production planning. The emphasis was achievement of a higher 
level of interoperability and a modern way of doing business in a collaborative 
commercial environment. Improved customer service was also considered as an 
important emerging requirement. Information became more transparent and 
accessible by company's employees and trading partners. 
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Hence although the evolution paths for western countries and China are somewhat 
different, the objectives are very similar, these being effectiveness and standardisation. 
Similarly, most of the critical success factors identified in western countries, such as 
top management support, software suitability, ERP vendor quality, effective project 
management, reengineering business processes are equally applicable in a China 
context. However, culture is also an important and unique factor when implementing 
ERP system in Chinese firms. 
3.11. Summary 
From a vendor's perspective, managing people is the hardest aspect throughout the 
implementation of ERP systems. Other concerns, such as resource availability and 
ability to adapt, are comparatively less painful. It has been suggested that human 
obstacles constitute 62% of the root causes of project failure (Deloitte & Touche, 
1999). Realising the challenges faced by major ERP vendors, the development of an 
understanding of the common reasons for project failure has therefore been seen as a 
core objective of this literature review. 
Poor customisation, Middleware technology bugs, incomplete interfacing with legacy 
systems, and poor performance are, in general, the major technical problems 
associated with ERP implementation. However, these are generally of less 
significance than the social factors, as during such implementations, human resistance 
to change is a primary and recurring source of failure. Managing resistance through 
extensive communication and training is therefore seen as essential to the reduction or 
elimination of risk in project execution. 
According to the META group (Romeo, 2001), it takes an average of 23 months to 
fully implement a typical ERP project cycle. However, the longer the cycle, the 
greater is the risk of failure. Breaking the implementation into phases is therefore 
deemed essential in the search to secure success. 
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The avoidance of massive modification is also key to retaining efficient 
implementation. Hence, most researchers have concurred that the planning phase is 
critical to moving forward towards successful implementation. Poor project planning 
(Bryan, 1999) is therefore claimed as a common failure factor and extremely careful 
planning is identified as a core requirement to help minimise the risk of failure 
(Donovan, 1999). Without an adequate level of planning, customisation may take 
place in an uncontrolled manner and intended benefits will be only partially realised. 
Planning should therefore begin as soon as the software purchase contract has been 
signed and it should cover every stage of the implementation cycle. However, the 
evidence suggests that many or most of the pre-implementation activities are often 
either neglected or not properly planned. 
Turning to the issue of business focus and leadership, there is no doubt that support 
from senior executives and `management buy-in' (Typanski, 1999) are also crucial to 
the implementations as a whole. Furthermore, the communication process must be 
more specific. Communication throughout the project with clear, upfront objective 
and scope definition is vital to securing successful implementation (Clarke, 1999). In 
this context, project management is seen rather as a corporate reporting tool. 
In association with communication, training is also deemed to be critical. The Gartner 
Group (Donovan, 2001) has indicated that at least 15% of an ERP implementation 
budget should be allocated to training people. Without an appropriate level of 
training in place, it is difficult to keep the functional managers informed of the 
objectives and accountable for the responsibility assigned. Proper and organised 
training will also help promote team spirit with which synergy and implementation 
effectiveness can be realised. 
Furthermore, the consensus appears to be that a common mistake is to assume that `go 
live' represents a full stop to an ERP project. Instead, this needs to be seen as just the 
commencement of another `difficult time', namely that of `post-implementation 
improvements'. A typical implementation cycle should therefore be anticipated as 
spanning the entire cycle from the project planning stage through to the post- 
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implementation support and audit stages. However, it appears that to date, relatively 
few researchers have paid adequate attention to this particular area. 
Above all, many former researches on ERP implementation in China failed to attend 
to the cultural impacts and this has been identified as a gap jeopardizing successful 
implementation of ERP systems in China. Hence, this stage of the research has 
focused on the issue of critical success factors with reciprocal interaction to the 
cultural dimension that are relevant to the implementation of ERP systems in China. 
This lays the foundation for the case study of Pepsi which is subsequently presented, 
but more importantly, the literature review establishes the basis upon which JBA 
Advantage can be analysed and improved as an implementation methodology. 
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4. EVALUATION OF SELECTED METHODOLOGIES 
In this chapter, several common ERP implementation methodologies are discussed 
including SAP AcceleratedSAP, PeopleSoft Express and Oracle AIM Advantage. 
These are then compared with the JBA's product: JBA Advantage, and its associated 
methodology for implementing ERP systems. 
Apparently, there is no perfect implementation methodology in the market. Given the 
large market share of SAP, PeopleSoft and Oracle, their methodologies were therefore 
obvious candidates for selection and evaluation against JBA Advantage. This 
evaluation process will give an understanding of not only the characteristics of each 
implementation methodology but also the similarities and differences amongst them. 
It will also provide a general understanding of a typical implementation cycle for ERP 
systems. Above all, the ultimate purpose of this evaluation is to facilitate the redesign 
of JBA Advantage which in turn aims at improving the process of implementation in 
terms of efficiency, effectiveness, control and governance. 
4.1. SAP AcceleratedSAP 
In the past, many would consider that SAP was not only deemed to be too 
complicated, but its implementation was also seen as being too lengthy and costly. In 
the autumn of 1996 at SAP's Sapphire conference, AcceleratedSAP (ASAP) was first 
announced, and initially targeted U. S. enterprises. ASAP aims at helping to shorten 
the implementation time. 
Later, SAP released Global ASAP, a version of ASAP, which targeted large 
multinational companies deploying SAP R/3. The primary goal is to equip ASAP 
with steps and tools that are of use to global organisations. The underlying principle 
is that a suitable use of templates and tools in association with many of the project's 
steps will improve the likelihood of successful implementation. According to the 
Aberdeen Group (SAP, 1999), a study of 15 ASAP implementations in 1999 indicated 
that the average implementation time was 6.94 months whereas a traditional SAP 
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implementation may take 4-5 years. There are several reasons that contribute to the 
successful adoption of this newly introduced methodology. For example, 
implementation project schedules are extremely predictable, with the project studied 
being only seven working days off schedule, and this noticeably reduces the 
implementation cost. Also, the Aberdeen Group reported that the ratio of services-to- 
license-fee was closer to 2 to 1 in terms of expenditure. 
This new release of methodology aims at reducing the implementation time by 
foregoing extensive business process reengineering, sticking to a deployment 
roadmap, and leveraging internally developed tools and accelerators. In lieu of 
relying heavily on detailed design, emphasis is placed on the rapid development of a 
blueprint for the system. 
Structurally, ASAP has five major stages - (1) project preparation, (2) development of 
a business blueprint, (3) realisation phase as SAP R/3 is configured to meet specific 
business needs, (4) final preparation and testing, and finally (5) go-live and ongoing 
support. These are discussed in more detail below. 
ASAP also provides an adjustable project schedule, checklists, spreadsheets, 
questionnaires and documentation templates to help the implementation consultants 
and project managers do their jobs in a more efficient manner. 
As part of the Accelerated SAP offering, SAP Release/3 or R/3 is shipped with pre- 
configured hardware and a database for itself. It uses reference models to closely 
configure R/3 to fit a particular manufacturing industry, such as consumer goods 
manufacturing. According to Gary James of Team 21 (SAP, 1999): 
"Historically, where organisations have gotten in trouble with R/3 
implementations it is because they didn't understand all the steps, and 
have bitten off more than they can chew ... ASAP aids the understanding 
of all the bits and pieces involved in an R/3 implementation", 
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ASAP is different to a traditional implementation in that it is more focused on the 
business process reengineering aspect. This means that BPR is totally behind the 
project scope. 
The SAP R/3 now becomes much less flexible in terms of carrying out process 
redesign by setting switches. Hence, according to Dilzer (1999), the very nature of 
ASAP's fifth step - go live & support - is a recognition that a system is never 
completely implemented. Unfortunately, the ASAP roadmap is not sufficiently self- 
contained, since the concept behind it is to break it down into pieces such as the 
upgrade roadmap and the euro roadmap. 
According to SAP, in 1999 the average implementation time was 7.5 months with 
over 1000 projects adopting AcceleratedSAP (ASAP) as their implementation 
methodology. The success of ASAP lies in its design, which allows optimisation of 
time, quality and efficient use of resources during implementation. 
In terms of resources, ASAP has major elements as follows: Roadmap, Tools, Service 
and Training, Knowledge Management, and accelerators such as checklists, templates 
and cut-over plans that are interconnected to leverage a total solution to the 
implementation. These are elaborated on as follows: 
" Roadmap - this is a methodology and project plan with detailed descriptions of 
individual project activities. It consists of five phases: Project Preparation, 
Business Blueprint, Realisation, Final Preparation, Go Live and Continuous 
Change, 
" Tools -ASAP-includes specific tools to support project management along with 
questionnaires to help define the business process requirements, 
" Service and Training - comprises all consulting, education and support 
activities, 
" Knowledge Management - allows user-defined documents to be attached to the 
Knowledge Base. This also provides pre-defined documentation templates. 
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The Five Stage ASAP Roadmap 
The five phases as shown in Figure 4.1 govern the successful delivery of R/3, as 
follows (SAP AG, 2000): 
Figure 4.1 SAP AcceleratedSAP 
Phase Description Activities 
1 Project Preparation " Plan the organisational readiness. 
" Change the company culture. 
" Provide level 1 training. 
2 Business Blueprint " Document new way of doing business 
using Business Engineer. 
3 Realisation " Execute the blueprint. 
" Provide level 3 training. 
4 Final Preparation " Perform stress and integration tests on the 
newly defined model. 
" Perform preventive checks. 
5 Go Live and Support " Establish proper procedures and 
measurements. 
" Provide round-the-clock technical and 
remote consulting support services. 
" Perform regular checking on the system. 
Source: SAP AG (2000) 
Phase 1- `Project Preparation' is concerned with gathering resources and making sure 
there is proper planning and organisational readiness in place prior to moving forward 
with the implementation. It requires a full agreement in terms of acceptance from the 
decision-makers plus a clear project objective and the definition of an efficient 
decision-making process. More importantly, a company's culture may have to alter to 
accept changes arising due to the implementation of new processes and procedures. 
With the use of ASAP's `Project Estimator', a series of predefined questions can be 
used to help understand the managers' expectations of R/3. 
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Quality assurance is also important and a quality assurance check is therefore 
introduced to help make sure the implementation remains under control. During this 
phase, Level 1 training is required to help review the SAP's structure for service and 
support, and the SAP-specific terminology. 
Phase 2- `Business Blueprint' helps to document the new way of doing business. A 
specific tool called Business Engineer, which delivers a complete toolkit of 
predefined business processes, is strategically used to help derive new processes. 
Basically, this is the business process re-engineering phase. During this phase, a great 
deal of discussion and the completion of a series of questionnaires take place. The 
most significant deliverable to come out of this phase is a document that outlines the 
future vision of the reengineered business model. 
Phase 3- `Realisation' represents an execution of the business blueprint. With the aid 
of SAP consultants the project team can quickly set up a baseline system based on the 
blueprint developed, and can then fine-tune the system to meet all the business 
requirements documented. Likewise, a SAP specific tool called Implementation 
Assistant is used to help group and configure related business processes. Level 3 
training with much focus on conducting workshops is also strongly encouraged during 
the Realisation phase. Through the advanced training, the project team will develop 
the proficiency they will need to run the system. 
Phase 4- `Final Preparation' involves running rigorous testing on the developed 
model and takes the end-users through a series of comprehensive training. The reason 
for running system testing procedures against the fine-tuned business models aims at 
optimising the operational performance. Volume and stress tests as well as 
integration tests are carried out. Preventive maintenance checks are included as 
prerequisites to ensuring optimal performance. 
SAP maintains that the train-the-trainer method is still considered the most effective 
way to ensure acceptance, although the key to the project success is getting end-users 
up to speed. In order to move on to the next phase for `Go Live and Support', support 
team, service helpdesk and audit procedures must also be properly in place. 
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Phase 5- `Go Live and Support' requires the establishment of procedures and 
measurements to review the benefits of the investment on an on-going basis. SAP 
offers its customers the product and maintenance services 24 hours a day, 365 days a 
year. SAP believes that responsive support is the key to preserving the quality of 
services. A number of support services are available at SAP. The Online Service 
System aims to provide SAP's customers with a vehicle for forwarding problems or 
questions and tracking the progress towards resolution. The Remote Consulting 
Services enable SAP consultants to log onto customer sites via remote connections in 
order to investigate and solve problems. After `Go Live', another tool, EarlyWatch, 
helps to proactively diagnose the system with the intention of recognising and 
resolving potential problems. 
In summary, AcceleratedSAP is dominant among the proven solutions for 
implementing R/3. Adopting best business practices as well as providing user tools 
and support is the reason behind the success of this method of accelerating 
implementation. Pre-defined processes, templates and checklists are its key features. 
In addition to emphasising company readiness for enterprise-wide implementation, 
ASAP is extended to take into account the after-go-live support by introducing a 
number of services to assure optimal performance. It also places an emphasis on 
preparation, from the project kick-off up to the project completion. 
Project success depends upon how well the preparatory work is done. 
Psychologically, it is more convincing for customers' support and acceptance if a less 
complicated methodology is in place. Nobody wants a cumbersome solution. What 
is required is a clear and understandable method. 
With five simple phases, AcceleratedSAP covers a wide range of activities from 
preparation work through into after-go-live support and services. However, there is no 
doubt that support remains an on-going issue. There is always an argument that `go- 
live' does not mean that the project is complete. From experience, it can be 
summarised that until a good level of support is in place, customers will always blame 
the software and the work that consultants have done as long as they are suffering 
from difficulties with the software. 
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4.2. PeopleSoft Express 
Based in California, PeopleSoft Inc. employs more than 7,000 people and had 
revenues of $1.4 billion in 1999 (PeopleSoft, 2000). PeopleSoft's enterprise software 
provides a wide range of applications such as human resource management, financials, 
and logistics, manufacturing and supply chain management. 
Like other ERP suppliers, PeopleSoft has its own implementation methodology, 
called Express, which is powered by its Rapid Implementation Toolkit called 
PeopleSoft Advantage Toolkit, for streamlining the entire implementation process. 
PeopleSoft's Express puts an emphasis on hands-on training and also on the provision 
of best practices and standardised workflow. The implementation methodology offers 
a number of implementation options within a defined set of procedures. The stated 
objectives of introducing Express is to get a faster return on investment, cut the cost 
of ownership, and generate the competitive edge possible with a better system. While 
PeopleSoft's Express Methodology provides enough guidance to achieve rapid results 
and the freedom of structured choice to make strategic changes, PeopleSoft's 
Advantage Toolkit contains a set of best business practice procedures, tools and 
guidelines developed over hundreds of implementations for organisations of all sizes. 
In pursuit of optimal acceleration, the PeopleSoft Advantage Toolkit must be fully 
integrated with the Express Methodology. The toolkit is still important after the 
implementation go-live, as it continues to provide guidance for system enhancements, 
performance tune-ups and upgrades. 
As exhibited in Figure 4.2, it has four implementation phases within PeopleSoft 
Express - structure, prototyping, transition and deployment. `Structure' represents a 
starting point from which to move forward. It starts with launching an exhaustive fact 
finding operation and then precisely describing the legacy systems, core business 
practices and organisational readiness to help define the scope and direction of the 
implementation. The output from this phase is the construction of a hardware and 
software backbone that will be used throughout the entire implementation. 
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Moving into the `Prototyping' phase means running the old and new systems in 
parallel. The newly derived model is first prototyped using RapidTyping and then 
tested against different scenarios. By definition, RapidTyping was originally 
designed to provide customers with classroom instruction followed immediately by 
hands-on application of the new system. In this respect, it resembles JD Edwards' 
conference room pilot. During the prototyping phase, the implementation team can 
help with interface design and setup as well as data conversion to the PeopleSoft 
system. Essential customisations deemed to be critical to the company's competitive 
edge are included. 
Figure 4.2 PeopleSoft Express 
Phase Description Activities 
1 Structure " Fact finding on existing legacy 
systems. 
" Define scope and direction of the 
project. 
2 Prototyping " Define future model, data conversion 
programs and other interfaces. 
" Define custom programs. 
3 Transition " Design user training. 
" Develop training materials. 
" Conduct training. 
4 Deployment " Provide phone-based technical support 
after go-live. 
" Provide remote consulting services. 
Source: PeopleSoft Co. (1999) 
`Transition' is concerned with final preparation before going live. Designing a 
curriculum of specific end user training is the priority in this phase. Ensuring 
adequate training is extremely important to the success of a project. Training 
materials must be well prepared and the training must be carried out in a logical 
sequence whereby an individual audience could manage to understand the new way of 
doing business. 
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The `Deployment' phase represents moving across into `go-live'. When it comes to 
going live, PeopleSoft provides the implementation consultants with tools to 
troubleshoot and solve problems. Issues associated with after `Go Live' support also 
fall into the `Deploy' phase. Online phone-based technical and application support is 
available in addition to the onsite and remote consulting services. Since rapid 
implementation is conditional, assessment is required to take place to determine 
whether the company has acquired the necessary resource and processes. 
4.3. Oracle Accelerators and AIM Advantage 
With headquarters in California and annual revenue of $9.7 billion in 1999, Oracle 
Corporation is famous for providing a wide range of enterprise business solutions. 
Founded in 1977, Oracle employed 43,000 staff world-wide in 1999. 
Figure 4.3 Oracle AIM Advantage 
Phase Description Activities 
1 Definition " Identify business and system 
requirements, propose the future 
business model, and propose the 
application and information technology 
architecture. 
" Organise & orient project team. 
" Develop learning plans to ensure team 
members receive enough training and 
support necessary to do the jobs. 
2 Operational Analysis " Collect management, technical and end 
user business process requirements. 
" Develop business scenarios for 
assessing the level of fit between the 
detailed business requirements and 
standard application functionality. 
" Create a model for the application 
structure. 
" Develop prototypes of business 
processes. 
3 Solution Design " Create the optimal business process 
solution to meet the future business 
requirements. 
" Design application configuration options 
and detailed business procedure 
documentation. 
" Design custom extension, Interfaces and 
data conversion process. 
" Identify process and organisational 
changes required for Implementation. 
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Phase Description Activities 
4 Build " Develop custom extensions including 
enhancements, conversions, and 
interfaces. 
" Execute performance, integration and 
business system tests. 
5 Transition " Deploy the finished application into the 
organisation. 
" Fully test the business system. 
" Execute data conversion. 
" Use developed documentation to train 
end users and support staff. 
" Conduct readiness checks. 
6 Production " Present cutover and beginning of the 
system support cycle. 
" Carry out refinement and measurement 
activities. 
" Provide on-going support to the 
organisation for the remaining life of the 
system. 
" Begin regular system maintenance. 
Source: Oracle Corp. (2000) 
As an ERP solution, Oracle Applications is Oracle's flagship product. Oracle also 
provides AIM Advantage, as depicted in Figure 4.3, which identifies and summarises 
the key phases in terms of descriptions and associated activities. Figure 4.3 Oracle 
AIM Advantage, This is a proven, comprehensive method and toolkit to guide the 
implementation of Oracle Applications. The product integrates with FastForward (a 
fixed scope offering for implementing Oracle Applications in the middle market), 
Oracle Business Models and Oracle Tutor. With pre-defined templates, process 
workflows and project work plans, AIM Advantage streamlines the implementation 
process to save time and money when deploying Oracle Applications. 
AIM Advantage was first developed with the aim of providing the following key 
features: 
" Flexibility - AIM Advantage either uses a pre-packaged approach or develops 
a tailored approach based upon the size and complexity of the proposed 
implementation and the organisation's unique requirements; 
Page 61 of 239 
Evaluation of Selected Methodologies 
0 Scalability - AIM Advantage was designed to fit a wide range of situations, 
from the largest, multi-national, multi-site, multi-entity projects, through to the 
smallest, limited size, constrained scope projects; 
" Structured Framework - AIM Advantage uses project phasing to include 
quality and control checkpoints and allow co-ordination of project activities 
throughout the implementation. More specifically, AIM Advantage is rolled 
out in a flexible six-phased approach that helps map the business processes to 
the Oracle Applications, with full capabilities for management review and 
changes along the way; 
" Leading Edge Technology - AIM Advantage is web-deployed and self- 
updating. All documentation is on-line and users can drill down to a specific 
project task and open the deliverable template to begin work. 
For carrying out business reengineering, Oracle AIM Advantage utilises business 
process realignment techniques known as PERM (Packaged Enable Re-engineering). 
PERM offers a consistent framework for the business process realignment efforts. 
Easy-to-customise documentation templates are used to help get the project started in 
the fast track. In terms of technical requirements, AIM Advantage requires some 
other PC software to be installed. 
" Microsoft Windows 2000 or Windows XP, 
" Microsoft Office, 
" Microsoft Project, 
" Microsoft Internet Explorer, 
" Oracle Business Models (OBM), 
" Microsoft Visio. 
As a recap, Oracle AIM Advantage, a comprehensive method for implementing 
Oracle Applications, is part of Oracle Accelerator's suite of methods, tools and 
enablers. The incorporation of industry best practices into FastFoward helps further 
accelerate the implementation. FastForward is Oracle's offering, designed to address 
the unique cost and timeframe requirements of growing companies. It provides rapid 
time to market, enabling companies to quickly implement comprehensive e-business 
solutions at predictable costs. 
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By executing the six phases of implementation - Definition, Operational Analysis, 
Solution Design, Build, Transition and Production, the intention is that Oracle 
Applications should be able to go live with optimal efficiency. Each phase consists of 
several project activities. Unlike other methodologies, each project activity, which 
contributes to the success of implementing ERP in a resource constrained 
environment, is mandatory and therefore is not avoidable. For example, AIM 
Advantage uses prototyping to illustrate the design of future business processes. 
Creating an appropriate project environment whereby a project team is formed and 
team members can be trained is an important prelude to the implementation. Notably 
there is no so-called `conference room pilot' in place. The prototyping is therefore a 
process whereby analysis of existing processes and design of new processes take 
place. Custom programs as well as conversion methods are designed based upon the 
prototyping process. 
The methodology is intended to be straightforward and easy to understand. 
Nonetheless, it is sophisticated in terms of the tools available to help the acceleration. 
Prototyping presents a more interactive approach to understanding and solving the 
problems, as well as defining solutions to the future business model. However, the 
validity of a prototype model is a challenge and the process is time-consuming. 
The prototype becomes the most important vehicle for developing a blueprint. In 
short, activities ranging from business process reengineering through to customised 
development are all included in the AIM Advantage package. Throughout the 
implementation, Oracle accelerators such as standard workflow and conversion plans 
are used selectively. As a result, the project can be undertaken quickly, in a fairly 
short period of time, while the quality of work remains highly acceptable. 
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4.4. JBA Advantage 
Since JBA believes that every customer is different and in most cases the customer 
dictates the sequence of events, it came up with an initiative of reinventing its 
proprietary implementation methodology - JBA Advantage. The second generation 
of JBA Advantage, as proposed in the later chapter is deemed to be more 
sophisticated, in terms of scalability and flexibility, than any other implementation 
methodologies previously described. 
The concept behind JBA Advantage is to embrace risk management, the sales 
handover process and customer ownership into the methodology. The Risk 
Management dimension is concerned with accommodating the assessment and review 
of the processes necessary to support this methodology in the pre-sales phase. The 
Sales Handover Phase aims at clarifying roles and responsibilities with the ultimate 
purpose of improving working practices for the transition period where the customer 
solution is handed over to the customer consulting services. The Customer 
Ownership Phase helps clarify the escalation process for prospects and customers and 
minimises potential conflicts by accurately mapping the implementation process and 
defining the responsibilities. For each of the three embraced processes just explained 
above, good communication is the most significant recipe for achieving success. The 
methodology is divided into phases, activities and tasks in the form of a hierarchical 
structure. Some activities can be flagged as optional, depending on the scale of the 
project and the budget constraints. Each activity can be seen as a checkpoint, a 
planning activity or a process. 
JBA Advantage may be considered as a framework that has evolved to empower sales, 
pre-sales and customer services professionals to deliver the highest standard of 
customer service for the selection and implementation of System 21. For customer 
service professionals, it provides a roadmap that sets out a series of activities through 
which services can be delivered. 
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Figure 4.4 JBA Advantage 
Phase Description Activities 
1 Pre-Sales " Prospect Review 
" Campaign Set Up 
" Campaign Planning 
" Establish Customer Requirements 
" Define the solution 
" Hardware and Communications Planning 
" Internal Campaign Review 
" Campaign Review with Customer 
" Risk Assessment 
" Risk Management Review 
" Secure Contract 
" Handover to Foundation Phase 
2 Foundation " Internal Project Briefing 
" Customer Project Briefing 
" Project Planning 
" Contingency Planning 
" Software Planning 
" Project Launch Sign-off 
" Plan Business Process Workshop 
" Business Process Review with Customer 
" Sign off Business Models 
" Hardware and Software Delivery 
" Foundation Phase Sign-off 
3 Familiarisation " Education Planning 
" Deliver Education 
" Review Education 
" Education Sign-off 
" Familiarisation Planning 
" Familiarisation Preparation 
" Conduct Familiarisation Sessions 
" Review Familiarisation Sessions 
" Customer Sign-off Familiarisation 
" Develop Software Modifications 
" Plan Data Load 
" Familiarisation Phase Sign-off 
" Customer Executive Update 
4 Simulation " Plan Simulation 
" Conduct Simulation Sessions 
" Review Simulation Sessions 
" Customer Executive Update 
" Sign-off Simulation 
5 Implementation " Implementation Planning 
" Contingency Planning 
" Live Environment Set-up 
" Develop Conversion Programs 
" Technical Implementation 
" Train End Users 
" Verification of Live Environment Set-up 
" Data Conversion/Data Entry 
" Verify Data Conversion/Load 
" User Set-up 
" Readiness Review/Go Live Meeting 
" Review'Go Live' Support Plan 
" Full Project Sign-off 
6 Project Conclusion " Customer Handover Briefing 
" Handover to Support Desk 
" Handover Completion 
" Project Closure 
(Source: JBA Advantage, 2000) 
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JBA Advantage pays much attention to three areas: business processes, continuity of 
vision, process and people, and the advanced technical underpinning. This 
methodology embraces the concept of scalability that suits any size of System 21 
project from the smallest single site to the largest international project. Scalability 
means that the activities involved may be the same across small and large projects, 
but the time allocated to complete each activity may vary. 
The methodology is rolled out in six phases, as illustrated in Figure 4.4, namely the 
Pre-Sales Phase, Foundation Phase, Familiarisation Phase, Simulation Phase, 
Implementation Phase, and Project Conclusion Phase. 
The Pre-sales Phase is included in the new methodology for the primary reason of 
achieving continuity through using a project folder and baton carrier by which people 
can follow through the project activities as planned. It is important to underpin the 
message that the customer's project starts before they start the implementation. In the 
Pre-sales phase, customer requirements and the level of involvement of the baton 
carrier are defined. 
The Foundation Phase sets the implementation `terms of reference' and provides the 
customer with an opportunity to give the project a high profile within their 
organisation. This phase involves conducting project briefings, moving forward with 
project planning, contingency planning and software installation, signing off project 
and business models, reviewing the business processes using JBA proprietary 
business modeler namely @ctive Modeler which can also be extensively used to 
understand and re-engineer the customers' business model during the Pre-Sales Phase. 
In general, the methodology is less rigid than ASAP, yet it still provides flexibility in 
terms of allowing customisation to meet with the requirements of an individual 
environment. It represents a guide to the level of resources required. In many cases, 
this methodology can be further tailored to meet specific requirements. 
There are several implementation models to choose from, depending on the scale of 
implementation and customer requirements. The simplest model supports Fastart 
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implementations. No matter which model is adopted, emphasis is placed on 
continuity, and related activities and tasks are organised in a logical sequence. JBA 
Advantage defines a number of roles to be assigned to the project. Typically, it 
requires a `baton carrier' to be appointed, who will take on responsibility for ensuring 
continuity. However, it does not clearly describe the relationship between the project 
role and the functional role of individual project team members. This would allow an 
individual to accept multiple roles within a project. 
In conclusion, according to Allen (1999), a new organisation must have the capability 
to be profitable, to deliver referenceable customers, and to train and motivate its staff. 
Such an initiative led to JBA Advantage being re-invented to support the vision and 
future needs of JBA, and more importantly the needs of customers. Ultimately, this 
improved version of JBA Advantage is therefore expected to bring into the 
organisation a competitive edge in competing with other ERP methodologies as far as 
implementation is concerned. 
4.5. Analysis 
There is no doubt that none of the ERP implementation methodologies is found to be 
perfect. This is also applicable to JBA Advantage. First of all, although the 
methodology is primarily designed to be scaleable and flexible, it will potentially take 
a tremendous amount of time to complete all the compulsory activities and tasks even 
for a relatively small-scale project, particularly when there is a tight implementation 
schedule in place. Few SMEs could afford not to opt for a quick implementation. In 
such situations the Fastart or quick implementation is therefore generally accepted, as 
it involves fewer activities. 
Secondly, there is a pre-requisite to put in place a so-called baton carrier or managing 
consultant who will work throughout the sales cycle until the end of the project to 
ensure continuity. From an operational perspective, this might not be feasible, for two 
reasons. Firstly, there is an issue of availability of enough experienced consultants to 
take on the responsibility especially when there is only a small team of professionals. 
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Secondly, there is a question of who will pay for the consultants' time, since none of 
the prospects would ever expect to absorb any of the time cost designated to such pre- 
sales activities. 
Finally, the overall project management cost is inflated when there are so many 
activities to cover and manage. For small projects in particular, customers do not 
expect to incur a huge amount of cost for project management. The result can be that 
Project managers end up `stuck in the middle', hardly moving backward or forward. 
In relation to other major implementation methodologies selected for comparison, 
JBA is unsurpassed in the areas of scalability and activity coverage. Prototyping or 
blueprint sketching is commonly used in all the implementation methodologies under 
evaluation. While Oracle's AIM Advantage is more sophisticated in offering a wide 
range of templates and tools to help define the user requirements and implement the 
ERP application, JBA Advantage is comparatively weak in providing consultants with 
such tools to accelerate the implementation process. In addition, JBA Advantage is 
also vulnerable in terms of incorporating appropriate and adequate tools into any 
particular implementation. For example, it pays very limited attention to data 
conversion, which requires extended consideration, including attention to the type of 
data to be converted and the cost of conversion. 
Unlike the other three methodologies, JBA Advantage is limited in terms of 
promoting best practices by providing standard workflow, templates and data 
conversion plans, although it supports `Fast' implementation where project activities 
can be selectively applied. Over-customisation of the system may result. However, 
in regard to comprehensiveness, a large number of pre-sales and project conclusion 
activities are included. 
Also, the idea of emphasising `continuity' and appointing a `baton carrier' is unique. 
Ownership is therefore explicitly underlined for a successful ERP implementation. 
Furthermore, JBA Advantage is like ASAP in terms of recognising the need to 
prepare the entire organisation before moving into the ERP implementation. Both 
implementation methodologies place serious emphasis on the `after go-live' support, 
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which PeopleSoft Express and Oracle AIM Advantage are found to neglect. 
Accentuating regular and, more importantly, frequent reviews through the 
implementation process is one of the characteristics that JBA Advantage is seen to 
provide exceptionally well. This represents the spirit of JBA Advantage and this step- 
by-step approach appears to be the most effective way of securing the success of 
implementation. 
Finally, regardless of the implementation methodology, the key lesson learned is that 
implementation methodology and strategy are always interrelated. This accounts for 
the cohesive relationship between the implementation methodology and its associated 
tools. 
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5. CASE STUDY: PEPSI COLA 
This case study aims at presenting description and analysis based on observations 
spanning ERP projects carried out simultaneously at three Pepsi Cola pilot sites in 
China. Although these are treated as three separate implementations they all came 
under a single company initiative in that they had identical intentions and 
implementation strategies and the same group of consultants was involved. This 
implies that they can be considered as being linked for the comparison purpose. 
However, the management styles and degree of dedication involved at these three 
sites, were notably different. 
The author's role in all three projects was to oversee the implementations on behalf of 
JBA with the consultants reporting directly to himself on a regular basis. The author 
had also worked closely with the BU project managers, at the planning stage. This 
meant that full access to data was afforded, thereby providing an ideal opportunity to 
monitor and evaluate progress on the respective projects. Multiple sources of data 
including company documents, customer profiles, interview records and customer 
project review reports regarding the Pepsi implementations as well as market research 
data and survey results from within JBA International were all possible and available 
for the research purpose with customer's authorisation and company's approval 
respectively. Customer interviews as part of the project review mostly took place on- 
site. The BU advisory project manager and the site project owner/sponsor were 
involved in every customer interview. Project management issues were discussed as 
core part of the customer review. There were 4 planned reviews at each 
implementation site and only 2 were carried out finally in Changchun Pepsi because 
of the accelerated implementation. Guangzhou Pepsi and Shenzhen Pepsi participated 
into all planned review sessions. Feedback was analysed and in particular the cultural 
issues were presented in Figure 5.2 of section 5.8. 
The sections below begin with some general background information on Pepsi's 
operation in China, including an introduction to the function of its China Business 
Unit (CBU). An explanation of the organisational structure of the Department of 
Information Technology at CBU follows alongside an account of the ways in which 
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various departments reacted in terms of selecting software appropriate to their ERP 
needs. 
The individual cases are then explored in more detail focusing on issues such as the 
inter-relationship between Pepsi BU and JBA International and the degree of support 
offered by the respective parties. This leads to an analysis of why failures occurred 
and conclusions about what would have been done differently, with the benefit of 
hindsight and the reflective learning that has taken place. 
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5.1. Company Profile 
Like many other multinational corporations in Asia, Pepsi Cola Inc. (or PepsiCo) 
established its regional office in Hong Kong. Geographically, PepsiCo is divided into 
ten business units world-wide. The Hong Kong office is the headquarters for two 
BUs - Asia-Pacific and China - with a combined workforce of about 120 staff, many 
of whom are Hong Kong based. Amongst these are some corporate employees who 
work on auditing, treasury and legal functions. 
The primary business objective of the BUs is to foster the business growth of its joint 
ventures (JVs) across the Asia-Pacific region and China. This implies the provision 
of a wide range of administrative support and consulting services in various functional 
areas such as finance and accounting, IT, logistics and purchasing. In some JVs, 
PepsiCo holds a majority of the shares and exerts a stronger influence than the local 
partners, over management decision making. Some JV locations, such as Shanghai 
and Guangzhou, are of significant strategic importance whilst others are much smaller 
in operation and importance. 
At the time of the research, the company had continued to declare operating losses 
over a period of years and several of its IT-related projects were still underway. Some 
of these had histories stretching back as early as 1997, when PepsiCo had 
implemented a JD Edwards ERP package to automate the accounting function for its 
office in Hong Kong. Since its completion, the company had planned the selection 
and deployment of additional Enterprise Software systems to help run the finance, 
sales and distribution functions in its various JVs. 
In April 1998, PepsiCo selected JBA System 21 Drinks suite and implementation of 
this solution commenced shortly afterwards. 
5.2. Organisation Structure 
The Department of Information Technology was to play an important role in 
leveraging the information technologies into Pepsi's business operations. A new post, 
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Director of Information Technology, was first created in 1994, representing a solid 
commitment to increasing the regional capability in the use of information systems 
and technologies. Apart from formulating strategic directions, the Director was 
charged with wider responsibility, covering IT issues in both Asia-Pacific and China. 
This was a corporate management decision which included letting the IT department 
deploy appropriate information systems for the BUs. 
In early 1998, the management of the China Business Unit (CBU) agreed to the IT 
Director's proposal to roll out JBA System 21 Drinks suite at its strategic JVs in the 
next 2-3 years. Geographically, these joint ventures (twenty of them, at the time) 
were located in widely dispersed parts of Mainland China. The initially selected 
locations for the implementation of ERP systems included Guangzhou, Shenzhen, 
Chongqing, Changchun, Beijing, Nanjing, Shanghai and Wuhan. 
Within CBU, the departmental structure was flattened and divided into at most two 
levels within which supporting analysts directly reported to their respective IT 
managers at a higher level. The internal resource was very limited. IT managers were 
expected to take on a project management role and report to the IT Director. For the 
ERP implementations, they had to make full and effective use of external consulting 
resources. Each IT manager was assigned responsibility for an equal number of 
projects across China. However, none of them was delegated with decision-making 
power over and above that of the JV management. 
Unlike the two IT managers who were essentially working between the 
implementation consultants and the user departments, the Director himself worked 
closely with the management of the joint ventures, focusing upon the determination 
and selection of ERP systems. 
5.3. Selection of Software Package 
One of the likely reasons behind the selection JBA System 21, in favour of other 
enterprise software, was that PepsiCo valued the vision of JBA International as well 
as the functionality of its software package. In terms of strategic focus on niche 
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markets, JBA International was one of the few ERP vendors in the market providing 
multinational corporations, as well as medium sized enterprises, with specialised 
solutions for the beverage industry. 
Although there had been a strategic decision in principle to adopt JBA System 21 as a 
preferred ERP solution for all the JVs located in China, individual Pepsi locations 
were still allowed to make their own choices on the final selection and 
implementation of ERP systems. Consequently some JVs chose to ignore the internal 
recommendation for a number of economic, political and technical reasons with the 
result that JBA International did not secure a monopoly within all PepsiCo's joint 
ventures. 
5.4. Pilot Projects 
In the two years prior to the commencement of the research reported here, Guangzhou 
Pepsi Cola Beverage Co. (or Guangzhou Pepsi) and Shenzhen Pepsi Cola Beverage 
Co. (or Shenzhen Pepsi) signed the first and second contracts with JBA International 
for the product licence and implementation support of the JBA System 21 Drinks 
Suite. Subsequently, additional user licences were bought. At Guangzhou Pepsi, 15 
user licences were initially purchased, but this quickly moved up to 55 by early 2000. 
At the time of writing, the company planned to add another 20, with new modules, 
such as Transport Planning, being added to the original suite. Also, notably, 
Guangzhou Pepsi relied substantially on JBA International to supply other support 
including professional services, since they had an increasing numbers of registered 
ERP users and a more complicated business operation. 
Around the same time, Shenzhen Pepsi started their ERP implementation with an 
initial focus on its Finance modules. In late 1998, Changchun Pepsi, located in north- 
east China, decided to proceed with the implementation of the sales modules, 
following an initial purchase of 15 user licences. Among these three locations, 
Changchun Pepsi had the simplest form of operations. However, even they were still 
unable to complete the implementation of the selected modules within an expected 
Page 74 of 239 
Case Study: Pepsi Cola 
timeframe, primarily due to a lack of communication among the implementation 
teams and a lot of rework on the implementation tasks. 
Since the first two contracts, with Guangzhou Pepsi and Shenzhen Pepsi, were signed 
at the same time, it was believed that resource conflicts could hardly be avoided 
unless the implementations could be arranged to take place in a set sequence. It was 
therefore agreed that the financial modules for Shenzhen Pepsi and the distribution 
modules for Guangzhou Pepsi would be implemented simultaneously during the first 
half year. Then resources would be swapped around to continue the implementation 
of the remaining modules. The local management of these two joint ventures finally 
agreed to this idea and the implementation took place, in parallel, as scheduled. 
During the first few months of the Guangzhou Pepsi project it was notable that JBA 
International failed to complete its work for on time, and a number of reasons can be 
offered to explain this failure. Essentially, the implementation consultants, who were 
new to the company, committed several acknowledged mistakes in setting up the 
system. The mistakes included inappropriate installation of software, improper 
configuration of the system parameters, and incorrect set up of the master data files. 
Considerable free work was therefore carried out, in an attempt to rebuild confidence. 
Unfortunately, the situation continued to get worse. As a result, JBA International 
was blamed for falling short on its obligation to lead the projects forward and due to 
the existence of an expectation gap, both parties came to experience considerable 
frustration. The project managers on the customer side (i. e. Pepsi BU) expected JBA 
International to take on every responsibility and communicate directly with end-users 
on every decision. Conversely, consultants from JBA International had a common 
understanding that Pepsi BU was supposed to lead the implementation. This 
contradiction carried on right up to the latest stage of implementation, since there was 
no ownership taking and no mechanism in place for detecting the occurrence of 
miscommunication and misunderstanding. 
Other reasons why the project proved to be so difficult at Guangzhou Pepsi, was that 
the consultants were rather inexperienced and the users were particularly demanding. 
Due to the need for a large number of reworks, the quality of service was frequently 
questioned in the review meetings. It was generally accepted that a lack of confidence 
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on the part of the customer was one of the underlying reasons for failure as it had 
been evident, since the beginning of the project, that Guangzhou Pepsi was concerned 
about the consultants' ability and experience. Neither trust nor synergy was evident 
throughout the implementation. This was partly due to the fact that no accurate 
understanding of the business operations was communicated beforehand to facilitate 
the implementation. Instead, there was an unrealistic expectation that implementing 
an ERP solution could automatically help improve the business process. Several 
operational and procedural changes were subsequently commissioned but these 
changes were not adequately managed either. As a result, the implementation was 
badly affected with considerable additional cost and service and time being incurred. 
Even though confidence was eventually regained as the learning cycle matured and 
more resources were allocated, the project still overran. Disagreements endured in 
regard to the way that business operation should be reengineered and the expectation 
gap failed to be satisfactorily closed towards the project closure. 
At Shenzhen Pepsi, one of the most influential obstacles preventing the 
implementation from moving forward was the human issue. The Chief Financial 
Officer was given the sponsorship and assigned responsibility to arrange necessary 
resources for the implementation. Unfortunately, there was no clear indication or 
directive from the top management to emphasise the importance of the 
implementation. Consequently, the accounting staff at Shenzhen Pepsi continually 
refused to work in accordance with the agreed schedule using a claim of `lack of 
resource', as an excuse. Conversely, the implementation consultants, lacking 
sufficient understanding of the users' requirements, introduced several errors into the 
configuration settings. For example, incorrect interpretation of the requirements was 
evident as the consultants attempted to formulate these without adhering to strict 
governance whereby the validity of the requirement could be ascertained. Also, the 
consultants failed to demonstrate adequately an ability to accurately set up the chart of 
accounts. As a result, user confidence was even further diminished. 
The project delays at both Shenzhen and Guangzhou were clearly related to improper 
alignment with user expectations. Particularly in the case of Shenzhen Pepsi, neither 
the project sponsor nor the end-users were particularly enthusiastic about leaping into 
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a new system to improve efficiency. The only directive or incentive offered was 
simply to select and implement Y2K compliant accounting software as an upgrade to 
the current system. However, the end-users, mostly accounting staff, kept presenting 
various excuses to avoid moving the project forward. In particular, they found the 
new ERP solution more complicated than the PC-based accounting system that they 
had been using for years. Furthermore, from a user's point of view, JBA System 21 
appeared to have no advantage over the system that it was replacing. Furthermore, in 
absence of official approval from the local Tax Bureau, System 21 was prohibited 
from being used as an authorised tool for reporting the company's P&L accounts. 
As a contingency plan, Shenzhen Pepsi eventually bought a copy of a millennium- 
compliant version of their existing PC-based accounting software, and it was not until 
January 2000, that a final decision was confirmed that the existing PC-based 
accounting system would be replaced with System 21. From that point onwards, the 
implementation was again resumed. Then, quite suddenly, a lot of outstanding issues 
emerged, demanding immediate solutions. Most of the issues were related to system 
integration. Hence, it became evident that the company was never ready to 
implement the ERP solution. 
The third of the case studies concerned the project with Changchun Pepsi which had 
originally started in late 1998. The work that was initially carried out was very 
similar to that at Guangzhou Pepsi i. e., implementation of the Sales and Distribution 
modules initially. In terms of the project environment, the project size of Changchun 
Pepsi was more or less similar to that of Guangzhou Pepsi and Shenzhen Pepsi and 
the original implementation schedules, as illustrated in Figure 5.1 were largely 
overlapping. 
It was also agreed to adopt a `fastart' implementation with a very limited number of 
visits to Changchun Pepsi during the first three months. By February 1999, the first 
phase was declared complete. There were two reasons for such a fast implementation. 
First, the consultants had learned enough from the first two implementations with 
Pepsi Cola. Second, Changchun Pepsi was also able to assign internal resources to 
work closely with the implementation consultants during intensive training and 
implementation programs. 
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Figure 5.1 Implementation Timeline 
(Source: JBA International, 2000) 
Following completion of Phase 1, the project was suspended until June 2000. The 
suspension was partly due to the massive data validation and fixing process that had 
to be carried out following the consultants' work on data conversion. The project 
resumed in a better shape and the financial module was implemented in three months, 
thereby according to the local requirements. However, some discrepancies were 
found, due to incompatible interfaces, as the charts of accounts defined for 
Guangzhou Pepsi and Changchun Pepsi were inconsistent. 
From here on, another round of data fixing and customisation took place and the 
problems were finally resolved. However, the project completion was delayed and 
Changchun Pepsi was forced to undertake additional customisation since the 
embedded business model, as initially developed for Guangzhou Pepsi, was not 
deemed to be completely applicable. 
5.5. Customer Interaction 
Following their experiences, as outlined above, the project managers from both Pepsi 
and JBA International eventually moved closer together and presented a more 
concerted joint effort in terms of moving the ERP project forward. Both companies 
essentially agreed to value and promote the concept of effective partnership. A 
Page 78 of 239 
Case Study: Pepsi Cola 
mutual agreement was reached whereby the BU project managers should actively 
work towards persuading individual JVs to adopt System 21 as the preferred ERP 
solution across Asia, including China. However, despite this pressure some of the 
Asian operations still decided to select SAP R/3, partly due to the fact that JBA 
International was unable to demonstrate its capability to offer cost-effective support in 
certain Asian countries. 
Initially, Pepsi BU relied on JBA International to deliver the required implementation 
support services. However, JBA International failed in its provision of 
implementation support for Guangzhou Pepsi and Pepsi BU began to withdraw its 
direct support for JBA International. As a consequence, the strategic partnership 
virtually broke down. 
5.6. Support Issues 
Depending on the scale of operations, some Pepsi locations were not able to sustain 
the necessary resources for IT support. It is likely that they were expecting as much 
assistance as possible from Pepsi BU to manage the ERP projects. In addition to 
project management, software development support was also necessary and critical. 
Sharing the corporate resources and support was therefore a strategic decision for 
Pepsi. However, this brought about situations where simultaneous implementations 
were difficult to implement as a result of conflicting calls on resources. To help out, 
project managers from Pepsi BU worked on behalf of the joint ventures to implement 
the ERP systems alongside the consultants from JBA International but in any 
particular timeframe, there were still always two implementation projects underway. 
In terms of roles enacted, it was mutually agreed that the consultants from JBA 
International would conduct all user training and workshop provision, while Pepsi BU 
would take care of all remaining activities involved in subsequent implementations. 
The agreed plan, emerging from the contract negotiation, was to make good use of 
Pepsi BU's project managers to manage and lead future projects, leading to a 
substantial reduction in the support provided by JBA International. 
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Support for the remote locations involved also proved to be difficult since dial-up 
access to the remote hosts proved to be a somewhat inefficient and unreliable method 
of providing support, largely due to the inferior network infrastructure that was in 
place at this time. Either the connection could not be established, or it was suddenly 
lost, resulting in only a partial update to the database. On-site support was therefore 
preferred. However, such an arrangement in China could only be partly justified. 
Guangzhou and Shenzhen are geographically, relatively close to Hong Kong with 
daily scheduled intercity through trains linking the two locations (typically about two 
hours). Conversely, Changchun is some 2,500 miles away. Consequently, it took a 
day or two to get there in order to provide on-site support. For remote fixing, as noted 
above, the data link needed to be more reliable. 
In order to enable a more efficient support facility, a mutual understanding was 
reached that someone from within each implementation location would be assigned to 
work with the consultants in providing user support. Nevertheless, the outcome was 
not as satisfactory as expected since in practice, it was found that the assignees proved 
incapable of learning well enough to assist the consultants. They were either not 
interested or not capable of understanding the work that was being carried out during 
the implementation. Language was one of the key issues since all displayed text was 
in English and the user manual was also written in English. Another difficulty arose 
due to hostility and failure to recognise the new systems. In general, at this time, the 
concept of ERP was still quite new to most local businesses in China and it inevitably 
proved necessary to count on repeated training to help individuals appreciate its use. 
Even then many individuals appeared to remain ignorant about why ERP systems 
were needed. As a result, no significant improvement was made in terms of helping 
the implementation and very often, the entire effort was in vain. 
5.7. Analysis of Failure 
Implementing an ERP system is like managing any other project that requires 
collaborative planning and effective resource allocation. Contingency planning is 
always mandatory. More importantly, user expectation needs to be carefully managed, 
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particularly since the impact of project failure is so widespread and severe, given that 
the whole organisation is likely to suffer. 
An exhaustive degree of preparatory work is vital to ensuring a company's readiness 
to proceed with ERP implementation. The ideal situation is where everyone from the 
organisation is motivated to support the implementation. However, this rarely 
happens in real life. For example, only a small group of people from Shenzhen Pepsi 
was really dedicated to supporting the implementation. Even the involvement of the 
project sponsor was minimal, as he, himself, was brought onto the project without 
having been properly briefed about the objectives and predictable potential downsides 
of the implementation. 
Furthermore, leadership was absent and nobody appeared to respect the consultants or 
the implementation services that they provided. This appeared to reflect Shupe's 
(1999) view that one of the critical factors for successful ERP implementation is to 
put the right people in place, who have leadership abilities. Similarly, according to 
Allen (1999), designating a single leader is vitally important for avoiding risks. 
Detailed knowledge of the company business environment is another acknowledged 
key to success but observations in this case revealed that on PepsiCo's projects 
implementation consultants rarely got to know enough about the business processes 
involved. For example, upon signing the contract for the pilot implementation, 
PepsiCo was full of confidence that Guangzhou Pepsi would become a showcase for 
other Pepsi managed bottlers across China. Initially, everything appeared to be going 
well, apart from some complaints about the availability of resources. However, 
shortly afterwards, an expectation gap became starkly evident in terms of the project 
deliverables. From this point onwards, the working relationship between PepsiCo and 
JBA International began to deteriorate noticeably. Partially as a result of 
miscommunications between the parties, during the Pre-Sales stage, Guangzhou Pepsi 
continued to express their frustrations with the consultants' perceived inability to 
deliver on commitments. 
The issue of software customisation was also a significant issue here. It is widely 
recognised that customising ERP software packages, in order to interface with legacy 
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systems, is always a challenge and is not recommended unless there is strong 
justification and a definite scope of work can be clearly defined and agreed. In 
general, the avoidance of customisation is usually favoured, since customisation work 
is always risky and, in the worst case, may even kill the entire project. 
Support and maintenance of such customised programs is also an issue. Particularly 
in Hong Kong, it is quite common for people to change jobs very frequently. 
According to Trepper (1999), staffing was ranked the second most important 
management problem facing ERP project leaders and managers. Good people are 
hard to retain, partly because they tend to be continuously looking out for, and subject 
to, improved offers in terms of salary remuneration, title upgrades and job satisfaction. 
Smart, young talent is even harder to keep. Most such people are energetic, 
innovative and competitive. Therefore, for those IT firms that look for a progressive 
business growth and who want to remain competitive, a key management issue is the 
keeping of people who are well versed and effective in the latest technologies. With a 
frequent turnover of personnel, quality of work is not easy to guarantee; nor is there 
sufficient expertise to deliver the required service. For example, at Pepsi, a lot of 
customisation work was carried out as a result of the consultants lacking competence 
and/or the experience needed in order to be able to suggest alternatives to meet user 
expectations. 
Reflections on experiences in these cases suggest strongly that incompetence in 
managing user expectations and participant relationships was a key factor 
underpinning project failure. This appears to concur with Roberts (1997) conclusion 
that inappropriate set up of the project organisation. Preserving a good user 
relationship requires an extended level of care and attention. For example, Guangzhou 
Pepsi exemplifies a situation where collaboration and expectation was badly managed, 
and poor alignment of work was clearly evident. Here, the finance manager assumed 
responsibility for co-ordinating the resources needed for the implementation, while 
JBA International took the role of project manager. However, all that the finance 
manager expected to have to do was to express her new ideas for of the improvement 
of logistics operations, and this would then be implemented automatically as a feature 
of the ERP implementation. Unfortunately, the new ways of doing business that 
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descended from this directive, introduced several requests for changes to the software, 
which in turn led to several difficulties of the type discussed above. 
Clearly, the management of customer expectations requires careful planning and 
mutual understanding among the team members and this constitutes an integral part of 
any ERP implementation. For example, Guangzhou Pepsi continuously requested 
customisation that was barely achievable, as it would have taken a lot of time and 
significant resource allocation for the development work to be completed. As it 
transpired, Guangzhou Pepsi committed up to twice the budgeted cost to the 
implementation while JBA International, on their part, donated many hours of free 
work as part of their compensation for acknowledged rework and inefficiency. Quite 
clearly, this represented a compromise between the both parties since the user 
requirements were not completely spelled out and accurately interpreted. Fortunately, 
the finance manager at Guangzhou was so dedicated to the project that she was 
prepared to work very closely with the implementation consultants to make sure that 
Guangzhou Pepsi would obtain the intended benefits from implementing System 21, 
and the project was eventually completed. However, it could hardly have been 
counted a complete success, by conventional project management standards. 
In the second case considered here, Shenzhen Pepsi also experienced their own set of 
difficulties when implementing the financial modules from System 21. According to 
Allen (1999), successful implementation depends substantially on the extent to which 
functional managers remain accountable for project delivery. However, in this case, 
no one was ever assigned ownership of either success or failure. The financial 
controller who was assigned the role of project sponsor was found to be limited in his 
ability to push for the implementation due to the fact that in practice, he was fully 
preoccupied with the routine operations on which his KPIs were defined while the 
JBA project manager could offer only limited help in turning this failure into a 
success. Consequently, the whole project slipped six months behind schedule, and the 
financial chart of accounts was changed several times with lots of rework being 
involved during its implementation. 
The third case considered here was that of Changchun Pepsi. Some six months after 
the implementation work started at Shenzhen Pepsi, Changchun Pepsi also requested 
Page 83 of 239 
Case Study: Pepsi Cola 
an implementation of the sales modules in order to kick off their ERP project. 
Consultants were sent to Changchun in late October of the same year to start a `quick 
implementation'. Based on the customised model that Guangzhou Pepsi had 
implemented, Changchun Pepsi managed to successfully roll out their sales order 
processing application, and then their accounts receivable module, over a period of 
three months. However, in the succeeding few months, the operations started to 
suffer. This could be attributed to the fact that Changchun had their own 
requirements that where different from those that had been formulated at Guangzhou 
Pepsi, so the system as adopted was not necessarily a best fit. 
The ultimate reason for the failure was that all of those concerned, had assumed that 
ERP would be able to achieve whatever had been planned for it to achieve, without 
first attempting to exchange ideas about strategic priorities for the implementations 
across the respective Pepsi facilities. For example, Guangzhou Pepsi aimed at 
reengineering their business processes while implementing System 21. However, 
other Pepsi facilities did not have such requirements. 
As of December 1999, Pepsi had come to operate some 16-20 facilities in China. 
Although each facility had a similar business model; unfortunately, each of these 
operations varied slightly since PepsiCo's control over local management was very 
limited. 
It also needs to be recognised that the ways in which IT projects are managed in Asia 
is very different to the way it is done in the western countries from which ERP 
emerged. This is particularly so in China, where it has become a common but 
daunting challenge for project managers to build co-operative structures amongst 
individuals who lack experience in sharing responsibility on the implementation of 
ERP systems. For example, at Shenzhen Pepsi, there were frequent examples of 
failure to meet schedules, largely owing to senior managers being unable to commit 
enough time to the project. As a consequence, there was little momentum in place to 
drive the project forward. 
Additionally, as already elaborated upon in earlier sections, managing user 
expectations is an acknowledged key to success, but this demands full collaboration 
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from senior executives. However, these senior executives must firstly understand 
their information environments, as explained by Typanski (1999) and endorsed by 
Bryan (1999). This analysis suggests that lack of executive buy-in was instrumental 
in these failures. 
At Guangzhou Pepsi, the financial controller who was appointed as the project 
sponsor during the project kick off, apparently expected the consultants from JBA 
International to provide full support on any implementation issue arising. However, 
with respect to the provision of resources, it had apparently never occurred to the 
company that it should supply more analysts to work with JBA on the implementation. 
Conversely, the consultants from JBA erroneously assumed that Pepsi would be 
assigning technical staff to learn how to implement System 21. Hence the user 
expectation, as finally understood, was different to that which was originally 
communicated during the sales contract negotiation. Pre-sales consultants came up 
with a proposal based on an understanding that Pepsi would be allocating the 
necessary resources and would be working closely with the consultants during the 
implementation. As suggested by Allen (1999), involved managers should 
collectively own the project. However, the split of responsibility was neither clearly 
defined in the proposal nor well communicated to senior management, including the 
project sponsors. Notably, it was supposed to be Pepsi BU's responsibility to close 
the communication gap between Pepsi JVs and JBA International but this failed to 
materialise. 
Finally, there was evidently some misunderstanding among the respective inter- 
working groups - Pepsi BU, Pepsi JVs and JBA. While Pepsi BU was unable to 
manage the alignment of their plan with that of JBA International, Guangzhou Pepsi 
and Shenzhen Pepsi blamed JBA International for badly managed support. This 
implies that there was not always a well-organised team structure with proper sharing 
of responsibility. For Guangzhou Pepsi, the team structure was agreed during the 
initial planning session. However, Pepsi BU was omitted from the structure and this 
confused people about what kind of support they would be providing during the 
implementation. 
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From half way through the implementation onwards, individual Pepsi JVs started to 
deal with JBA International directly. However, disputes resulted, due to several 
serious misunderstandings about job arrangements and the sharing of responsibility. 
Again, what people were interested in was how quickly the reported faults could be 
resolved. Nobody appeared to have thought of the validity of the team structure. No 
formal discussions or meetings were scheduled to define the information flow and 
problem handling at a strategic level and it is concluded that the organisation was 
simply not ready to implement an ERP system. Pre-implementation preparation 
activities therefore needed to be properly arranged for, as Donovan (1999) suggested, 
if people are not well prepared to accept and operate within the new environment, 
implementation is highly unlikely to succeed. While key changes are needed, 
education is the best way to influence peoples and develop their mindset to accept 
changes, as Dey (1999) suggested. 
5.8. Reflections 
Summarising, these case studies have explored a number of surrounding issues such 
as support from within Pepsi BU, difficulty in sharing resources and difficulties 
encountered in providing on-site support from JBA International. From this, it must 
be concluded that generally, there was a notable lack of significant accomplishment in 
terms of budget overspends and project overruns throughout these implementations. 
However, it was also noted that these failures produced rather different degrees of 
impact on the respective businesses involved. 
These problems occurred despite key representatives from within Pepsi BU working 
alongside staff from within the individual joint ventures and consultants from JBA 
International. Hence in principle, collaboration was present but in practice this 
occurred in a totally disorganised manner. Expectation gaps, ownership taking and 
resources conflicts were left unresolved. In general, it appeared that the joint ventures 
assumed that System 21 would prove to be a tool for changing their operations and 
business processes with minimal human intervention. Consequently, support for the 
implementation from within Pepsi was seen to be minimal. Conversely the consultants 
were left with unreasonable liabilities throughout and were faced with unachievable 
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timeframes for service delivery. As a result, none of the implementation projects was 
deemed to be a success. Indeed, it was concluded that part of the reason behind the 
implementation failures was a lack of trust and confidence between these partners. 
The case studies also show that the company (Pepsi) was apparently not ready to 
adapt to the changes introduced by implementing an ERP solution. The cases also 
indicate that no matter how successful the work is, leading up to the go-live situation, 
support for the post `go-live' period must not be underestimated. 
It is therefore concluded that the failures observed in these studies were usually due to 
a lack of collaboration among teams from the respective stakeholder organisations, 
rather than simply inability on the part of the consultants, in managing users' 
expectations. As a result, a lot of unexpected extra work was necessary and, to certain 
extent, this further complicated the implementation. Among the various reasons for 
failure, miscommunication and misinterpretation, specifically at the initial stage of 
implementation, had a particularly significant impact on the entire project. Early 
consultation was not present, nor was there any corrective action towards the end of 
the project. Furthermore the initiative, aiming to improve the business processes, 
introduced substantial customisation work, which dragged the entire project into deep 
trouble. 
Poor implementation support, partly due to the inaccessibility of technology, 
represented another contributive factor in the failures. This seriously impaired the 
consultants' ability to deliver the expected level of service. As a result, the project's 
momentum was lost and the BU became politically reluctant to further engage with 
the implementation. 
More importantly, the case studies have illustrated a general need to adequately 
prepare organisations for ERP implementation through consistent communication of a 
clear vision in a cascaded approach backed by appropriate training, as needed. The 
benefits of implementing an ERP system also need to be fully communicated since if 
these benefits are clearly recognised, a substantial degree of support can result. 
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Figure 5.2 Factors Affecting ERP Implementation Failures 
Case 1 
Guangzhou 
Case 2 
Shenzhen 
Case 3 
Changchun 
Language   
Business process re-engineering   
Report & table    
Partnership    
Price issue (cost & benefit)   
Lack of focus and user participation   
Lack of management support  
Data communications   
Availability of consultants  
Project management    
Source: Author's Field Study Data 
Implementing foreign ERP systems like JBA System 21 in China is always difficult 
largely because of the cultural difference coupled with other environmental factors. 
Addressing cultural issues hence became the centre of this research. In regard to the 
factors affecting the ERP implementation failures across the 3 pilot sites at Pepsi as 
illustrated in Figure 5.2, culture includes language, the way of re-engineering business 
processes, localized report formats and partnership with local people in delivering 
services. Apparently, the report formats, project management and partnership are 
seen to be the common issues jeopardising the implementation while management 
support and availability of consultants are deemed to be more specific to individual 
cases. 
From the case studies carried out at Pepsi in China, cultural issues are deemed to have 
significant influences to the success of ERP implementation. Significant localization 
on forms and reports took place given the statutory regulations applied. 
Communication was always an issue especially in northern China. This was mainly 
associated with the language for communications. Geographically, China is huge and 
the ways of communication in different parts of China are different. In all three cases, 
consultants were not able to correctly interpret and translate the requirements posed 
locally. Moreover, pricing issue is also an important consideration and mostly cost 
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can no longer be justified given the change of benefit throughout the implementation 
process. Project control is absolute critical in all three cases. Lack of trust and 
confidence with the consultants happened simply because these consultants were 
unable to fully appreciate the cultural gaps behind. Resource control was rather weak 
since the PMO was structured in such a way that effective communication between 
consultants and users was not facilitated. Addressing individual issues one by one did 
not seem to be effective and rewarding. Instead, all these issues needed to be tackled 
in a collaborative environment. Again, this formed the baseline for moving forward 
the research. 
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6. DEFINITION OF HYPOTHETICAL MODEL 
Essentially, the hypothetical model is defined in a two-fold manner. Both macro and 
micro improvements are offered as a means towards securing successful ERP 
implementations. The improvements that were derived, and offered for validation, 
were grounded in the observations and reflections when reviewing the ERP literature 
on commonly used implementation methodologies. However, these were 
substantially elaborated upon, following examination and reflections on the case study 
experiences with PepsiCo's ERP implementation projects. 
From a micro-focused perspective, it was evident that the JBA Advantage 
implementation methodology would need to be substantially improved. With respect 
to the macro-focused perspective, the new, hypothetical model embraces the newer 
version of JBA Advantage (as Tier 1 task force) with unavoidable course of actions 
included in interaction with a number of selective strategies (as Tier 2 task force) to 
form a proposed framework with which ERP implementation should become more 
secure. In other words, the micro-focused change represents the Tier 1 task force 
while the macro-focused model takes into account both the micro-focused change and 
the additional strategies (i. e., Tier 2 task force) which are considered selectively 
depending on the applicability. 
6.1. The Macro-Focused Hypothetical Model 
The macro-focused hypothetical model features the development of an integrated 
environment whereby implementation strategies and JBA Advantage interact 
collaboratively. There is no single implementation strategy that can guarantee 
successful ERP implementation. However, the seven strategies as recommended in 
Figure 6.1 do provide a contribution considered to be specific, flexible and, more 
importantly, `adaptable' to the implementation methodology. 
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Figure 6.1 Hypothetical Two-tier Adaptive Strategy Model 
Each of the strategies is explained as follows: 
[S 1] Ownership taking is key to making sure that every piece of project work 
contributes positively to success. However, ownership cannot be exercised 
effectively until a clear vision is defined and communicated (Kotter, 1996; 
Clarke, 1999 and Murrin, 2001). Given that executive buy-in (Typanski, 1999 
and Bryan, 1999) can lead directly to sponsorship of effective ownership taking, 
executives must be encouraged to clearly understand the information 
environment. This is a prerequisite that will enable them to contribute directly 
to the implementation process rather than simply pushing hard from above, for 
results. Executive staff involvement therefore represents a vital aspect of 
leadership, from which momentum is imparted. Effective delegation is also of 
key importance especially during the lead up to the implementation. 
[S2] Structured teaming needs to be present in order to ensure that the individuals 
concerned are able to contribute positively to the project as expected. Logically, 
teams are made up of internal and external resources. Internal resources include 
the functional managers, project managers, supporting staff and of course the 
end-users. External resource issues include the strategic use of partners and 
selective outsourcing. Additionally, it can be useful to have a `mediator' or a 
`translator' (Hamel, 1996) sit in the middle, assuming the responsibility for 
closing the expectation gasp and resolving any issues and disputes that 
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potentially inhibit the project from moving forward. Teamwork is therefore 
imperative. Leadership (Murrin, 2001) is also an essential part of this role, and 
becomes a necessity in terms of enabling effective teamwork. To a certain 
extent, synergy is expected as a result of effective leadership. As important as 
leadership, a supportive organisational structure is also needed as Wee (2000) 
suggested. 
[S3] Managing user expectations is a major task that the project team should address. 
This should begin with a thorough understanding of the company's culture and 
business strategy (Donovan, 1999). Furthermore, for effective implementation 
of the ERP system, a clear objective must be communicated (Clarke, 1999). 
Subsequently, user involvement and training (Holland et al., 1999) should be 
encouraged and provided respectively. Over-customisation should be avoided 
and a `win-small-win-early' approach, in concert with a `showcase' should be 
adopted to ensure that user confidence can be expanded (Kotter, 1996 and 
Hamel, 1996). 
[S4] Changing the way that people do business through implementing an ERP 
system represents a logical approach towards introducing best practice. 
However, resistance should be expected. Insufficient attention to `change 
management tactics' can kill the project (Bryan, 1999) and this, in turn. It is 
unlikely to be effective unless an appropriate training scheme is integrated 
(Stratman and Roth, 1999). Procedural and technological changes should 
therefore be incorporated transparently into the business environment. But this 
calls for an evaluation of the business environment and the company's culture, 
from which a strategy for preparing the organisation for implementation of ERP 
systems can be developed. 
[S5] Throughout the implementation, communication is vital (Randolph, 1994; 
Ward, 1995; Kotter, 1996; Lanfer, 1997 and Hammer, 2001). Consistent 
communication helps keep the project on track and helps to eliminate 
misunderstanding and misinterpretation in the area of change management. 
Alongside the communication channels, effective collaborative tools need to be 
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available. Ideally, the communication tools should be web-enabled so that 
relevant information can be obtained, exchanged and updated more frequently. 
Portal technology, in the era of Internet communication, should therefore be 
embedded to enable more effective and efficient communication. 
[S6] Business/TT alignment is always important in terms of making an ERP project 
meaningful. Information technology by itself is not the driving force behind 
success, unless business processes are changed accordingly to improve the 
operational efficiency and/or financial performance. The good side of 
implementing an ERP system is that it changes the way people do things. 
However, a lack of BPR experience (Huang & Palvia, 2001) can also contribute 
to failure in ERP implementations. Therefore, managing BPR constitutes an 
integral part of the hypothetical model and in many cases IT objectives and 
business goals are forced to compromise. 
[S7] Quality assurance is concerned with making sure an ERP implementation runs 
smoothly in a healthy environment and ends with adequate `post-go-live' 
support. Training (Donovan, 1999; Bryan, 1999 and Holland at el., 1999) is 
generally seen as an irreplaceable tool for conveying a project's vision, 
objectives and working instructions throughout the ERP implementation, and 
needs to be provided repeatedly, with contents being modified as needed. 
Hence at the core of this hypothetical model is the principle that `go-live' 
represents but one milestone towards the completion of a project. 
6.2. The Micro-Focused Hypothetical Model 
The micro-focused perspective, JBA Advantage, is depicted schematically in Figure 
6.2, which represents a direct replacement of SIP. This appears to be a promising 
methodology for the implementation of System 21 due to its sophistication and 
scalability. `Fastart' implementation is fully supported. In the context of functional 
coverage, JBA Advantage can be claimed to be superior to other implementation 
methodologies in the following areas: 
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" Pre-Sales activity is included as part of the implementation, 
" Sales campaign and risk assessment are covered, 
" Internal and customer project briefings are conducted prior to reviewing the 
project plan, 
"A graphical tool, `@ctive Modeler', is used to help develop a business model, 
" Customer executive updates are done in a shorter interval, 
0 Formal sign-off is adapted to secure completion of milestones. 
On the other hand, JBA Advantage falls short in some areas. For examples, it is 
somewhat weak on critical considerations such as accurate definition of the scope, 
BPR alignment, evaluation of company readiness, gap analysis, sharing of ownership, 
and appropriate use of tools for functionality mapping and status reporting. Also, 
development of change programs and post implementation support is limited. 
Figure 6.2 Current Model of JBA Advantage 
Source: JBA International 
The ultimate success of the project very much depends on how effectively the next 
generation of JBA Advantage can help to drive ERP implementation processes. A 
key research objective is therefore to develop an upgraded version of JBA Advantage 
with the ultimate goal of increasing the likelihood of success in closing deals as well 
as in the implementation of ERP systems. 
By addressing the project failures at PepsiCo, a hypothetical model of refinement or 
the next generation of JBA Advantage, as depicted in Figure 6.3, is thereby defined, 
which includes the incorporation of additional components integrated into its original 
JBA Advantage model. 
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Final Production Production 
Preparation Deployment Support 
Figure 6.3 Hypothetical Implementation Methodology 
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The additional components include: 
" Evaluation of company readiness for ERP implementation. 
" Schedule for developing appropriate change management programs. 
" Effective use of prototypes to create a blueprint model. 
" Provision of appropriate orientation and training programs to the 
implementation group members on a regular basis. 
" Effective use of toolkits e. g. graphical tools and checklists to accelerate the 
implementation. 
" Full integration with business process reengineering to make good use of the 
software where the best practices are adopted. 
" Regular risk assessment throughout the entire implementation. 
" Appropriate use of web-enabled project management tools to improve the 
group communication. 
" Provision of `after go-live' support. 
From observations and reflections in the case-studies one of the suspected reasons for 
project failure is that generally, customers seldom recognise the value of a 
collaborative approach to managing the implementation. Nor do they appreciate 
structural approaches to moving the implementation forward. Every ERP vendor has 
its own implementation methodology. In most cases, customers directly observe the 
methodology throughout the implementation cycle. 
The original version of JBA Advantage had already attended to some of the missing 
links for achieving a rewarding ERP implementation. However, it appeared that 
expectation gap can be closed if the implementation consultants start work on the 
project while a sales proposal is being drafted. The underlying principle of this 
refinement stresses the importance of assigning a principal or senior consultant to 
assist in the sales engagement process. The same consultant will then lead other 
implementation consultants for the period of the service delivery, once the contract is 
signed. Hence while the original JBA Advantage is less comprehensive in terms of 
solution design and testing, user communication, process control, definition of roles 
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and post- implementation support coverage, the newer version consists of six phases, 
as follows: 
1. Pre-Sales, 
2. Foundation, 
3. Familiarisation, 
4. Implementation, 
5. Final Preparation and 
6. Production. 
Major changes in relation to the original model include the insertion of new activities 
into the Pre-Sales and Foundation Phase and the rearrangement of activities in the 
Familiarisation and Production Phase. Examples include the management of users' 
expectations from the outset, the making available of custom programs for the 
simulation session and the arrangement of `after go-live' support. 
The new version of JBA Advantage was to be extended to include full coverage of the 
implementation cycle from pre-sales through to support after go-live. It also pays 
attention to the repetitive process of ensuring organisational readiness and validating 
the fitness of the prototype. In addition, it focuses on improving the communication 
process. Finally, it requires that prior to implementing an agreed solution, adequate 
testing should be carried out to make sure that the design of the solution is appropriate. 
With respect to the implementation cycle, it was considered from the previous phases 
of research that none of the common methodologies seemed to cover all of the 
expected project activities. For example, some methodologies emphasise simplicity, 
while some are keen on providing flexibility of options but none of the approaches is 
perfect. 
In contrast with other methodologies, the spirit of JBA Advantage lies with securing 
contracts by introducing a Pre-Sales phase in which the initial planning of software 
configuration is covered and an appropriate internal campaign is established, followed 
by risk assessment and drafting of an implementation plan. Also, the original JBA 
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Advantage arguably paid limited attention to the support issues after the system goes 
live, and it was concluded that this should be remedied in the new version. 
In summary, the refined model attempts to identify the missing links to the project 
success, and then redefines and redevelops the project activities to increase the 
effectiveness of executing JBA Advantage. Proposed changes, most of which are 
improvements, have been incorporated into the next generation of JBA Advantage, as 
summarised below (from A to Q): 
A. Evaluating the company's readiness to adopt the ERP system. 
B. Minimising the change of business processes to fit the proper and efficient use 
of the software (i. e. support to BPR through gap analysis). 
C. Incorporating more toolkits to expedite the project activities. 
D. Using a proprietary prototyping tool -C ctive Modeler to develop an optimal 
business process model. 
E. Separating education into the Level 1 (fundamental) and Level 2 (extended) 
training phases. 
F. Extending the Foundation Phase to cover the development and delivery of 
custom extensions and programs. 
G. Installing custom extensions prior to conducting Level 2 training. 
H. Providing on-going orientations throughout the implementation cycle. 
I. Incorporating a Simulation Phase into the Familiarisation Phase. 
J. Ensuring that the Familiarisation Phase itself is repeatable until the project 
members are 100% confident of implementing the ERP system. 
K. Providing for the business model and use of the ERP system to be presented 
by the key users, who are also the project members, during the Simulation 
sessions. 
L. Splitting up the Project Conclusion Phase into Final Preparation and 
Deployment Stages of Production. 
M. Introducing the Production Phase that extends the Project Conclusion Phase to 
cover the deployment of customised functions and address the support issues 
beyond the system go live date. 
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N. Adopting a parallel run in lieu of a direct changeover for non-Fastart 
implementations. 
0. Assessing the impact of deployment on the enterprise and developing 
measures to secure smooth implementation. 
P. Introducing a web-based project management tool to improve group 
communication and inspire collaboration. 
Q. Developing change programs upon completion of risk assessment for every 
defined milestone. 
6.3. Formulation of Hypothesis 
It is postulated that incorporation of the above changes into the current version of JBA 
Advantage, should lead to an improved generation of the product. The central 
hypothesis is therefore defined as follows: Properly managing customers' expectation 
will lead to a total project success, right through to the post go-live stage. 
Rather than simply explaining and advocating the suitability of the changes for 
improving the effectiveness of JBA Advantage, a hypothetical set of subordinate 
project activities are defined and tested. In the work that follows, the activities, as 
defined below, are therefore closely related to the changes proposed above. For 
example, the better we understand the customer expectation, the less difficult it will 
be to find out about organisational readiness. 
1. Managing customer's expectation is made easier if a senior consultant is 
assigned, at a senior level, to the Pre-Sales support team (in relation to point A, 
above). 
2. Accurate definition of the scope of work depends on whether customers' 
expectations can be well managed (in relation to point D above). 
3. Business process reengineering facilitates organisational readiness for the ERP 
implementation (in relation to point B). 
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4. Success in Development of a To-be Model (i. e. a final model) will be 
conditional on key users being given the ownership of the solution design 
process (in relation to point K). 
5. Prototyping secures validity when developing the final model and also aids the 
familiarisation process (in relation to points C-D-F-J). 
6. Simulation, using the final model, contributes further to familiarisation and 
success in achieving user education (in relation to points E-F-G-H). 
7. A final check on the readiness for going live, in addition to verification of 
software configuration, is vital in the final stages of implementation (in 
relation to points LM-0). 
8. Inferior support during the period following implementation is a likely cause 
of ultimate project failure (in relation to points N-P-Q). 
These project activities constitute a chain of actions that if validated, will support the 
proposed refinements to the current version of JBA Advantage. However, any 
breakdown in the chain would indicate the probability of failure following its 
adoption. In summary, the refinement aims to provide a more robust model with 
additional activities and checkpoints integrated into it. 
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7. STAKEHOLDER SURVEY 
The Case studies discussed above in Chapter 5 provided valuable qualitative data of a 
rich and detailed nature concerning experiences of ERP implementation within the 
Pepsi group. However, for the purposes of this research, it was clear that it would 
also be useful to obtain data pertaining to a wider sphere of stakeholders with interests 
in the issues of concern identified so far. In particular, there was a need to further 
evaluate the hypotheses outlined above in Chapter 6. It was therefore decided to 
explore the views of selected individuals within the industry more generally. 
The process started with an interview with a marketing officer from JBA International. 
His advice was instrumental when identifying contact companies within the selected 
industries; these being computer peripherals, electronics, garments and beverages. 
This same marketing officer was also responsible for the maintenance of JBA's 
customer databases which provided useful contact details for prominent `market 
players' in the selected industries. As of July 2000, this database contained some 
2,100 records of companies in the garments, electronics and beverages industries. 
Information from here was routinely distributed, on a regular schedule, to various 
sales executives and managers to assist them in formulating appropriate sales related 
actions. 
Initial contact information was also acquired from Dun & Bradstreet. Further 
statistical information about the companies was subsequently obtained from the 
Directory of the Hong Kong Productivity Council. The Trade Development Council 
of Hong Kong and the General Chamber of Commerce of Hong Kong were also 
regularly approached for information updates before the final compilation of the list 
of companies to which the survey questionnaires would be sent. 
Bearing in mind that System 21 had been initially developed as a mid-range ERP 
system, and making the assumption that small companies would be unlikely to 
consider implementing mid-range ERP systems, it was decided that the research 
would give absolute priority to mid-size enterprises. Consequently, the companies 
eventually selected for the survey were either multinational corporations or Hong 
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Kong based firms with manufacturing as well as distribution operations across China 
and Hong Kong. None of these companies was subject to making final business 
decisions outside Hong Kong. Above all, they all bore similar economic 
characteristics and cultural influences, although there were also some differences with 
respect to their economic, human rights and state of technological developments. 
7.1. Questionnaire Design 
At the core of this stakeholder survey was a questionnaire (see Appendix 1). This was 
developed to facilitate the collection of opinions from selected companies with 
general experience or intent of implementing ERP systems, regardless of the 
technological platforms selected. A five-point Likert scale was deployed so that 
statistical analysis could be carried out based on the scores attributed, thereby 
assuming interval data (equal intervals between the numbers on the scale). The 
questionnaire was designed to help validate the hypothetical model that had 
previously emerged from the observations in the literature on various implementation 
projects, backed up by the in-depth case studies at Pepsi Cola. 
Essentially, the questionnaire was divided into five sections. Section 1 (questions 1-9) 
was designed to help understand the company background and explore issues such as 
business scope, manpower capacity and office location. Section 2 (questions 10-21) 
aimed to identify the particular characteristics of the ERP systems within the selected 
companies. Section 3 (questions 22-52) attempted to understand in more detail the 
concerns experienced with the implementation methodologies used. Section 4-1 
(questions 53-63) examined customers' expectations of ERP vendors while Section 4- 
2 (questions 64-78) examined ERP vendor' expectations of customers. Finally, 
Section 5 contained questions that were more open-ended, descriptive and optional 
(questions 79-63). This was used to collect further information and comments from 
those completing the questionnaire. 
Copies of the questionnaire were initially sent through normal mail and subsequently 
via electronic mail to the selected companies. In regard to hypotheses testing, 
Page 102 of 239 
Stakeholder Survey 
Pearson's correlation coefficient was used to measure the relationship among different 
hypotheses. 
7.2. Data Collection 
The search for suitable companies drew upon two sources; the Internet version of the 
Trade Development Council of Hong Kong's company database (URL: 
http: //www. tdclink. com) and the directory of China's General Chamber of Commerce 
(URL: http: //www. hkgcc. org. hk). Of these, the Trade Development Council's 
directory proved particularly useful, providing one of the most exhaustive sources for 
obtaining suitable company contact information at the time of undertaking the 
research. 
The selected companies fell into four major vertical clusters, namely Beverages, 
Footwear and Garments, Electronic and Electrical Components, and Computer 
Peripherals. For each of these categories, companies having manufacturing facilities 
in China, and a minimum of 500 workers, were randomly selected. 
During the first round of this random selection process, nearly 1,000 companies were 
identified spanning the four selected categories (notably the majority, 600 or so, were 
engaged in electronic manufacturing). From the initial 1000, a total of 566 fitted the 
selection criteria. The main criterion was that they were in the right sector but they 
also had to be large enough to qualify (all had a labour force of more than 1000 
workers). There was no requirement for the selected companies to be listed on the 
stock markets. 
Figure 7.1 summarises the clusters of companies finally selected. Only 34 were from 
the Beverage industry; the totals for the remaining sectors being Computer 
Peripherals (113), Electronic-Electrical Components (247) and the Garments industry 
(172). For each of these, either the marketing manager or the managing director was 
contacted with a request to participate in the survey. It was accepted that although 
they might not be the most appropriate persons to actually fill out the questionnaire, 
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they would be the most obvious candidates to initiate such action. Out of the 89 
returned questionnaires, 62 (representing 69%) captured the name/position of the 
person who actually filled in the survey questionnaire. Around 90% (55 
questionnaires) were completed by IT function while the remaining ones were mostly 
tackled by other management staff. 
A total of 566 copies of the directions to the questionnaire were sent via electronic 
mail to the selected companies. Of these, the first batch of 80 was sent by normal 
mail. This first batch consisted entirely of companies from the beverage industry and 
also some companies from the electronics industry, while the second batch consisted 
of companies from the other selected industries. 
Figure 7.1 Selected Industries for Research Study 
Computer 
Peripherals 
Electronics 
Garments 
Beverage 7-734 
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Number of companies contacted 
Source: Author's Research Survey 
Sending questionnaires via electronic mail was found to be more efficient, since 
control and follow-up could be made more easily. For the first batch of questionnaire 
sent by normal mail, a total of 22 companies responded. Follow-up letters were sent 
to the remaining 58 companies, but this only led to another 12 questionnaires being 
returned. No more beverage companies responded to the subsequent distribution of 
the questionnaire by electronic mail. Among the other industrial groups, the 
electronics companies produced the largest response. 
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Of the 566 questionnaires sent out, a total of 77 companies (14%), were unattainable. 
A further 89 companies responded positively (16% gross response rate). Another 50 
companies (8%), responded indicating no interest in further involvement and the 
remaining 350 companies (62%) did not respond at all. 
Out of the 89 respondents who completed the questionnaire, 22 declared that they had 
never implemented or had no plans to implement ERP systems, while the remaining 
67 attempted to complete the questionnaire (12% response rate). From these returns, 
only 46 were complete and therefore useable and further analysis, as reported below, 
was based on these results, only (representing an 8% net response rate). 
7.3. Data Presentation and Analysis 
Based on the completed questionnaires, a statistical analysis was conducted using 
Pearson's correlation coefficient, this being presented below. Some of the comments 
derived from the respondents, including those who had not implemented ERP yet, 
were also found to be valuable in terms of understanding the general nature of ERP 
implementation, and these comments were also incorporated into the analysis, where 
appropriate. 
In the sections below, the method for testing the cohesiveness of the defined activities 
(i. e., variables) is first explained, followed by presentation of the statistical results. 
This aims to illustrate that `continuity' is the key to success. It is also intended to 
demonstrate from the survey results that inferior `after-go-live' support is a prominent 
cause of project failure. 
There are collectively eight corresponding survey questions associated with the 
activities (H1-H8) defined in a chain for the new model. It is postulated that a close 
relationship will be evident between each pair of adjacent activities. Pearson's 
correlation coefficient is primarily used for testing the cohesiveness of adjacent 
variables. 
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In the sections that follow, the statistical results from the survey are further explored 
with an emphasis on customer's expectation of the vendor's capabilities and activities 
as well as the vendor's expectation of the customer's co-operation. Initial thoughts 
about closing the expectation gap between the customer and the software supplier are 
also offered. 
The remaining sections exhibit other research findings from the questionnaire survey 
and the case study combined, in terms of how expectation gap, limited awareness of 
the implementation methodology, miscommunication, absence of change 
management programs and mistreatment of parallel testing can impact the 
implementation and lead to project failure. 
Raw results for the questions pertaining to these issues are included in Appendices 2 
through 5. Appendix 2 contains questions about the company and project in general. 
Appendix 3 contains questions pertaining to the respective research hypotheses and 
also to issues of a more general nature. Appendix 4 contains the raw results of 
questions pertaining to the issue of customer expectations while Appendix 5 contains 
the results for corresponding questions on the issue of vendor expectations. 
7.4. Statistical Principles 
Descriptive statistics are essentially used in this research to validate the hypothetical 
implementation methodology developed in previous sections on the basis of case 
study analysis and comparison of JBA Advantage with other major implementation 
methodologies, currently in the marketplace. 
Using accepted statistical conventions the sample mean (µ or M), and standard 
deviation () are calculated respectively for each of the research hypotheses of core 
importance. 
6_ 
E(X - M)z 
N-1 
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where X= individual rating on hypothesis 
M= mean of rating 
N= number of respondents 
Evaluation of improvements to the implementation methodology is thus carried out, 
principally based on the case study of Pepsi Cola's implementation of ERP systems 
and the analysis of descriptive statistics from the survey. The Pearson correlation 
coefficient, which was originally introduced by the English statistician, Karl Pearson, 
is central to the inferential statistical analysis of the research data and by definition it 
measures the strength of the linear relationship between two variables. 
As a recap, Pearson's correlation coefficient of X and Y is computed by using the 
following formula: 
the degree to which X and Y vary together 
r= 
the degree to which X and Y vary separately 
co - variability of X and Y r= 
variability of X and Y separately 
Again, the coefficient of determination is essentially used to measure the degree of 
association between two adjacent independent hypothetical variables. For example, if 
it was found that two variables had a correlation of 0.8, then r2 = 0.64 which implies 
that 64% of the variation in the y variable is explained or accounted for by variation in 
the x variable. The remaining 36% of the variation is unaccounted for. This would 
therefore demonstrate a fairly strong cohesive link between the two variables. 
Similarly, if this value of `r' applied to the link between two adjacent variables, it 
would again demonstrate a fairly strong cohesive link between them. 
7.5. Research Test Results 
A summary of the key results pertaining to the set of original hypotheses outlined in 
section 6.3, is presented in Table 7.1. The original research variables were H1, H2 ... 
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HK. From these, a number of research questions were defined and set out on a 5-point 
Likert scale in the questionnaire (see Appendix 1). Responses to these questions are 
shown in questions 30,32-34,42,44,47 and 50 in Appendix 3. These results were 
taken to encapsulate the respondents' level of acceptance with each of the respective 
variables. 
Table 7.1 Survey Results on Defined Activities 
Scores Given (Range -2 to +2 Avera e 
Respondent ID H, H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 He 
g 
Score 
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 0.500 
2 2 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 0.875 
3 
...... .... 
1 1 0 1 0 
.... .... 
0 0 1 0.500 
.. 4 0 
...... _ 
2...... 0 0 0 2 0 1 0.625 
5 -1 0 ... 
1 0 0 
..... 
1 
. 
1 1 
.... 
0.375 
......... -1 - 11 1 6 
.... _ 
2 
. 
........ 2 1 0 0 0 1 1 0875 
7 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0.500 
8 1 ... 0........ 0 0 1 0 
..... ......... 
0 0.375 
9 
_.. 
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0.625 
. 10 
.......... 
......... 0 
......... 
......... 
........ 
0 2 
........ -1 
0 0 0 0.250 
11 1 0 1 
... 
1 
.......... 
0 -1 1 2 0.625 
12 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.250 
13 2 2 0 0 1 2 1 1.125 
14 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.625 
15 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.625 
16 -1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.500 
17 0 2 
..... 
0 
.. _.. _ 
0 2 -1 -1 .... 
0 
... 
0.250 
18 
......... 
1 
... 
0 0 1 0 
............ 
0 
.. 
0 0 0.250 
19 -1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.125 
20 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0.375 
21 0 0........... 0 0 1 0 1 0.500 
22 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0.250 
23 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.250 
24 0..... 1 1........ 
....... 
0 1 0 0 2 0.625 
25 0 1 2 1 0 0 1 1 0.750 
26 -1 0 ... . 
2 0 1 0 0 1 0.375 
27 
..... 
.. 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0.750 
28 1 2 0 2 2 0 0 -1 0.750 
29 1 
..... -1 
1 0 2 
... 
0 0 0 0.375 
30 
........ _ 
2 0.... _.. 0 0 2 0 0 0 0.500 
......... 
31 1 2 -1 0 0 0 1 0 0.375 
32 1 2 1 -2 1 0 2 0 0.625 
33 1 1 1 1 1 0. 
.... ...... 
0 
... ...... 
1 0.750 
34 0 -1 1 
............ 0 . 1 1 0 1 0.125 
35 0.... 0 0 0.. 1 1 0 0... 
_ 
0.250 
36 1 1 ........ 0 1 -1 0 1 0 0.375 
37 1 -1 .. _ 
2 1 0 2 2 2 1.125 
38 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.500 
39 0 1 1 2 0 1 1 0 0.500 
40 
.......... ....... _ 
2 2 -2 1 -1 1 0 0 0.375 
41 -2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0.000 
42 0 0 1 0 1 0 -1 1 0.250 
43 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0.500 
44 
.... 
1 1 -1 0 1 0 -1 2 0.375 
45 0 1........ 0.... 0 1 1 0 0 0.375 
46 1 0 ... 0 1_ .0 1 0 0 0.125 
Source: Author's Field Study 
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For a more meaningful analysis, the Likert scale answers were rearranged as two 
tailed interval data (mid point 0= no opinion, l= agree, 2= strongly agree, -I = 
disagree, -2 = strongly disagree). The raw results from each of the respondents are 
summarised and presented in Table 7.1. 
From the raw data presented in Table 7.1, descriptive statistics were compiled, using 
the Excel spreadsheet facility, as presented in Table 7.2. This shows the means scores 
obtained (centred around the neutral answer which scores zero) and the associated 
standard deviation, maximum, minimum, mode and median. The number of positive, 
negative and neutral scores is also recorded in each case. 
Table 7.2 Descriptive Statistics and T-Tests Summary of Survey Results 
Defined Project Activities 
Statistic 
H, H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 H8 
Mean Difference 0.61 0.63 0.41 0.41 0.48 0.35 0.33 0.61 
Standard Deviation 0.93 0.83 0.83 0.78 0.75 0.67 0.73 0.71 
............... 
Max 2 2 2 2 2 2 
............. 
2 2 
Min -2 -1 -2 -2 -1 -1 -1 -1 
Range 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 
Mode 
.. 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
............. .......... 
Median 1 1 
. 
0 
..... 
0 
...... 
0 
... 
0 
...... 
0 1 
Positive Scores Count 27 
......... 
25 20 19 
........ 
21 17 15 24 
Negative Scores Count 5 3 4 2 3 
. 
3 3 
............. 
1 
Neutral Scores Count 14 18 22 25 22 26 29 21 
T-test 95% Confidence 
Interval of the Difference 0.33 0.39 0.17 0.18 0.25 0.15 0.11 0.40 
- Lower 
T-test 95% Confidence 
Interval of the Difference 0.89 0.88 0.66 0.64 0.70 0.55 0.54 0.82 
- Upper 
T Statistic 19.02 5.18 3.37 3.61 4.31 3.5 3.02 5.78 
T Critical (two tail) 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.01 
Source: Author's Field Study 
Table 7.2 also shows the results of the confidence interval analysis (from the T-tests 
performed) to test the significance of the results for the average scores calculated 
above (the null hypothesis being that respondents express neither agreement nor 
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disagreement, with the propositions made). These results demonstrate that in all cases 
the test results are deemed to be significant (at the 5% level) given that the mean 
difference in each case falls within the corresponding 95% upper confidence interval 
of the difference. 
The results show the mean scores for the defined variables lying in the range of 0.33 
to 0.63 inclusive. Bearing in mind that an average weighted score of 1 would 
correspond qualitatively to a response of `agree' then it is possible to gain, from these 
figures, an appreciation of the level of agreement expressed, with respect to each of 
the respective research variables. Overall the average score is 0.48 which might be 
taken as an expression of a moderate degree of acceptance of the research variables in 
general. 
Viewed alternatively, relatively few respondents disagreed with the defined activities 
(note the high percentage of positive scores as contrasted to negative ones, in Tables 
7.1 and 7.2). In total, there are 168 positive scores and only 24 negatives. However, 
there are also 177 neutral scores. 
Based on the average scores from Table 7.2, the ranking of defined activities is also 
possible, as illustrated in Table 7.3. This shows that activity H2, (accurate definition 
of the scope of work depends on whether customers' expectations can well be 
managed) ranks as the issue with greatest priority (0.63). At the other end of the 
spectrum is H7 (i. e., a final check on the readiness for go live) with a score of only 
0.33. 
The survey also reveals that project delay is moderately associated with inappropriate 
adoption of implementation methodology (see line 31 of Appendix 3). Also, the 
majority (59%) of respondents shared the view that the implementation 
methodologies offered by the ERP vendors are largely impractical for their 
implementation projects and virtually always need to be improved to suit the 
implementation's needs (see line 4 of Appendix 3). 
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Table 7.3 Acceptance on Defined Activities with Ranking 
Defined Project Activities Weighted Average 
Score 
Rank 
H, Accurate definition of the scope of work depends on whether 0.63 1 
customers' expectations can well be managed. 
H, Managing customer's expectation is made easier if a senior consultant 0.61 2 
is assigned, at a senior level, to the Pre-Sales support team. 
H8 Inferior support, during the period following implementation, is a likely 061 2 
cause of ultimate project failure. 
HS Prototyping secures validity when developing the final model and also 0.48 3 
aids the familiarisation process. 
H3 ............ Business process reengineering facilitates organisational readiness 0.41 4 
for the ERP implementation. 
H4 Success in development of a To-be Model (i. e. a final model) will be 0.41 4 
conditional on key users being given the ownership of the solution 
design process. 
Hh Simulation using the final model, contributes further to familiarisation 0.35 5 
and success in achieving user education. 
H7 A final check on the readiness for going live, in addition to verification 0.33 6 
of software configuration is vital in the final stages of implementation. 
Source: Author's Field Study Data 
Scalability of implementation methodology is also important since project size and 
complexity deviate considerably from one project to another. This is especially true 
when ERP vendors target different market segments and sizes of company. 
Consequently, 85% of the respondents shared the view that implementation 
methodology should be scalable and flexible (see line 5 of Appendix 3). 
7.6. Correlations Between the Defined Activities 
The proposed strategy for effective implementation of ERP systems is based on the 
chain of actions originally defined in the theoretical model, as discussed in chapter 6. 
Since it is postulated that ideally, there should be no breakdown in the chain of 
association, between the stages as characterised by the respective activities, statistical 
tests were also conducted to determine whether there were any clear associations (i. e., 
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correlations) among the activities (designated Hi through Hg). Pearson's correlation 
coefficient was used in this context, the results being presented in Table 7.4. 
Table 7.4 Correlation Analysis for Inductive Model 
C 
° 
`-° 
ö 
U 
Independent Variable 1 
(X) 
Independent Variable 2 
(Y) 
Pearson's 
Coefficient 
Rxy 
Variation of 
Percent between 
x&Y (r) 
1 H, H2 +0.184 3% 
2 H2 H3 -0.193 3% 
3 H3 H4 -0.030 
............ 
0% 
4 
............. ..... 
H4 
.......... ... 
H5 +0.269 
..................... 
7% 
5 H5 H6 +0.204 4% 
6 H6 H7 +0.125 1% 
7 H7 HB +0.122 1% 
Source: Author's Field Study Data 
Within this context the research was concerned with demonstrating a chain effect for 
the hypothetical variables (i. e., H, through H8), in the chronological order shown in 
Table 7.4. To this end the coefficient of determination (r2) was calculated for each 
pair of hypothetical variables (the results being illustrated in Table 7.4). However, the 
r2 for H, and H2 was 0.03, suggesting that only 3% of the factors accounting for 
variability were common to both variables. The other coefficients were similarly low, 
the highest being only 7%. Hence none of the Pearson's correlation coefficients, 
depicted here, was found to indicate a significant level of correlation. Each pair of 
adjacent activities was seen to display only a very modest correlation and in some 
cases, these were even marginally negative. For example, the survey result indicated 
that the strength of association between H4 and H5 was highest (r = 0.269). 
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7.7. Reliability and Validity of the Data 
Out of the 31 survey original questions, that were concerned with the ERP 
implementation in general, a unique total of 23 questions were selected to build a set 
of 4 distinct constructs which were seen, in collaboration, as a base to develop a two- 
tier adaptive approach to securing EPR implementation. These constructs were 
defined in association with 4 different groups of research interest namely the 
scalability and adaptability of implementation methodology (questions 23,25-26 and 
28-29), co-working with managing consultant to achieve precise definition of project 
scope and management of customer expectation (questions 30-32), key user 
involvement and accountability (questions 33 and 38-39) and finally the course of 
actions for mitigating the adverse implication due to change of business processes 
(questions 22,30-31,34-37,39,41 and 45-50). 
Table 7.5 summarises these major constructs and presents the corresponding 
Cronbach alpha scores obtained. The engagement of managing consultant received a 
Cronbach's alpha value of above 0.7, thereby indicating that the data was deemed to 
be significantly reliable. The Cronbach's alpha values of the remaining three 
constructs were seen to be marginal, mostly above 0.5 (Nunnally, 1978). 
Table 7.5 Data Reliability of Defined Constructs 
Construct N of Items Cronbach's Alpha 
1 Scalability of implementation methodology 5 . 662 
2 Engagement of managing consultant 3 . 
707 
3 Key user involvement and ownership taking 3 . 
327 
4 Mitigation of change implication 15 . 
511 
Source: Author's Field Study Data 
Out of the 4 constructs defined, scalability of implementation methodology and 
engagement of a managing consultant throughout the implementation cycle, to help in 
managing user expectation and securing project success, emerged as the two 
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foundation concepts behind the new operation model, as suggested in this research. 
Mitigation of change implications was also critical to the new model, although its 
associated Cronbach's alpha value was not significantly high. 
However, the validity of the data was less good, largely due the relatively small size 
of sample available (given the relatively low response rate). Also, in retrospect, the 
survey questions may not have been arranged in an optimal way such that the 
respondents could not easily distinguish and/or relate the survey questions wherever 
there was certain degree of association and uniqueness. 
7.8. Analysis of other Aspects of the Data 
The following sections focus on interpreting other aspects of the stakeholder survey 
data which is concerned with the respective issues of expectation gap, selective 
outsourcing, recognition of implementation methodology, ownership taking, change 
management, system prototyping and extended support after implementation. These 
issues will be cohesively and technically addressed in the new implementation model 
being developed as a significant contribution to this research. 
7.8.1. Customer and Vendor Expectation Gaps 
According to the field study, customers have high expectations that ERP vendors will 
ensure the competency and availability of implementation consultants, the quality of 
work and the ability to fix faulty programs. Figure 7.2 is produced using data from 
Appendix 4 and shows the mean scores obtained for the respective questions on 
Customer expectations, as recorded using the original Lickert scale. 
The ability to introduce new ways of doing business along with the implementation of 
ERP system is of the highest importance. However, in general, achievement of 
successful ERP implementation relies very much on the successful reengineering of 
the operational procedures and processes for efficiency improvements. Careful 
planning and execution of the process reengineering is therefore critical to reducing 
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the time required to implement an ERP system. The survey indicates that nearly 54% 
of the respondents tended to agree that BPR should be carried out before ERP 
implementation (see line 14 of Appendix 3). 
Figure 7.2 Customer's Expectation on Vendor's Capabilities 
Availability of local consultants 
Commissioning of managing consultants 
Competency of ERP consultants 
Continuity of work 
Rapid fixing of faulty programs 
Completion of process re-engineering 
Ability to integrate with BPR 
Effective education 
Availability of user tools 
Multiple site implementation support 
Timely follow-ups & reporting 
Source: Author's Field Study 
However, it is also argued that the implementation of ERP system should not come 
immediately after the completion of the BPR project (see line 20 of Appendix 3); 
otherwise, the blame for any problems will tend to fall on the ERP system. The 
remaining respondents, in contrast, held the opposite viewpoint: that implementing 
ERP system should fit into the BPR project, with a view to adopting the best practices 
to ultimately help improve the operational efficiency. 
The survey also unveils that a major change to the business processes, to fit the proper 
use of ERP software, is not generally preferred. Only 43% of the respondents agreed 
that changing the business processes to fit the environment represents the best way to 
accelerate the implementation of ERP systems (see line 16 of' Appendix 3). 
Page 115 of 239 
0123456 
Stakeholder Survey 
On the contrary, approximately 72% of the respondents asserted that external 
consultants with solid change management experience should be introduced to 
manage the BPR project and drive its success (see line 15 of Appendix 3). This 
indicates a contradicting view on the running of BPR/ERP projects. Nevertheless, 
this also implies that there ought to be a channel or a mechanism in place whereby the 
consultants can freely communicate and work together, during an ERP project. 
Figure 7.3 Vendor's Expectation on Customer's Co-operativeness 
Support from top management 
Recognition of corporate readiness 
Clear definition to scope of work 
Availability of internal IT support 
Avoidance of modification 
Appointment of advisory project manager 
Adoption of prototyping 
Regular executive briefing 
Share of ownership among key users 
Extensive training workshops 
Adoption of simulation 
Continuous analysis of risks 
Regular check-up of data integrity 
Chargeability for data fixing 
Management of change 
14.5 
4.2 
14 
13.3 
4.71 
3.4 
13.5 
1 2.2 
13.5 
2.8 
3.3 
12.5 
13.5 
1.6 
"9 
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 
Source: Author's Field Study 
Likewise, ERP vendors have certain expectations of their customers. Figure 7.3 is 
produced using data from Appendix 5 and indicates the mean scores obtained for the 
respective questions, again recorded using the original Lickert scale. Avoidance of 
modifications is among their top concerns (see line 5 of Appendix 5; average score = 
1.72), while the support from top management comes next (see line I of Appendix 5; 
average score= 1.5). A full recognition of corporate wide readiness is also deemed to 
be one of the critical factors (see line 2 of Appendix 5; average score = 1.15). 
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From a vendor's perspective, an executable yet effective methodology needs to be 
developed, based on achievable objectives to ensure the stability of the 
implementation process. In a business environment, nobody wants surprises. For a 
successful implementation, the scope of work again always needs to be specific and 
adaptable to the customer's expectations (also see line 3 of Appendix 5). In most 
cases, including Pepsi, customer dissatisfaction is usually seen as a result of 
misinterpreting customer expectations. 
From a customer's perspective, in order to close the gap, confirmation of user 
requirements by a senior consultant, who should continue to participate in the project, 
should take place even before the contract is signed (see line 9 of Appendix 3). 
However, accurate definition of the user requirements depends upon the consultant's 
ability to manage the customer's expectations. The questionnaire results show 61% 
of respondents sharing the same view that the managing consultant should effectively 
manage customer expectation (see line 10 of Appendix 3). In turn, the success of 
developing an appropriate To-Be model is highly dependent on how accurately the 
customer expectations and user requirements are interpreted. 
While closing the expectation gap tends to require adequate communication and in 
most cases compromises, a managing consultant who will then look after the entire 
implementation alongside the overall project manager, is expected to take on the 
responsibility for facilitating an effective communication channel. Primarily, he or 
she is expected to bridge the gap between the Pre-Sales commitments and the Post- 
Sales capability to deliver the commitments. In the absence of such a modulator, 
misunderstanding and unnecessary disputes are likely to arise. In order to achieve the 
utmost effectiveness, this managing consultant should continue to work with an 
overall project manager and a mediator from the user side throughout the entire 
implementation. An overall project manager should also be nominated from within 
the customer's executive office and be given the responsibility to report to the 
steering committee on the project's progress as the survey result suggested (see line 6 
of Appendix 5). 
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7.8.2. Increasing Acceptance of Selective Outsourcing 
According to the survey, all 46 respondents were found to have implemented off-the- 
shelf ERP packages, regardless of their respective operating environments (see line 10 
of Appendix 2). Slightly more than half of these 46 companies were multinational 
firms that were not self-dependent on IT support. It is fairly common for mid-sized 
companies in Hong Kong to adopt an outsourcing approach to IT support, given the 
assumption that staff turnover and cost effectiveness are two major driving forces. 
However, full-scale outsourcing is rarely seen, as selective outsourcing generally 
proves to be much more cost effective. For example, in Hong Kong, application 
development is already largely outsourced, while outsourcing to external parties for 
system implementation is also increasingly popular, since it is apparently seen as a 
strategic way to reduce IT operating costs. The survey indicated that 6 out of the 46 
companies were already hiring external consultants for ERP implementation (line 17 
of Appendix 2). 
7.8.3. Inadequate Recognition of Implementation Methodology 
Every ERP vendor has its own implementation methodology, which is also used as a 
strategic selling tool to help close sales deals. However, only 33% of the respondents 
fully appreciate or recognise the philosophy behind the implementation methodology 
in place (see line 3 of Appendix 3). The majority of respondents seldom oppose the 
straight adoption of the methodology as supplied. Nor could they identify any 
activities from the implementation cycle that the methodology would need to address. 
It was also found that up to 59% of the implementation projects required 
simplification or alteration to the implementation methodology as originally provided 
(see line 4 of Appendix 3 again), while as few as 7% of the respondents reported that 
they would prefer to have a generic methodology (see line 8 of Appendix 3). This 
again implies that the implementation methodology needs to be scalable (see line 5 of 
Appendix 3). 
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It is perhaps hardly surprising that in most cases, end users are not properly trained on 
the implementation methodology prior to the ERP implementation. However, this 
could be one of the possible reasons behind the high rate of implementation failure. 
According to the survey, it was found that some 68% of the respondents did not 
understand the implementation methodology in terms of its importance, applicability, 
flexibility to change and completeness (see line 2 of Appendix 3). Repetitive 
orientation sessions are also recommended for accelerating an ERP implementation, 
and strategically this should be conducted for everyone who impacts on, or 
contributes to, the ERP implementation, at any stage (see line 17 of Appendix 3). 
According to the survey, all 46 companies reported experiencing certain level of 
delays from three to six months and even more (see line 21 of Appendix 2). 
Furthermore, nearly two-thirds of these 46 implementations were large in operation 
involving expenditure of, on average, half a million dollars for any single 
implementation, this being deployed over an interval of six to twelve months (see line 
18 of Appendix 2). Typically, most project delays involve associated budget overruns, 
since they are likely to incur more consultancy time than originally expected. 
Although delays were reported and further follow-ups were conducted, none of these 
companies declared unsuccessful implementation stories. 
7.8.4. Absence of Ownership Taking and Repetitive Communication 
Some 63% of the respondents agreed that key users should share project ownership 
(see line 18 of Appendix 3). However, with the improved JBA Advantage model, key 
users will be provided with various opportunities to formulate and present their ideas 
for the areas that they are representing. Alternatively, they might hire external 
consultants to deliver the required services although reluctance to share ownership 
implies certain risks to the implementation of the project. 
The survey revealed that more than 89% of the respondents agreed that key users 
should receive their repeated orientation or training sessions, in phases, on a regular 
basis, with the intention of closing the expectation gap between implementation 
consultants and end users (see line 17 of Appendix 3). This implies a full 
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acknowledgement that continuous orientation is important to ensuring that the project 
stays on track and that everyone involved is clearly aware of what has been 
accomplished and what needs to be done in future. 
It is thereby envisioned that the expectation gap can be gradually closed by the 
continuous feeding of information and improved communication. Simply increasing 
the number of communication channels may not, in itself, help improve 
communication efficiency and effectiveness and if mishandled may actually lead to 
confusion instead. Communication channels should thus be restricted and properly 
managed in order to facilitate effective communication. For instance, the initial 
success of implementing System 21 at Changchun Pepsi was due largely thanks to 
restricting the communication channels. Hence the improved methodology adopts an 
interactive approach whereby a collaborative relationship is established through an 
extended level of interaction between the customer and the software supplier. This 
communication continued to be effective up to the point where other business 
priorities prevailed and people started shifting their focus away from the 
implementation project. 
7.8.5. Need for Effective Change Management Programmes 
In association with hypothesis H3,43% of respondents agreed that company 
preparedness was vital for an effective ERP implementation (see line 13 of Appendix 
3). It is like a walkthrough of the existing organisational behaviour, with the ultimate 
goal of making sure that the entire organisation is aware of the dramatic changes that 
may be required to support an effective implementation. The more the company 
adapts to the changes that the business process improvement project introduces, the 
less difficult it will be to implement ERP systems. This also explains why a study of 
business process reengineering needs to be carried out in advance of the ERP 
implementation. By being involved with the feasibility study, which may lead to some 
process changes, company staff should feel more comfortable with adapting to 
additional changes and new initiatives. 
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According to the field study, development of such change management programmes 
as are needed should take place ahead of the ERP implementation (see line 20 of 
Appendix 3). Moreover, change management programs will need to be customised to 
some degree as the implementation project moves towards successful completion (see 
line 15 of Appendix 5). 
7.8.6. Ineffective Prototyping 
The survey revealed that effective use of prototyping helps to accelerate the 
implementation of ERP systems (see line 24 of Appendix 3). Embedding the custom 
programs within the future model of business operation, in compliance with best 
practice standards, for commencing user acceptance testing was found to be the most 
effective use of prototyping. However, with the current model of JBA Advantage, 
simulation is done ahead of any changes needing to be embedded for the future model 
of business operations. Neither are the best practices included in the simulation 
process. 
According to the field study, only 11% of the respondents disagreed with the use of 
prototyping as a means of accelerating the ERP implementation (see line 24 of 
Appendix 3; average score = 4.37). Prototyping is commonly used in most of the 
major implementation methodologies, as previously described. However, there are 
tools available to explicitly reduce the implementation time. For example, standard 
templates and best practices are embedded in Oracle Advantage as core tools for 
achieving such an objective. 
Furthermore, prototyping is fairly easy to justify when there is a relatively strong 
coherence between the standard and custom programs. Given the assumption that key 
users are concerned with the success or failure of the project, adoption of prototyping 
represents a secure method of constructing a future model of business operation. 
Obviously, all major implementation methodologies, including AcceleratedSAP, 
PeopleSoft Express, Oracle Advantage and JBA Advantage, are in full support of this 
inspiration. 
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Simulation appears to work alongside prototyping, since it helps to validate the 
prototype. The conference room pilot of JD Edwards is a specific example of this, 
while `Familiarisation' provides the parallel process in the case of JBA Advantage. 
Supported by the field study as one of the hypotheses H6, simulation facilitates 
effective workshop (also see line 23 of Appendix 3). However, the fundamental 
concept beyond this familiarisation emphasises the application of standard functions 
instead of testing out the prototypes. A complete understanding of the future 
operational model by staff at all levels depends on whether the simulation can be 
carried out effectively. In short, well-organised education programs facilitate the 
successful deployment of commercial or non-commercial systems, while simulation is 
specifically used to validate the applicability of the To-Be model. 
7.8.7. Parallel Testing and Risk Assessment 
Most implementation methodologies, including AcceleratedSAP, seldom give 
emphasis to the execution of parallel testing. Instead, direct changeover is normally 
used as a means of deployment. However, parallel testing is imperative for the 
deployment of complex systems. Eliminating parallel testing therefore increases the 
likelihood of failure. The survey unveils that over 61% of the 46 respondents strongly 
agreed that parallel testing is inevitable (see line 27 of Appendix 3). Depending on 
the outcome of parallel testing, contingency plans may or may not be executed. 
Furthermore, the survey indicates that a regular review and updating of the 
contingency plan is needed, as it helps to secure a smooth transition into the final 
success of the ERP implementation (see line 28 of Appendix 3). 
Parallel testing represents a conservative approach to securing a final success. Risk 
assessment is also essential for decision-making about the time needed for carrying 
out the parallel testing. More than 74% of the respondents shared a common view 
that iterative risk assessment is needed on a regular basis throughout the entire 
implementation (also see line 25 of Appendix 3). Parallel testing is highly 
recommended for any large-scale ERP project, although it will increase the cost of 
implementation to an extent that depends upon the duration of the exercise. 
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The concept behind ERP development can easily be understood, but the actual 
deployment can become complicated, since it requires collaborative work among 
groups of people inside and outside the organisation. Successful implementation of 
ERP systems depends on a complete understanding of the functional aspects of the 
system and how the system reacts in various situations. Simply carrying out trial 
testing, which is like a miniature version of parallel testing, is not considered adequate 
and is rather risky. Functional and operational integration must be tested in parallel if 
a minimal interruption is expected. 
The survey indicates that some 61% of the respondents agreed that the execution of 
parallel testing would largely increase the chance of final success (see line 27 of 
Appendix 3). Typically, it may take two to three months to carry out the parallel 
testing. Normally, additional effort is also likely to be required from time to time, to 
rectify operational flaws as needed and to remedy any faulty programs that may arise. 
The ultimate value of carrying out parallel testing lies in the opportunity it brings to 
perform a final check of the company's readiness to achieve an effective changeover. 
7.8.8. Need for Extended Support after Implementation 
Many companies apparently believe that following completion of the ERP 
implementation phase of the project, all implementation activities can be expected to 
be over (Kirchmer, 1998). However, such companies continue to require 
improvements to their software based business processes wherever possible, and this 
implies that continuous re-engineering is necessary in order to achieve or retain a 
competitive advantage. 
The support issue is always a tough agenda item between the customer and the service 
provider. From the service vendor's perspective, the implementation is deemed to be 
over when the user acceptance testing is complete. However, this is not true from the 
customer's standpoint. Even with a warranty period of, say, 60 days, customers might 
not necessarily feel comfortable if, for example, they continue to experience data 
corruption. 
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Nearly 98% of the respondents strongly or moderately agreed that `after go-live 
support' should become an integral part of the implementation process, and therefore 
that the implementation methodology should take into account the availability of such 
a necessary service for a more rewarding implementation (see line 30 of Appendix 3). 
7.9. Reflections 
While a majority of clients tend to have high hopes of the ERP software vendors with 
respect to the availability of local consultants, competency of implementation 
consultants, responsiveness on fixing faulty programs, availability of user tools for 
data take-on and third party software integration, software vendors also have 
expectations of their customers. Precise definition of the scope of work, availability 
of internal technical support, avoidance of modifications, commissioning of a client- 
side project manager and the evaluation of company readiness for ERP software 
implementation are typical desires of an ERP implementation service provider. 
In short, most of the ERP projects failed primarily due to an inaccurate interpretation 
of the scope of work, inadequate awareness of implementation methodology, inability 
to recognise the importance of ownership taking and regular communication, 
inadequate change management, misuse of prototyping in relation to process 
simulation and a lack of post-implementation support. These causes of failure 
represent only the major implementation challenges and the missing capabilities that 
are worth a detailed study. Also, these factors are interrelated, and therefore they 
should not be treated separately when solutions are developed in attempts to achieve 
successful implementation. In the following chapter, these challenging factors will be 
discussed in more details. 
Above all, from a more strategic point of view, these challenges are all related to the 
ineffective management of the expectation gap and therefore a mechanism needs to be 
in place to help eliminate the gap and hence govern the entire implementation process. 
This mechanism will be the implementation model yet to be developed as a 
refinement of JBA Advantage (i. e., one of the major deliverables of this research). 
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8. DISCUSSION 
8.1. Developing A New Generation of Methodology 
The implementation methodology currently available to the selective customers of 
JBA International, including Pepsi Cola in China, is called JBA Advantage. This is 
the second generation of methodology produced by JBA International. When 
compared with its predecessor, this improved implementation methodology is deemed 
to be more sophisticated and scalable. Even so, there are several areas that still need 
to be improved so that more effective implementation of System 21 can be facilitated. 
A newer version of JBA Advantage, as depicted in Figure 8.1 has been developed as a 
result of analysing the case study of Pepsi Cola and the descriptive survey carried out 
in Hong Kong. Essentially, this version attempts to strengthen the project foundation 
for people readiness, improve the effectiveness of the familiarisation process by 
embracing customised programs into the simulation sub-process, emphasize the 
importance of final check to minimise risks and finally incorporate additional toolkits 
and processes into the existing version of JBA Advantage (as depicted in Figure 8.2) 
to help expedite the overall ERP implementation. In brief, improvements in terms of 
re-organising and expanding the existing implementation processes are recommended. 
Above all, Figure 8.2 underlines that each implementation process should be owned 
and managed separately. 
8.1.1. Strengthening the Project Foundation 
The scope of work, as defined in the `Foundation Phase' of the new model, extends to 
cover the design and development of custom program extensions, since project failure 
was seen in the case study of Pepsi, when customisation was really needed and was 
not properly managed. The Foundation Phase is now more exhaustive, as it is 
reformed to embrace a new structure of project stages as follows: Definition, 
Operational Analysis, Preparation, Solution Design, Development Testing and 
Completion. This new structure is concluded to be more sensible in terms of fostering 
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Figure 8.1 Building Blocks of New JBA Advantage 
Stage Substage A Tasks F Owners T ools 
P Re 'd 
Pre-Sales None Conduct initial meeting; Sales Rep  
Present software functionality & capabilities; 
ADDoln senior lead consultant to conduct Pre-Sales 
study & recommend solutions; 
Manage/alien customer's expectations;  
Decide appropriate proposal; 
Write up proposal; 
Drat contract with executive approval; 
921 contract signed; 
Allocate overall project manager; 
Arrange Internal kick off meeting; 
Arrange external kick off meeting with customer; 
UDdate project plan & costing.  
Foundation Definition Define scope of work; Client Proj 
Design workflows; Mgr  
fin administrative procedures; 
Conduct executive briefing and updates; 
Schedule and conduct project planning session; 
Evaluate organisational readiness;  
vI change programs; 
vel Infrastructure and installation plans;  
fin organisation & communication channels; 
Assign ownership and responsibilities; 
ev I orientation plan for project members; 
Devetoo knowledge transfer plan; 
Develoo quality control plan; 
vI contingency plans; 
Uodate project plan & costing.  
Operational familiar with the business flows; Key Users 
Analysis Review model; 
II operational & technical requirements; Functional  
Perform GAP analysis. Heads  
Preparation n 11 technical infrastructure; Client Prof 
Arrance software & hardware delivery; Mgr 
Condu Initial orientation for project members; 
Nominate client project managers; 
Activate vendor's local support resources; 
Establish communication & reporting channels; 
Uodate project plan & costing.  
Soluaon Design Create optimal business solution to meet future Key Users 
business requirements; 
Propose the To-Be Model; (Prototyping) Functional 
Document adopted business processes; Heads 
Desion data conversion, custom extension, reports; 
ldenbly process and organisational changes; I 
Review the To-Be Model; 
Update project plan & costing.  
Development Develop custom extensions, application Client Proj 
Testing enhancements, data conversion and Interfaces; Mgr 
Execute stress and integration tests.  
Completion view development of To-Be Model; Client Proj 
NojN acceptance of To-Be Model. Mgr 
Familiarisation Education Phan liver and review education. Proj Mgr 
Simulation plan, conduct and review simulation sessions. Proj Mgr 
Implementation Preparation R vi implementation plan; Client Prof 
Review contingency plan; Mgr  
Set uo and verify live environments; 
Training Design user training by consultants & key users; Client Proj 
vI training materials; Mgr 
Train end users by key users. 
Data Load PPerform'Go-Live" readiness check; Client Proj 
Perform data entry/conversion; Mgr 
Verity data conversion.  
Review Review project progress; Clien PProj 
nu 'Go-live" meeting; Mgr 
Review support  
Update project plan & costing.  
Production Deployment Perform a final quality control check; -0-i-ent Pro) 
Handoverdocumentation; Mgr 
Conduct pre-production briefing; 
Obtain client's sign oft; 
Arrange public release with parallel runs; 
Initiate service warranty; 
Update project plan & costing.  
Support Provide a fast route or quick fixes. Client Proj 
Conduct user surveys; Mgr  
Monito and analyse problem log;  
vi and adjust support quality, 
vi change requests & arrange development; 
Declare closure of the project. 
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the momentum needed for a successful ERP implementation. However, the 
prerequisite for achieving such success is the presence of company-wide preparedness, 
in which users will be trained and concerns will be addressed through regular 
communication. 
An essential point is that key users must be provided with `Level 1' training, so that 
appropriate ERP configurations can be developed and introduced to end users. The 
key users are normally functional heads, while the end users are those who will 
ultimately benefit from using the ERP systems. As part of the change management 
efforts, the key users must be involved in the design of business processes and the 
implementation of ERP systems. Key users' involvement in the solution design 
suggests that a more suitable prototype could be constructed. However, formal 
education and training should be provided to help them do so (Bingi et al., 1999; 
Holland et al., 1999). Therefore, the Foundation Phase can never be avoided under 
any circumstances, since it should trigger some critical processes through which the 
key users can be oriented to recognise the value of their contributed effort into the 
ERP project. 
Given the understanding that enterprise wide cultural and structural change should be 
managed (Falkowski et al., 1998), continuous system orientation, for the key users is 
imperative. This is facilitated by level 1 and level 2 workshops for the key users is 
imperative, to ensure that everyone involved is fully oriented towards accomplishing 
the project's goals. Unlike a project briefing, orientation, this is defined as an 
interactive and repetitive process to help foster an effective channel for 
communication. This is not necessarily delivered in a top down manner that provides 
every single member with instruction to move on during the implementation. Instead, 
it should be an exercise in bi-directional communication, carried at out every stage of 
the implementation, thereby forming a significant part of the preparedness program. 
For effective progress reporting, there must be a mechanism by which every 
individual can be informed of what other people are doing. Unless everyone is fully 
aware of what other people are actually doing, the implementation will be inevitably 
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Figure 8.2 Process Flow and Check Points 
Additions or Hiahliahts: 
Appointment of managing consultant 
for pre-sales support; 
Alignment of expectations. 
Additions or Hiahliahts: 
Evaluation of company readiness; 
Assignment of ownership; 
Development of change programs; 
Gap analysis; 
Arrangement of orientation programs 
for key users; 
Have key users to present solutions to 
their functional areas; 
Nomination of client project manager, 
Establishment of communication 
channels; 
Use of prototyping to build to-be 
model; 
Development of custom programs 
before the familiarisation 
Appointment of vendor for local 
support. 
Additions or Highlights: 
Combination of Education with 
Familiarisation; 
Inclusion of simulation. 
Additions or Hiahliahts: 
Development of end-user training 
materials. 
Additions or Highlights: 
Final checkpoint. 
Additions or Highlights: 
Inclusion of post implementation 
support service. 
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risky. Specific workshops, aimed at assisting individuals in tackling various 
management issues, should be conducted at various stages. Within these workshops, 
key users must first be orientated to align their expectations with the project goals, 
during the initial stage of implementation. The alignment of expectations should then 
be exercised repeatedly in order to sustain the momentum and continue moving 
towards the successful completion of the project. 
The Preparation sub-stage is a new addition to the Foundation Phase. The critical 
tasks as defined in the Preparation Stage include the achievement of orientation for all 
key members, the appointment of client project managers and the selection of local 
vendors to arrange customer implementation services. It is thus essential to create and 
maintain effective communication channels, as depicted in Figure 8.2, since solution 
design is a core activity that carries a great deal of information that requires to be 
exchanged and propagated. 
Significantly, the survey results suggested that prototyping should be adopted to help 
reduce the expectation gap. In most cases, the future model, emerging from the 
solution design process, is likely to require a certain degree of customisation. The 
development of suitable custom program extensions can be possible if there is 
adequate and accurate communication. With regard to the workflow design, gap 
analysis is therefore unavoidable, since most ERP systems, including System 21, are 
unable to meet every single business requirement. Once again, the adoption of 
prototyping is seen as favourable, as it allows the requirements of custom program 
extensions to be precisely defined and mutually agreed. 
Instead of creating a prototype for the entire solution, what is actually needed is a 
prototype for the custom programs. Therefore, strategic use of prototyping can help 
to close the expectation gap quickly and improve customer satisfaction. However, 
among the ERP vendors, none appears to have adopted this kind of prototyping as 
part of their implementation methodologies. 
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8.1.2. Enforcing Ownership Taking 
In addition to strengthening the project foundation, ownership taking does help avoid 
confusion and hence improve the smoothness of the overall ERP implementation. It 
is also with regard to the hypothetical strategy [Si], ownership taking is key to 
facilitating project management in a more effective manner, as project ownership and 
project management are equally important but should be handled separately. By 
general definition, project management involves optimising the use of scare resources 
and managing various forms of risk to meet stakeholder expectations. In other words, 
it should be used to optimise outputs relative to inputs while factoring in both risks 
and expectations. Most people duly perceive that project management ensures 
accountability or the linking of people to project tasks and deliverables. However, 
project management can never compensate for people who lack discipline (Spafford, 
2003). While the policies and procedures should remain essential to cultivating 
discipline, ownership taking is always imperative to ensuring that ERP projects can be 
effectively managed. In particular regard to the adaptive approach, project ownership 
can be split and even transferred, given that there is a readily available mechanism to 
make sure that the ownership continues to be sustained through to the end of the 
project. 
As in the Pre-Sales Phase, it is the sales manager, rather than anyone else, who must 
take on the initial ownership of the project until it is securely handed over. While 
many other articles emphasise the role of the project manager, key users are the focus 
of this research model. The key users are generally department heads, who should 
help to determine the final architecture and decide on the schedule within which the 
ERP system should be adopted. More importantly, key users are also supposed to 
take on the `ownership' of the operational analysis as well as solution design. In other 
words, they are required to share the implementation's success or failure. As a logical 
consequence, they are motivated or forced to participate significantly at a decision- 
making level in a specific definition of the project's scope and deliverables, gap 
analysis, development of change programs, review of the contingency plan and finally 
a construction of the 'To-Be' model. 
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During the early stage of the Foundation Phase, key users' involvement in overall 
project planning is always obligatory, since it is of prime importance that they must 
play a leading role in the subsequent stages. For notable implementation 
effectiveness, key users working in collaboration with the implementation consultants 
are required to come up with appropriate resolutions to the problem areas for which 
they have been given ownership. Until the key users become extensively involved 
with developing the solutions, no real commitment towards success can be evidenced. 
Delegation of ownership is also considered as a significant contributor to increasing 
the likelihood of overall success, while individuals are still given responsibility to 
accomplish specific tasks. A proper ownership structure will largely facilitate a 
collaborative working environment where successful ERP implementation can be 
fostered. 
8.1.3. Embracing Customised Programs Into the Simulation 
Instead of scheduling a series of education programs on how to use the standard 
package, it would be better if customised programs could be integrated into the future 
model for pilot testing. Education then becomes a key part of the Familiarisation 
process. This serves as a pre-requisite to carrying out the process simulation. With 
such an arrangement, key users could find the Familiarisation Phase more useful, 
since they are now able to try out the operation of the future model. This also gives 
the key users enough confidence to carry out end-user training by themselves. 
The `Familiarisation Phase' has a repeated process in which key users are given the 
opportunity to carry out a process simulation for the future operation of the model, as 
developed in the Foundation Phase. Custom program extensions, which are 
additional programs developed through recognising requirements that cannot be 
fulfilled with the current ERP functionality, are now integrated into the process 
simulation (thus allowing validation of prototype). As a result, key users can thus 
understand what exactly they will be getting out of the simulation and will be able to 
assess how comfortable they are with the customisation. Although over- 
customisation needs to be avoided to reduce errors and to retain the capability to take 
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advantage of newer versions and releases (Rosario, 2000) and core programs should 
not be modified at all (Sumner, 1999), custom program extensions are seldom 
avoidable, and to a certain extent, can be added and operated side by side with or 
around the core programs to enhance functional compatibility. Fine tuning a 
prototype is an iterative process which also represents an innovative improvement to 
JBA Advantage. 
8.1.4. Emphasising Final Readiness Check 
The Implementation Phase is characterised by having a final readiness check, 
implemented ahead of full deployment when working towards project completion. 
Assembly of live environments, initial data load and user training are critical activities 
as far as the readiness check is concerned. Final Preparation itself is essentially a 
major checkpoint for ensuring that everything is ready for an official launch of the 
system. Since most ERP projects take a relatively long time to implement, risks arise 
at different stages. These need to be addressed as a matter of priority. In this new 
version of JBA Advantage it is suggested that quality assurance, risk assessment and 
contingency planning should be organised so that checkpoints can be defined to help 
secure the success of implementation. 
It is also advised that checkpoints need to be integrated into the quality assurance 
process to ensure a secure move from one stage to the next. As a result, contingency 
plans would need to be reviewed and changed as necessary at the end of each stage. 
Contingency planning is crucial to reducing the risk of failure by incorporating more 
time to react and to pursue other options in situations where a specific action does not 
produce the expected deliverables. The larger the scale of an implementation project, 
the more important is the contingency planning. Above all, project failure is often a 
direct consequence of not being able to live with the contingency plan. However, 
developing contingency plan is always neglected by many other ERP implementation 
methodologies. 
Furthermore, the Implementation Phase should never take place until key users are 
confident enough to train end-users on new ways of doing business. To achieve 
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implementation success, the key users must be given the responsibility to develop a 
plan for user training and they must conduct the training accordingly. As in the case 
of Pepsi, the BU acting as advisory project manager had to actively support the 
training process, as effective project management should be disciplined, and should 
include co-ordinated training (Falkowski et al., 1998). 
8.1.5. Expediting Implementation with Tools and Processes 
Apart from the competency of the individuals involved, the availability of effective 
communication channels and the degree of compromise among the individuals or 
groups involved, are vitally important. Moreover, the effectiveness of improved 
methodology is also dependent on how well the pre-implementation work can be 
accomplished. The availability of data take-on and fixing tools is found to be useful 
in accelerating the implementation process. For example, Scheer and Habermann 
(2000) argue that modelling methods, architecture and tools are critical while Rosario 
(2000) suggests that proper tools, techniques and skill in using these tools will offer 
considerable aid towards successful ERP implementation. Therefore, different tools 
and processes are necessary to improve the likelihood of implementation success. As 
depicted in Figure 8.3, implementation processes and tools are therefore suggested as 
key features in the improvement of JBA Advantage. 
Figure 8.3 Processes and Tools for ERP Implementation 
Processes Toolkits 
" Business Process Reengineering " Scope Checklist 
" Gap Analysis " Functionality Wish List 
" Prototyping " Risk List 
" Continuous Orientation " User Profiling Tool 
" Ownership Taking (Key Users) " Affinity Diagram Tool 
" Quality Assurance " Workflow Tool e. g. @ctive Modeler 
" Parallel Run " Web-based Project Management Tool 
" Customer Relationship Management " Data Capturing Tool 
" Supplier Relationship Management " Data Verification Tool 
" Integrated Support (Pre- & Post- Sales) " Data Fixing Tool 
" Extended Contingency Plan " User Surveys 
" Change Management 
" After Go-live Support 
Source: Author's Field Study 
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Lastly, as delivering early measures of success is important (Wee, 2000), measures 
and controls are implicitly addressed in the new version of JBA Advantage. 
Continuous assessments of risks, regular update on resources, schedules and 
milestone achievements, regular orientation for key users, and finally, regular reviews 
of the contingency plan are embedded into its methodology. 
However, implementation success is still unlikely if tools and processes are not used 
effectively, since it is found that most of the issues affecting success are human- 
centric. Therefore, the new version of JBA Advantage emphasises and requires a 
solid foundation building so that implementation can be effectively facilitated. 
Regardless of the implementation methodology available, scalability, flexibility and 
collaboration, leading to a secure platform, are vital to securing successful 
implementation. 
8.2. Linking Up the Two Tiers: The Methodology and Strategies 
The survey results reveal that companies with ERP implementation experience mostly 
agree that an extended degree of flexibility is always needed because of various 
changes that arise during the course of implementation. While only a few 
implementation methodologies are scalable and flexible, most are rigid and require a 
lot of attention. In most cases, ERP vendors recognise the common situation that a 
vanilla version of implementation methodologies can be marginally enforced. 
However, if this flexibility is abused and the changes are not properly managed, any 
further attempt to stay on the implementation methodology seems a waste of time and 
the implementation is likely to be out of control. 
Control and flexibility are inherently contradictory. Implementation methodology 
attempts to put in place some kind of control, while a real life implementation always 
requires flexibility to various degrees. Therefore, this dilemma needs to be resolved 
before it turns into a barrier to the project's success. Ideally, the implementation 
methodology should be positioned strategically and customised as needed so that the 
implementation strategy can be suitably supported. However, for most 
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implementation projects, it is hard to decide on the methodology until an overall 
strategy is formulated. Unlike implementation methodology, which is deemed to be 
less adaptable, a good strategy incorporates a certain degree of flexibility. With 
regard to change management, the implementation strategy also appears to be more 
significant than the methodology. Therefore, a company-wide implementation 
strategy should always be formulated prior to implementing any ERP system. 
Figure 8.4 Comparison of Strategy and Methodology 
Strategy Methodology 
" Specific " Generic 
" Managerial concern " Operational concern 
" Customer driven " Vendor driven 
" Flexible " Rigid 
" Environment dependent " Environment independent 
" Non-Procedural " Procedural 
Source: Author's Field Study 
In general, strategy and methodology, as depicted in Figure 8.4 are both generic and 
specific respectively. However, in the ERP world, their positions are sometimes 
reversed. A methodology has to be generic, since confusion might result if numerous 
variations are developed. On the contrary, to be effective a strategy needs to be 
specific to the organisation's culture and working environment. Implementing an 
ERP system without a defined strategy is rather risky. No two organisations are 
exactly the same. Due to the fact that the business world is so complex, it is not 
usually justifiable to develop a new methodology for a specific organisation. To a 
certain extent, therefore, a strategy represents a fix to a methodology. Alternatively, a 
methodology can also be considered as a baseline for developing an appropriate 
strategy. 
In terms of user involvement, senior executives must always be involved in 
formulating an appropriate strategy for effective ERP implementation. This strategy 
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should address various managerial issues, including the economic justification for the 
project, financial arrangements, communication channels, reporting schedule, 
resource allocation and commitment, rollout support and timeframe, the change 
management and system integration approach, etc. Only when these managerial 
issues are resolved can operational staff focus on the execution aspect of 
implementation and reap the benefits of the implementation methodology. The 
collaboration issues regarding how communication can be better facilitated will be 
discussed in the following section. 
Hence with respect to the ERP projects, both implementation strategy and 
methodology are equally important. However, their target audiences, sources of 
initiative and degree of flexibility are somehow different. Despite their differences, 
they also have similarities. For example, neither implementation strategy nor 
methodology can solely secure a successful implementation without top management 
support. Both the implementation strategy and the methodology require regular 
reviews and, more importantly, adaptations so that implementation can be truly 
supported. Changes must also be documented while the implementation is moving 
forward. 
In terms of process reengineering, methodology is more applicable, since a structured 
approach needs to be adopted for the execution of new or changed rules and processes. 
For example, employees at Pepsi were expecting some sort of guidelines and 
instructions to help them through the exercise, although, at the same time, they tended 
to exhibit resistance to the process change. In practice, the process of BPR 
transitioning requires a development of operational strategy since a methodology is 
rather reactive with regard to inspiring people to perform. Successful adoption of an 
implementation methodology relies on people's understanding of the corporate 
objective in respect to the ERP implementation and how well the users' expectations 
can be managed. Details of the BPR issues and the management of user expectation 
will be discussed further in the following sections. 
With respect to change management, it is imperative to formulate a strategy at a 
broader level that is aimed at facilitating a methodology and rectifying any 
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unexpected results of the implementation. Process reengineering is always 
accompanied by changes and usually resistance too. Strategic and tactical measures 
need to be developed to combat this resistance. Hence until a change management 
strategy is well developed and tested, any tactical measures are likely to be in vain. 
The latter section will attempt to address the change management in the context of 
this research. 
Above all and again, company readiness represents another pivotal requirement for 
achieving successful ERP implementation. Introducing changes through BPR, as well 
as managing these changes, is a major part of the preparation process. An ERP 
implementation strategy is more valuable if it can support implementing BPR project 
initiatives. In general, formulating a strategy is vital to preparing the entire company 
for the implementation of an ERP system. An educational programme geared towards 
achieving company readiness, with special attention to change management and BPR 
transition needs to be developed and executed accordingly. However, such a 
programme cannot be successful until it can cope with the company's objectives with 
regard to ERP implementation, organisational culture, and employee attitude towards 
implementation and the availability of resources. 
In short, implementation strategy and methodology are not only complementary but 
also supplementary. In the process of formulation, an adaptive strategy should be 
developed to compensate for inadequacies in the methodology, since ERP vendors are 
unlikely to customise their implementation methodologies for a specific 
organisation's setting. Indeed, according to the research survey, implementation 
methodologies are seldom changeable. Even though some methodologies are scalable, 
companies still find it difficult to exactly follow the vendors' approach when 
implementing ERP systems. This implies that chief executives as well as operational 
staff must be well educated on the implementation methodology as soon as the 
implementation begins. From this point onwards, a relevant strategy can then be 
formulated. 
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8.2.1. A Showcase Approach 
Being increasingly accepted as a generic strategy toward the effective implementation 
of ERP systems, a showcase approach, in close relation with the deployment of a 
hypothetical strategy [S3], significantly contributes to multiple site implementations. 
As a fulfilment of the `Win small Win early' element defined in the hypothetical 
model, this particular section aims to illustrate a strategic use of the showcase 
approach using comparative examples from two multinational companies, namely 
Pepsi Cola (Pepsi) and Chubb Security (Chubb). Depending on the organisational 
circumstances, a showcase can be either of a top-down or participative mode. 
Of these, the latter is considered more difficult to cope with. Preserving low staff 
turnover rates and reducing change resistance is a challenge for those multinational 
companies who intend to implement ERP systems for their operations in China. 
Examples, with reference to a strategic use of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), are 
cited to illustrate how resistance can be effectively managed. KPIs, as the term itself 
suggests, are not an exact measure of achievement but rather provide an indication of 
performance, with a focus on effectiveness and efficiency. Furthermore, KPIs exhibit 
certain characteristics that include appropriateness, relevance, accuracy, timeliness, 
completeness and finally comprehensiveness to facilitate an assessment of individual 
as well as group performance. 
Like most multinational companies in which a strategic use of ERP system is critical 
to reducing costs and improving efficiency, Chubb had attempted to implement 
PeopleSoft as a business solution. In this case each global business project was given 
an identity. For example, the implementation of the PeopleSoft ERP solution at 
Chubb was known as Project Atlas. Establishing an identity is just a kind of branding. 
Brands are inherently strategic and leave footprints wherever they go (Crawford, 
2001). In comparison with other critical projects, Atlas was very powerful in terms of 
the time and resources the company needed to commit. The sales contract for the 
software licences was originally signed in the UK between Chubb Plc and PeopleSoft 
Inc. as a global deal. From the companies short-listed for support and services, IBM 
Global Consulting Services (formerly PriceWaterhouseCoopers Consulting) was 
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chosen and given a designated role as sole global implementation partner, while 
PeopleSoft provided only the software licences and classroom training. 
With reference to an informal survey of experienced ERP project managers from 
various corporate IT departments and the Big Five consulting companies, staffing 
(including turnover) was ranked the second out of ten project management headaches, 
whereas resistance to change was comparatively easier to tackle (Trepper, 1999). 
Dealing with employees is deemed to be the first priority in the successful 
implementation of changes. At Chubb, there was a common belief that employees 
with the required skills and experience could make a significant contribution to the 
effectiveness of the implementation. As a result, selected employees were invited to 
join the core team as key members and work full time on the project. A project office 
was established in Sydney shortly after the project was initiated. The office consisted 
of around fifty individuals, of whom half were the core members elected from their 
respective business operating units, the remainder being external consultants. As it is 
generally accepted that an effective project requires group as well as individual 
commitment to succeed, the full attention of these core members was seen as key to 
moving forward the implementation. 
The core members representing individual countries were sent to Sydney to define a 
global to-be model. In the meantime, a change management team was formed. While 
the contract was signed globally for the entire Chubb, implementation firstly kicked 
off in Asia Pacific with extended IT support from Australia. Singapore had been 
identified as a showcase location where a prototype would be implemented. Upon 
acceptance of the showcase, multiple site implementations would, in future, take place 
across the Asia Pacific. The general manager of IT for Asia Pacific was initially 
appointed as global project manager for Project Atlas and worked full time on the 
project. 
In any software implementation project, resistance to change is virtually unavoidable. 
However, it may be beneficial to implement the correct change which would lead to 
an opportunity to do more business (Suresh, 2001). Perceived risk and habit are two 
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fundamental sources of innovation resistance (Sheth, 1981). Resistance can often be 
reduced through adopting an early consultation process (Fowler and Walsh, 1999). 
This was also recognised to be an effectivevehicle at Chubb, encouraging user 
acceptance, especially at the operations level. Indeed, involving the end users from 
the start is seen as a `magic key to success' (Salopek, 2001). Successful attempts to 
involve and consult with the end-users as soon as the software selection begins forms 
an essential part of this company's readiness as part of its approach towards 
successful implementation of ERP. Early consultation is seen as a selling process 
through which management can be convinced, as long as the showcase is properly 
demonstrated. After all, `seeing is believing'. However, it is also apparent that if a 
showcase falls short, the entire implementation process could be seriously and 
adversely affected. 
Both Chubb and Pepsi opted for a showcase approach. In Pepsi's case, the intention 
was to construct a showcase at one of the pilot sites where strong resistance at the 
operations level threatened to defeat the project. A showcase is more than just a user 
prototype, as it requires thorough planning and proper execution. Full attention to the 
preparation of a single showcase is crucial, while an immediate attempt to 
simultaneously implement the ERP system at several locations is rather risky. In 
retrospect, the initial failure at Pepsi was a direct result of a lack of groundwork 
before moving forward. The implementation consultants were found to lack the 
experience required to identify the user needs, while the internal support staff also 
failed to make any appreciable effort to close the expectation gap within the 
organisation. Inadequate involvement and technical support from the internal support 
staff left the end users to rely excessively on the external consultants, who were also 
found to be incapable of providing the expected technical solutions. Inability to 
manage users' expectations thereby sustained resistance, while inferior control over 
resources produced additional blocks against winning users' confidence. 
Conversely it was observed that Chubb was more efficient in terms of resource 
allocation. For example, it was recognised that core team members needed to be 
assessed and that they were allowed to work full time for the project. Closing the 
expectation gap was also seen as being within the duty of the core team. In addition, 
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the pursuit of management buy-in was also an immense task that the core team had to 
work on, since it was important to determine from the outset, how the management 
could be influenced. 
A showcase is likely to be more successful when a suitable execution mode is adhered 
to. A top-down or directive mode is favourable if the gap only exists at the 
management level and a strict control over the operations unit is being exercised. 
Conversely a bottom up or participative mode is more appropriate if effective 
delegation is being practiced comfortably at the organisational level. 
With respect to the top-down mode, management executives need to be convinced of 
the benefits that the implementation will bring. If the management is listening to the 
operations departments, then the challenge is more to do with persuading the 
operations staff at an early stage. No matter which mode of execution is employed, 
continual support from company management is again critical to every stage of the 
implementation process. Furthermore, management should also have a strong 
commitment to using the system for achieving business aims (Roberts and Barrar, 
1992). Contracting staff and hiring contingent resources are good examples of the 
`commitment' that Pepsi had extensively adopted to accelerate its ERP 
implementation. 
With respect to the participative mode, every attempt to relate KPIs with the work that 
employees are doing for the project, should positively contribute to the project's 
success. In some cases, the real challenge of ERP is not so much gaining buy-in but 
helping employees to cope with job makeovers (Schneider, 1999). In many US 
corporations, employees are required to develop their own KPIs that will in turn form 
a baseline to help decide how they should be rewarded for satisfactory performance. 
Inspiring individuals to react is key to this strategic approach. In practice, operations 
staff members need to get involved. Indeed, lack of full commitment at the operations 
level goes a considerable way to explaining why the implementation projects at Pepsi 
failed. 
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Thanks to the rapid growth of the economy in the last couple of years, the workforce 
community in China is now adjusting itself towards efficiency and adaptation to 
change. People at work are becoming more open-minded, as a result of an increasing 
threat of competition. However, the relative immaturity of IT in China's industries, 
with regard to a lack of long-term MIS strategy and project experience, is still 
considered to be a major obstacle to effective implementation of ERP systems (Huang 
& Palvia, 2001). Informal planning, process modelling and interdependent social 
relationships and attitudes toward organisational changes all limit process innovation 
efforts (Martinsons, 1998). A complete attitude change is still a long way off in 
China. 
Further to the showcase approach, teamwork is also critical to pursuing effective ERP 
implementation. Implementing teamwork calls for paths of change (Fox & Howe, 
1997). In Mainland China, motivation is among the most difficult of paths to work 
with. Forming a KPI team to define key result areas, report KPIs frequently and 
finally identify hierarchical KPIs is key to managing the motivation (Parmenter, 2001). 
However, the concept of KPIs is reasonably new to workforce management in China 
and it will probably take some time for Chinese industries to embrace this innovative 
concept of performance evaluation. 
Additionally, implementing ERP systems inevitably calls for overtime work, yet this 
is not acceptable as a general practice in Mainland China. If employees are already 
overworked, eliminating any non-essential tasks from the system may require the 
development of incentive programs to motivate change and incorporation of these 
programs into performance reviews (Schneider, 1999). 
Rewarding performance appropriately can foster motivation. However, without 
avoiding people from shifting to do different jobs from time to time, any further 
attempts to improving work efficiency are unlikely to be successful. For rewards to 
be powerful, they must be visible (Kerr, 2000). To facilitate a successful ERP 
implementation in China through improved motivation, giving away a mixed reward 
of tangible gains is currently believed to be effective in terms of cultivating the 
employees' motivation to work more effectively. Monetary reward is generally 
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considered to be the most effective motivator, albeit with a short period of validity, 
since there is a common phenomenon whereby individuals with reasonable incomes 
tend to compare themselves with others in terms of tangible gains. 
With radical changes and improvements to the economic condition in China, an 
increasing number of people consider moving from one job to another even if this 
involves only a modest pay rise. As a result, overall productivity is affected, and this 
indirect benefit should be transformed into a more meaningful driving force. 
Extending sabbatical vacations or giving away days' subsidy in exchange for more 
communications and effective implementation work, for instance, was quite 
commonly experienced during the implementation of System 21 at Mitsushita China, 
an original manufacturer of the `Panasonic' brand. Also, since good technical staff 
with ERP experience are extremely hard to find and keep, especially in state-owned 
enterprises, a project manager should therefore develop a performance recognition 
program that helps with staff retention. 
In conclusion, no matter what implementation methodology is adopted, a successful 
attempt to prepare a showcase represents a sound strategic approach toward 
implementing an ERP system, as it helps to break down change resistance and also 
closes the expectation gap through the extended participation of operations staff. 
Hence a showcase is more like a prototype, yet it calls for more attention in planning 
and execution. The aim of demonstrating a showcase is to stimulate expectations 
from other parts of the organisation. This implies that it will foster effective 
communication and increase people's excitement and motivation to move forward 
with the project. Adopting a showcase approach to get the implementation going 
smoothly can help reduce fear as well as risk of change. Similarly correlating KPIs 
with tangible rewards can go a long way towards eliminating resistance and staff 
turnover, hence helping to increase productivity. Again, support from top executives 
as well as operations staff is equally important. However, it is acknowledged that it is 
not usually easy to gain full support at the operations level, where more human related 
issues are involved. For this reason a participative approach is far more appropriate 
when dealing with the operations staff, since they need to be. cultivated to perform in a 
controlled environment. 
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8.3. Cultivating Change and Managing User Expectation 
In a complex business world, managing resistance has been considered a key 
challenge for ERP implementation. People resist changes for different reasons. Fear 
of changing the way people do things is rather easy to handle. Some other people, 
particularly those in supporting roles, are reluctant to change simply because in many 
cases they are not properly asked or are pressured to make any changes. Young 
people tend to be more adaptable as long as they can recognise the real benefits of the 
changes. Among the various reasons for resistance, anxiety about being retrenched is 
the most pressing concern, especially in an economic slump. Increasingly, employees 
are forced to make certain changes when, for instance, reducing overhead costs turns 
out to be the organisation's concern. This generally results in sacking direct labour 
and re-arranging the workload of existing employees. However, the entire 
organisation's morale would be affected if employees were not suitably convinced to 
accept the changes. Therefore, changes have to be clearly defined and communicated 
with everyone affected in a structured way. 
Instead of introducing changes with a top-down approach, it is deemed to be more 
effective to let employees voice their needs for changes. Pushing for change 
acceptance inevitably induces resistance. Although intended changes can be 
implemented, there are still concerns about whether these changes are flexible enough 
to continue to be effective. Once an excuse can be found to avoid exercising the new 
practices, people might fall back on the old ways of accomplishing tasks. Therefore, 
people must be proactively persuaded to accept new changes in order to establish a 
collaborative environment that in turn fosters change initiatives from within the user 
groups, on the condition that top management support can be sustained for a 
successful implementation of changes while the change initiatives envisaged from 
within the user groups constitute the operational success. 
Below are the steps suggested for establishing a collaborative environment that 
transparently stimulates initiatives for changes: 
1. Appoint, as facilitator, a senior executive, preferably from the board of directors, 
who understands the good and bad sides of the business. 
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2. Form a change management committee composed of representatives, preferably 
senior managers, from various functional departments with the responsibility for 
defining the company's change-related goals as well as encouraging their 
subordinates to participate in the design of new way of doing business. 
3. Sell the benefits of best practices which form the benchmark for comparison of 
efficiency to the functional managers. 
4. Relate the best practices to the key performance index (KPI) and communicate 
clearly with the managers about how this KPI will affect their survival within 
the organisation. 
5. Cascade the message that process changes are just as important as technological 
changes, with examples to illustrate the inter-relationship between the two 
changes. 
6. Schedule brainstorming sessions, with extended support from the facilitator, for 
individual functional departments to help generate agreeable initiatives for 
achieving the goals of process change. 
7. Consolidate initiatives with the values added, if any, by for effective changes, 
develop an action plan and obtain approval. 
8. Set aside sufficient budget to facilitate the training and purchase of necessary 
equipment for the changes. 
9. Develop a strategic education plan for different levels of staff as a priority from 
the beginning of the project and revise the plan on a regular basis. 
10. Establish an effective communication plan for people to give comments, 
suggestions, complaints and feedback. 
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11. Reward and make known to other people in the organisation the party that 
successfully implemented the changes. 
Establishing a collaborative environment allows employees to take part in stimulating 
change initiatives As a result, change initiatives and customer expectation should both 
come to be relatively easily managed. Effectively customer expectations should be 
managed with reference to the hypothetical model strategy stage [S3], right from the 
point where customers are first approached with the offer of an ERP solution. This 
should be the case even although there is the possibility of a conflict of interest 
between the salespeople and the system implementation consultants. Again, an early 
adoption of the `Win Small Win Early' approach is favoured for managing customer 
expectations, as mutual confidence and trust can more readily be accumulated. 
It is also imperative that the managing consultant must lead the implementation 
whereby the implementation consultants are guided in how to move forward during 
the ERP implementation. Moreover, he or she must act as a mediator to effectively 
close any gap emerging between the sales persons and the system implementation 
consultants, when conflicts arise. Since the managing consultant comes from within 
the post-sales organisation and is involved in the solution selling process, 
commitments made during the product demonstration are believed to be much more 
practical and achievable. In addition, misinterpretation and misrepresentation, often 
associated with traditional practices for handing over implementations of the project, 
can be avoided. By these means, expectation gaps can also be effectively minimised. 
The efficiency of implementation also depends on the managing consultant's ability 
to understand the capability of the implementation consultants. User expectations can 
most easily be set with least effort, if this is done during the initial stage of 
implementation. Situations often arise whereby compromise can no longer be made 
once the project has got into deep trouble. Setting user expectations is therefore a 
critical function that the managing consultant has to assume throughout the 
implementation process. 
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Like any disaster recovery plan for any business organisation, the successful 
implementation of an ERP system requires the full collaboration of the workforce 
across all levels of organisation. Most survey respondents and ERP vendors share a 
common view that ERP implementation should be considered as a business 
undertaking rather than just an IT project. From this perspective, management 
approval of a project initiative alone, does not necessarily guarantee an 
implementation's success. This requires other parts of the organisation to contribute 
to the implementation with a high level of co-operation. According to the survey, it is 
recognised by participants that functional managers, who are supposed to lead the 
implementation at the operational level, are often either insufficiently trained or not 
properly assigned a share of ownership of the project's outcome. 
8.3.1. Confusion and Circular Dependence 
In the course of ERP implementation, individuals or functional departments are 
always given specific responsibility. Unfortunately, a formal collaborative workflow 
scheme is seldom precisely defined. This might result in certain degree of confusion, 
especially when people are working in groups. In the worst case, confusion about 
responsibility might turn into arguments, increased levels of discomfort and finally 
unexpected delays to the implementation schedule. Clarification of assigned 
responsibility with reference to a defined goal is necessary and a clear explanation of 
collaboration is also required to prevent a circular dependence from causing 
significant project delays. 
Circular dependence comes about when, for instance, IT staff members rely on users 
to carry out user acceptance testing while the users continue to expect IT staff to 
organise the testing and provide extended support in validating the testing results. 
Furthermore, it takes much more time to complete even a trivial job when ownership 
is not clearly defined and assigned. For instance, at Chubb, even though a regular 
progress review meeting is held between IT staff and users, to discuss various 
implementation issues, the outcome is usually disappointing since their procedures 
lack a suitable method for ensuring effective communication. The methodology has 
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to be encouraging and reliable. Staff members need to be stimulated and encouraged 
to contribute their ideas. 
Given that project executives are concerned with the timeframe and budget 
considerations whilst operations staff members are more concerned with the resource 
availability and, even more importantly whether they can get things done with 
minimal disruption to their day-to-day jobs, a closed communication loop is important. 
This should aim at ensuring group awareness not only of progress but also of any 
concerns and potential risks since if serious enough, such risks might quietly kill the 
project altogether. However, avoiding discussion on (future) risks is fairly common, 
especially in the Asian community, especially if individuals think that such avoidance 
can help them to deliver the results, on time. 
In practice, regular reviews may help resolve some, but not all, of these problems. In 
particular, in a general review meeting, people might avoid raising new initiatives and 
hence causing chances of failure. Some critical issues might therefore be hidden from 
the agenda. This explains why so many implementations still fail. 
8.3.2. Language Barriers and Cultural Difference 
Whilst cultural difference, as already illustrated, can directly affect implementation, 
language barriers can also play a pivotal role in reducing the effectiveness of 
communication. Most international firms in Hong Kong still have expatriates hired 
for various managerial positions, although less have been employed since 1997, when 
the sovereignty of Hong Kong was returned to China. It is quite common for 
expatriates to take up leadership roles in driving change. However, local staff- 
members can often respond rather reactively in accepting modern technologies and 
new ways of doing business, introduced in this way. For example, at Chubb, 
supporting staff, even at a senior level, tend to be operationally focused and less 
proactive in communicating with the upper management during process improvement 
initiatives. Also the Asian community, and in particularly the Chinese, tend to be 
naturally reticent in expressing their concerns or going into detail during meetings 
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with the foreign community primarily because of the language barrier. Effective 
communication is therefore adversely affected. 
8.3.3. Closing the Loop 
Both illustrated scenarios, to a certain extent, cause failures in ERP implementation. 
Clarifying the degree of involvement is crucial to making sure that individuals are 
resource-capable to complete designated tasks. In day-to-day operations, ad-hoc 
assignments prevail with a higher degree of urgency and the implementation work is 
therefore inevitably postponed. While this situation continues, the entire 
implementation can be seriously affected. Therefore, involvement needs to be clearly 
defined and constantly reviewed with a view to reducing conflicts of interest. 
At the operational level, full-time involvement is preferred, yet rarely achievable, and 
thus operations staff end up having to put in extra effort to avoid dealing with routine 
activities. This requires commitment at the operational level because the operations 
staff members are the people who understand the business at their fingertips and they 
are the ones who are capable of facilitating the implementation. Functional managers 
will also need to make sure that their staff members are adequately motivated and 
available for the implementation. For example, during the course of System 21 
implementation at Aiwa Hong Kong, where project delay was minimal and the 
functional managers were fully committed to the implementation, operational 
commitment proved to be a key factor in the project's success. 
For improved effectiveness, it is also recommended that small, specific, task force 
groups should be formed where individuals are given designated responsibilities with 
clear objectives and well-defined deliverables to complete some specific tasks. The 
aim of this is to achieve implementation efficiency by creating synergy. For instance, 
with respect to the calculation of wages, the HR staff will be familiar with the pay 
rules yet technically incapable of validating the calculation results. Conversely, IT 
staff are well positioned to be able to review the technical competency of the 
calculation formulas and hence come up with a test plan for validating the testing 
results. 
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During the course of implementation, more than one specific task force group (Tier-1 
grouping) can be formed and, in due course, dismissed. Each group should be further 
split into two identical workgroups (Tier-2 grouping) with similar capabilities and 
resources assigned. Each workgroup should have no more than three people, ideally 
one with operation experience and two with technical skills. These two small 
workgroups will be assigned to do the same task separately and learn from one 
another. 
In conclusion, operational commitment is probably vital for the successful 
implementation of an ERP system. Without leveraging mutual understanding and true 
collaboration, confusion due to a circular dependence, can easily result, and develop 
into a major barrier to implementation. Cultural differences have an impact on the 
implementation, and therefore, staff members need to be motivated to communicate 
freely and effectively. Functional managers also need to make their staff available 
most of the time by avoiding routine and ad-hoc job assignments. Defensiveness at 
the operations level presents another challenge to progress on ERP implementation. 
Operational commitment is therefore an effective instrument to eliminate the risks and 
hence promote the most effective way to close the expectation gap. 
8.4. Improving the Communication Mechanism 
For many ERP implementations, project teams are often given the task of chasing a 
series of fluid requirements, but are not provided with a process for managing changes 
to the project scope. Hence there is often a false belief that technology alone will 
prevail. As organisations embark on ERP initiatives, many key issues, such as the 
integration of client, implementer, and software vendor plans and the constant 
management of project scope, cannot be easily addressed until a project management 
office is well established. Hence keeping up a project office to perform its functions 
throughout the implementation is just another challenge. A project management 
office assumes a leadership function in defining the combination of process, 
technology and standards to meet strategic and tactical project management needs. 
This improves the project management processes based on the provision of 
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organisational feedback, and roles such as mentor, facilitator and knowledge broker, 
so that senior executives can manage a portfolio of projects including customers and 
initiatives (Axam and Jerome, 2003). A properly organised project office, with at 
least a full time project manager and key users of three categories - middle managers, 
customers and the ERP consultants - can therefore prove both strategic and critical to 
ensuring project success. 
Conversely, inferior communication within the project office always lengthens the 
development cycle and prevents the implementation success. A strategic project office 
role can be a key success factor for avoiding this pitfall by assuming an organisational 
leadership role and providing structure and discipline as needed. Given appropriate 
governance it can also improve communication, establish an enterprise standard for 
project management and help reduce the disastrous effect of failed development 
projects on enterprise effectiveness and productivity. Based on the fact that 
communication caused severe delays in Pepsi's projects, an improved communication 
flow, as illustrated in Figure 8.5 was therefore suggested, aiming at a more effective 
implementation of ERP systems. 
With reference to applying the suggested communication flow to Pepsi's 
implementation projects, the customer and supplier (Pepsi and JBA International 
respectively) communicated in a three-tier model accordingly. Tier 1 and Tier 3 refer 
to internal communication in a detached environment at supplier and customer side 
respectively. Tier 2 is an interface between Tier 1 and Tier 3. 
These two groups of people, each with different roles, come to own several 
designated functions and processes. Inter-group communication then takes place 
within these three tiers. In seek of continuity, a managing consultant was initially 
appointed to take over the project from a sales manager and work with the overall 
project manager on a regular basis, reporting to the project director who was the 
managing director of JBA International. The sales manager who reported to the 
project director was therefore closely bound with the project, so that while he was free 
to work on other customer deals, he was still responsible for this core project. 
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Figure 8.5 Proposed Communication Flow 
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In this collaborative working model, the managing consultant was empowered to give 
direct instructions to both non-JBA and JBA implementation consultants. All 
consultants were required to surrender their utmost support to the overall project 
manager from JBA International. Being treated as a facilitator, the client BU project 
manager, who was also given explicit technical support, was required to work with 
the overall project manager. From time to time, the client project sponsor was 
required to work hand-in-hand with the BU's advisory project manager to determine 
the scope and schedule of work while the client side project manager had a reporting 
line to the client project sponsor. Key users from within the customer side of the 
relationship were the major players, since they owned their business, and to a certain 
extent might resist changes within them. 
In terms of quality assurance, a specialist from JBA International was assigned to the 
project office. This QA specialist, who reports directly to the project director, was 
actually the owner for executing the checkpoints and validations. With the above 
structure, it was likely that splitting up the project ownership was an added value to 
the success of running the implementation program. 
In general, everyone in the project office must first be educated on the concept of 
emerging software and the associated implementation cycle in general. For effective 
communication, orientation workshops, preferably iterative in nature, also need to be 
carefully planned and executed. Above all and again, it is imperative that top 
management should continue to grant their genuine support to the implementation. 
While top management support is crucial, functional managers, normally representing 
the middle management tier, and who act as key users, must also share the ownership 
of the project. For this to work a hierarchical structure is necessary to help the team 
understand how they should contribute to the implementation. 
To further promote collaborative work, everyone involved should be subject either to 
applause or blame for the project success and failure respectively as in the absence of 
dedicated support from middle management, implementation is unlikely to succeed. 
This can be validated with reference to the ERP implementation at Shenzhen Pepsi, 
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where the CFO was assigned to the client project manager's role. Unfortunately, no 
real achievements were made, since he was not adequately facilitated to perform his 
function well. Frustrations resulted and the project slipped. 
In conclusion, it can be seen that unwillingness to share responsibility is a significant 
cause of failure. This also explains why a structured project organisation, along with 
phased orientations throughout the implementation, is also key to a project's success. 
The newer version of JBA Advantage therefore puts much more emphasis on forming 
and orientating project organisation. 
8.4.1. A Collaborative Approach 
With the recent developments in ERP systems, a hypothetical requirement for a 
collaborative working model can now be met on the condition that a secure and 
reliable Internet connection is available. Technically, when a full speed 56K 
connection can be established, accessing enterprise applications on a designated 
server over the Internet is no longer a difficulty. Furthermore Broadband connection 
is getting cheaper and becoming more reliable as a consequence of continuous 
improvements in data communications over the last decade. Many companies can 
now afford to acquire a 3MB/512KB connection for a small monthly fee. Although 
this collaborative model represents the next generation of the client-server model, the 
architecture is based on the Internet technology, which provides a revolutionary 
change to the security control and user interface. 
However, although the technology is undoubtedly there, it is being under-utilised, 
primarily due to inadequate training and a poorly organised structure for the 
implementation of the collaborative model. No matter how rich the functionality an 
ERP system can provide, it is still only a tool, and as such, it needs to be properly 
managed. The problem is that some employees consider this collaborative model 
ineffective, since it affects the way they do their businesses and also takes times to 
successfully transform the model into a practice. Different groups of employees have 
their own concerns about adopting this model of operation. For example, sales 
persons may see it as a selling tool to differentiate the service from that of other 
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competitors while finance analysts will find it an amazing tool to share financial 
information among the members of management. On the contrary, operations staff 
members are typically among the most resistant groups within an organisation, 
possibly because ERP will immediately disclose inefficiency in their working 
methods. Although the benefits of adopting a collaborative model can easily be 
recognised, it still requires a frequent and mutual understanding across all 
departments at a company level. 
Initially, there are challenges to implementing a collaborative working model, since: 
0 People, in general, fear being closely monitored. 
" Technical people working off-site have limited access to the Internet for 
information exchange. 
" External members of staff (e. g. suppliers and contractors) may have already used 
other similar software packages for operating a collaborative model. 
" Incomplete and inaccurate information associated with the model fails to 
facilitate accurate decision-making. 
Based on the assumption that a collaborative model is more applicable to a situation 
where a fairly large group of people are involved and the communication process is 
therefore complex, full collaboration at work can hardly be achievable unless the 
following conditions can be met and properly managed: 
" The model, by its nature, should add a competitive edge to the business that is 
unlikely to be provided in any other way. 
"A senior executive needs to be involved in sponsoring and configuring the model. 
" The members of staff have to be well informed of the objectives and procedures 
attached to the collaborative model. 
" An infrastructure must be ready to facilitate remote update of information. 
0 The information has to be accurate, complete and up to date. 
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0A guideline or procedure for operating the model needs to be developed with 
classroom training provided. 
Throughout the implementation, customers not only require attention, but they also 
need to be well informed, on a regular basis, about the progress of the project. 
Transparency reduces confusion and misunderstanding based on the assumption that 
nobody wants surprises, and everyone involved should be regularly updated. Without 
this, momentum can too easily be lost. As an implementation strategy specified in the 
hypothetical model, a web-based project update and reporting tool should be available 
as part of the communication portal with which individuals can report progress and 
exchange information over the Internet. The project update function should also be 
automated and alert messages should be provided if something goes seriously wrong. 
By doing this, individuals can be cultivated to work on the project more efficiently. 
Nevertheless, key users, consultants and contractors still need to get together on a 
regular basis to review the project status, although the exchange of information is 
made easier by the web-based tool. 
Under virtually no circumstances does the technology itself determine the success of a 
technological implementation. The successful adoption of new technology depends 
on a change management strategy that guarantees staff support. This relates closely to 
the hypothetical strategy [S6]. As Tenefrancia (2002) affirms, for the implementation 
to succeed, the structure of business has to be changed to meet the new ways of doing 
business by redesigning the company, realigning resources, monitoring achievements 
and providing training. More importantly, staff commitment to change needs to be 
recognised and honoured. In addition, a crystal clear vision must also be articulated, 
stakeholder concerns must be properly answered and internal support for change has 
to be assembled. 
Commitment building is therefore important to moving a technology project on 
towards success. However, the commitment building activities need to be adequately 
planned and carefully managed. Above all, while attempting to avoid giving too 
much detail, line staff involved the details of who, what, when, where and how, and a 
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holistic approach should be taken to assist in realising the project's anticipated 
outcomes. 
8.4.2. The Process Defined 
A large number of empirical studies have revealed that it is rather a matter of `People 
and Preparation' that determines a truly successful implementation of an ERP solution; 
a human centric and project oriented collaboration process is therefore suggested, as 
shown in Figure 8.6. By developing'common goals, down to activating monitoring 
tools to secure the continuity and healthy of the entire implementation process, 
coherent acceptance of one stage determines a vigorous move towards the next. 
Step I. Cultivate Shared Vision 
Change will only come about if employees believe it is what management at 
every level in the organisation wants. In a grounded approach for modelling 
team structure, as Teare et al. (1999) illustrated, the senior management team 
must examine themselves, their organisation and their management style and 
plan actions that clearly indicate that they are prepared to support everyone 
through the process of change. 
One of the key factors that can jeopardise an effective ERP implementation is 
a lack of regular, effective communication. Prior to establishing (an) effective 
communication channel(s), a creed will need to be conceived, agreed and 
supported. This is especially important at the operations level. Especially 
when a collaborative model is adopted, operations staff will be heavily 
involved. By nature, an ERP project requires the most dedicated effort from 
those individuals who are the most concerned with the project's progress. 
Without a common interest, individuals will sooner or later lose track of what 
they have committed to. 
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Shared vision needs to be included in this creed because it relates to 
conviction, commitment and clarity of intent that generates a need for learning 
and the collective will to learn. Senge (1990) contends that shared vision is an 
integral part of the framework for learning. This means that shared vision is 
highly cohesive to team learning. 
At Chubb Security, cultivating shared vision has been fully supported as a 
valuable repositioning towards an effective readiness for the implementation 
of PeopleSoft. However, it took more than half a year for the general manager 
of IT Asia Pacific and a selected group of business analysts to plan, organise 
and implement a readiness program for the entire Asia Pacific region. 
Eventually, thanks to a collaborative team structure whereby senior managers 
from major business units were able to envision the implementation in the 
same way, the implementation came to be seen, from the management point of 
view, as a half-success. 
Step 2. Integrate Key Performance Indicators into the Process 
In terms of process definition, Gotta (2001) describes collaboration as 
focusing on structural improvements across a collection of tasks and a series 
of activities with the aim of producing a definable business output. The most 
appropriate solution is therefore to improve the overall business performance 
by targeting both efficiency and effectiveness at the process level, requiring 
optimisation and sub-optimisation of activities and tasks around the Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs). This implies an integration of KPIs into the 
collaboration process. 
Levitt (2002) adds that integration is not only important for connecting and 
embedding application functionality and contents, but that it should also 
increase employee productivity rather than just improving scalability or easing 
administrative burdens. 
Page 159 of 239 
Discussion 
Notably Key Performance Indicators or KPIs have always been used and have 
been persistently advocated within Chubb as a standard procedure for the 
measurement of individual and group performance. From experience, KPIs 
have proved extremely useful at Chubb in terms of helping individuals to set 
their goals and define criteria for validating the performance. 
Step 3. Establish Interfacing Channels 
The most difficult issues during improvement initiatives involve people, in the 
sense of persuading individuals to accept proposed changes, especially if this 
involves the possibly of a reduction in headcount. Hence the effectiveness of 
improvement programs is frequently governed by the effectiveness of the 
communication process. 
Communication is important as changes are planned and carried forth and the 
communications strategy is obviously the most important of vehicles for 
conveying messages pertaining to organisational change. Many difficulties 
often associated with significant change, can be dealt with more easily if there 
is strategic thinking about what and how to communicate. 
Establishing effective communication channels is absolutely crucial to the 
implementation success, but the technological interface is just as important as 
the human interface. Levitt (2002) explains that technology must not only be 
used, but must be used appropriately, to achieve the best results. End users 
must therefore select the most appropriate interface for particular tasks and 
must be able to rely on back-end systems to seamlessly provide the necessary 
supporting content and functionality. Collaboration is, again, concerned with 
structured interactions between partner/supplier entities. This means that it 
focuses on data exchange and process integration across business boundaries. 
The addition of video to audio-based communication can also result in 
improved decision-making when compared to other collaborative technologies 
(Barker, 2002). 
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Step 4. Strive to Earn Support from the Operational Workforce 
In a research study carried out by the Meta Group, internal pressure was found 
to be an effective driver for persuading the adoption of collaboration within 
most organisations. The results showed that overall, 60% of the survey 
respondents had been pressured from inside their organisations to offer 
collaborative capabilities. 
Kiesier and Mirson (1975) suggest that line authority has a greater 
communications impact because it carries more organisational muscle than 
staff positions. 
Publicising success stories is especially important during the changing stage of 
the change process. This was strategically adopted at Chubb and JBA 
International as an effective tool to inspire all team members and hence 
mobilise future success. Klein (1996) claims that it is equally important to 
develop a means of rectifying problems through feedback and adjustment. 
Step S. Develop Teams and Teamwork 
Developing teams and teamwork is crucial to the survival of most 
organisations. Effective and efficient teamwork reduces operating cost and 
improves productivity. Maier (1967) developed a classic listing of benefits 
that a team can contribute: 
" Teams produce a greater quantity of ideas and information than 
individuals acting alone, 
" Teams improve understanding and acceptance among individuals 
involved in the process, 
" Teams create higher motivation and performance levels than individuals 
acting alone, 
" Teams offset personal biases and blind spots that hinder the decision 
process, 
" Teams sponsor more innovative and risk taking decision-making. 
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To improve the performance of teams, team members have to have authority 
to make decisions on the spot, providing instant responses to customer needs. 
Empowering teams is therefore a significant consideration when moving 
towards the achievement of effectiveness. Brower (1995) presents the four 
essential A's: authority, accountability, alignment of direction, and ableness. 
He also argues that empowering teams to succeed requires information, 
supportive functions and systems, and leadership at four levels. Cross training 
among members also helps to make possible the balancing of workload and 
makes the team members more valuable. Furthermore, while Stough et al. 
(2000) place extra emphasis on education and training concerning the use of 
teaming throughout the internal organisations, Teare et al. (1999) suggest that 
any effective education process should address the following three main areas: 
0 Generating an awareness of the need for continuous improvement and the 
changes in attitudes that are necessary to achieve this, 
0 Developing the ability of everyone in the organisation to utilise problem- 
solving and quality tools and techniques so that they can analyse problems, 
identify their root causes and develop effective solutions, 
0 Establishing the skills necessary, at all levels, to work together in teams 
and to sustain the improvement programme. 
To keep up their morale, teams also need to be recognised and rewarded. 
Further to this, Teare et al. (1999) argues that an organisation must develop an 
equitable method for recognising the contribution made by its people through 
publicising successful implementation projects and assessing the performance 
of managers in terms of the support they give to their teams and their projects. 
To this, Stough et al. (2000) add the suggestion of giving away `small wins' to 
motivate the teams to strive. 
Brower (1995) contends that empowering teams also requires leadership at 
four discrete levels, namely, leadership of the team, distributed leadership 
within the team, middle managers as leaders and executive leadership. Finally, 
he proposes that every team should have a single designated overall leader and 
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that important processes need to be identified whereby one team member can 
assume accountability for each one, for a given period of time. 
To be successful, the virtual team itself must also become an organisational 
tool for speeding up most processes. In return, virtual teaming capitalises on 
existing experts within, or across, organisations. More strategically, a set of 
directions (e. g. mission and vision) and criteria for measuring virtual teaming 
effectiveness must be prepared and used consistently. Above all, for this to 
work well, education and training concerning the use of virtual teaming must 
be conducted throughout the organisation. 
Step 6. Conduct Conceptual Training 
Teams must be trained to understand how they should perform and provide 
their services with greater value. Therefore, understanding the whole rather 
than just the fractional parts of behaviour is more important. Senge (1990) 
refers to this as `systems thinking'. 
It is evident that conceptual training is desirable to facilitate a shared vision. 
Major audiences for such events are the operations staff, rather than the senior 
managers. Their support will give the implementation a foundation from 
which to move forward. 
The conceptual training will be much more contributive if it takes a top-down 
approach. For example, the conceptual training was conducted at Chubb 
through which the global marketing staff from the UK office and the IT 
analysts in Australia constantly communicated with the senior managers of 
every business unit for the purpose of encouraging mind-set changes. During 
the implementation process, other forms of communication such as email 
updates, management briefing notes and monthly newsletters were also 
employed to make sure everyone involved is sufficiently informed. 
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Step 7. Implement Portal Technologies 
A key to success with modern teams involves the continual use of information 
technology to support team activities such as setting clear goals, co-ordinating 
and negotiating with others, planning and managing work processes and 
gaining decision-making skills. 
There are several commonly used types of GroupWare to facilitate 
communication among teams, such as e-mail, PC-based conferencing systems 
and collaborative writing/programming/drawing packages. Workgroup 
database management systems, workflow automation systems and workgroup 
scheduling systems are examples of effective means of information storage 
and retrieval. Some other GroupWare is available for supporting decision- 
making. Portal technology is increasingly familiar to those who rely on 
various sources of information to do business. It is particularly useful for 
enhancing group communication. Its popularity is primarily due to the ease of 
access through commonly used browser software, such as Internet Explorer. 
Portals allow people to store and retrieve information in multimedia formats. 
No matter how remarkable these new technologies are, the key point is that 
simply getting on with these emerging technologies without a plan for 
implementing the change will be a waste of time; only an appropriate use of 
portal technologies can support virtual teaming in reality. 
For the implementation of PeopleSoft at Chubb, Microsoft SharePoint Portal 
Server is being used to support the effective sharing of information within the 
company. External consultants and third parties to the company with 
appropriate authority can also gain access to the Portal. SharePoint Portal was 
selected as a strategic product to help with Chubb's communication and has 
been found to be very effective in providing both the core and extended 
members of the PeopleSoft implementation team with an excellent 
communication channel. 
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In particular, extended members are working part-time on the implementation 
and they also need to be well informed of the progress in an efficient and 
effective manner; otherwise their contribution to the project will be minimal. 
Step 8. Conduct Workshop 
With a shared vision clearly defined, conceptual training can be conducted in a 
more effective manner. While training will not totally guarantee ultimate 
success, a workshop will give individuals a chance to practice their 
collaboration and hence lead to a greater possibility of success. The workshop 
representing group collaboration in action must be relevant and effective in 
terms of making sure that individuals get the maximum benefits out of it. By 
attending the workshop, individuals should be able to increase their comfort- 
level in the context of collaborative working. During the workshop at Chubb, 
IBM Global Consulting Services (formerly PwC Consulting) acts as facilitator 
while Chubb IT is heavily involved in working collaboratively with the 
representatives from different business units. Depending on the scale of the 
business one, or a group of, IT business analysts is dedicated to coaching one 
business unit throughout the implementation process. In total, there are 
twenty-nine business units involved in Project Atlas. 
Step 9. Activate Alerts and Monitoring 
Further to the workshop, core team members should be capable of working 
collaboratively to achieve unequivocal effectiveness during the project 
implementation. However, this process needs to be monitored to make sure 
that collaboration is present and effectively managed through to the project 
completion. Hence some kind of monitoring tool needs to be deployed for 
monitoring purposes. Many commercial products are available, such as 
Microsoft's Team Manager, Lotus Notes, and Microsoft Exchange. These 
products can be used to monitor and report on the project progress data by 
employee, project or time period, but above all, effective monitoring depends 
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on whether objectives are set beforehand. Managers must develop a balanced 
scorecard of measures to enable them to drive forward their improvement 
programs. Teare et al. (1999) contend that these measures represent the key 
success drivers for the organisation. KPIs are once again involved here and 
appear to close the loop in this collaboration model. 
In conclusion, collaboration is a relatively difficult aspect, as proper planning on 
resource co-ordination across different levels of an organisation is required to make it 
an effective cue for the project implementation. Adequate groundwork is also crucial 
to the effective implementing of an ERP solution. This implies defining a shared 
vision in association with KPIs followed up by establishing interfacing channels and 
developing teams. A truly collaborative working model in association with the 
hypothetical strategy [S5] is now viable through the power of the Internet, and this 
model is now part of many advanced ERP solutions. However, different people might 
have different views on its effectiveness and any satisfactory deployment ultimately 
relies on how well the changes associated with the model can be managed. This 
working model could bring in as much as business values, since management decision 
can now drive the technology to help transform business changes. However, 
infrastructure, training, management involvement and timely provision of information 
are also key to achieving this collaborative model a success. 
8.5. Moving into ERP Implementation with Process Re-engineering 
In general, implementing an ERP system can be seen as just another change to the 
organisation and a BPR project may possibly contain a certain number of ERP 
implementation projects. BPR must be clearly defined in the context of objectives, 
schedules and interactions, mutually agreed and fully communicated. Obviously, a 
top-down approach is more suitable for the implementation of such enterprise-wide 
solutions, since inherent support from within top management can be assumed. 
Depending on the management objectives, BPR is mostly integrated with ERP 
implementation. There are several ways in which the system integration can be 
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interpreted, given that both BPR and ERP projects are strategic and business oriented. 
Essentially, it can be summarised from the research that there are two distinctive 
perspectives underlying a seamless integration between BPR and ERP projects. A 
more common view of this integration comes about in a situation where BPR should 
always be considered as a separate management exercise ahead of the ERP 
implementation and therefore widely accepted as a precondition to the successful 
implementation of ERP systems. Alternatively, ERP implementation may be seen 
purely as a means to support the smooth execution of a BPR project, and this implies 
that the BPR project embraces the implementation of the ERP system. 
For those who believe that integration represents a continuity of project 
implementation, a distinct initiative for the execution of business process 
reengineering should be communicated and executed at all levels of the organisation. 
It is therefore recommended that external consultants, preferably from a reputable IT 
consulting firm, should be invited to plan for the BPR project, given that they could 
manage to introduce and implement the best practices that most renowned ERP 
systems, including but not limited to System 21, are able to support. 
Business process reengineering should provide momentum to change the mentality of 
company employees so that changes can be adapted and the organisational culture can 
be transformed. The more successful the reengineering of business processes, the 
more efficiently and effectively the implementation of the ERP system can be carried 
out. The Foundation Phase can also be simplified, as the organisation is well prepared 
for adapting to the changes. Notwithstanding, the organisation must prepare its 
change management programs, as too many changes in a short period of time might 
lead to confusion and frustration. Continuity is a key component that helps move the 
implementation forwards. If the ERP implementation is widely accepted as an 
extension to the BPR project, no one in the organisation should get confused. Once 
the objective is made clear, implementation work should go smoothly and efficiently. 
With reference to the case study, the project failure at Guangzhou Pepsi was actually 
due to the fact that employees were confused about the implementation of the ERP 
system, and therefore they did not manage to prepare themselves to adopt an 
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integrated ERP solution as a replacement for their legacy systems. It was the 
management's intent to change the ways people did things. However, the 
implementation approach was not well communicated, and resistance occurred as a 
result. No one was actually informed of the organisational impact that was likely to 
arise from implementing System 21. Nor was there a plan in place for managing the 
resistance that emerged in practice. Communication is also important for achieving 
seamless integration, since it is quite common for external BPR consultants to fail to 
communicate with ERP consultants. The likely outcome is that the momentum for 
adapting to change will not be successful until every employee is confidently oriented 
to the implementation approach and effective communication can be sustained 
throughout the implementation process. 
To avoid confusion and interruption, it has been argued that ERP implementation 
should be kept separate from any other enterprise projects. For example, the 
implementation of System 21 at Aiwa Hong Kong was found to be successful since 
no customisation was done at all. Although the implementation project was over- 
stretched in terms of the resources and support services available, it was ultimately 
successful, with the installed applications up and running on schedule. From the very 
beginning of the implementation, the managing director as well as some other senior 
managers at Aiwa had demonstrated their full support for the implementation. In no 
more than three months, the implementation project was complete. 
As a result, Aiwa quickly decided on a similar implementation for their Thailand 
operation. Software installation and implementation support were both granted to 
JBA International. Obviously, one of the underlying reasons for this particular 
success was the separation of the ERP implementation from other projects. On the 
other hand, reengineering existing business operations and processes was assumed to 
be part of the ERP implementation for Pepsi Guangzhou. Different facility locations 
have their own ways of doing business. As a result, a lot of customisation work was 
carried out and severe confusion was caused. This therefore implies that any attempt 
to relate BPR to ERP or vice versa deserves serious consideration. 
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Moreover, since BPR is a more focused exercise, it should not be restricted by the 
functionality of an ERP system. For the sake of effective collaboration, external ERP 
consultants should be involved in the BPR project. Business process reengineering 
consultants, however, should never be provided by the ERP vendors. Instead, they 
should be business analysts possessing in-depth knowledge of the ERP industry and a 
sophisticated understanding of how they should work hand in hand with the ERP 
consultants. Confusion needs to be eliminated and a clear objective should be 
communicated. Above all, the company's readiness is important to achieving a 
successful ERP implementation. An appropriate change of mindset across the whole 
organisation is considered essential and this can only be done through a BPR project. 
Process reengineering has a direct impact on ERP implementation, although they are 
always considered to be separate projects. Design and execution of changes should be 
viewed as a significant aspect of company readiness for ERP implementation. The 
intent to implement an ERP system is to facilitate the adoption of new processes that 
are already defined in the BPR project. In some cases, defined processes are poorly 
implemented with the vanilla or base version of the selected ERP system and 
therefore these new processes, even if already been agreed before, need to be further 
customised to fit the ERP system. 
It is beneficial to highlight the value of adopting an ERP system to everyone 
concerned in the organisation and explain how it will make life easier. For example, 
when certain processes are identified as needing to be changed, a comparison of 
manual and automated ways of accomplishing the job needs to be adequately 
communicated to those who are responsible for making these changes happen. The 
tactic suggested is therefore, to first make the users aware that changes are inevitable 
anyway, with the new procedures that are being put into place, and then to introduce 
the automation of these procedures using the selected ERP system. In such a way, 
people are more easily convinced of the need to adopt the new system. The drawback 
is that it will take longer to obtain acceptance. However, if this strategy is employed, 
good results can be more likely. 
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While many companies in Hong Kong have already implemented ERP solutions, 
some enterprises are still running legacy systems. These systems are often inaccurate, 
unreliable, inflexible, slow in response, non-user friendly, hard to modify, difficult to 
interface with other systems, and cumbersome at retrieving data for analysis. For 
those companies intending to implement ERP systems, employees generally expect 
that the new systems will overcome all existing difficulties with the current systems. 
However, the reality is often not that simple. 
As already discussed in previous sections, customer expectation has a considerable 
impact on the readiness for implementation. In many cases, employees do not know 
exactly what will happen and how much it is worth sacrificing in order to get the 
required benefits out of the ERP system. The new system will probably bring hope to 
the people who have been suffering from the operational inefficiency but some 
employees' expectations will be too high, while others will expect only relatively 
minor changes. This reflects the observation that people do not always to see the 
same thing from the same angle. If people understand the goals of implementing a 
new system and if they perceive in what ways the new system can assist them in 
doing business more effectively and efficiently, the likelihood of successful 
implementation is much higher. However, if users of the legacy systems expect some 
kind of automatic process enhancement as a direct consequence of the ERP 
implementation, this can become dangerous. In practice, improper changes to the 
business processes will certainly cause the implementation of ERP to fail. To 
conclude, a successful ERP implementation mostly depends on whether a single 
common view can be established in which ERP is considered as part of the BPR 
project, in which case a collaborative alignment of IT/business goals, as defined by 
the hypothetical model, should prove viable. 
8.6. Other Implementation Considerations 
8.6.1. Choosing Right Partners 
Unlike QAD and other ERP vendors, JBA International has never run its consulting 
services with channel partners in Hong Kong. Nor has it formed any strategic 
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alliances with other technological providers such as IBM for developing the local 
markets. As part of its corporate strategy, customers of JBA International are all 
provided with direct support and services from its nearest local presence. For Pepsi, 
the implementation service and technical support for its customer branches in China is 
provided from Hong Kong. 
Developing business in China is somewhat risky, and this explains why multinational 
companies tend to set up partnerships with local firms that understand the region, the 
people and the market needs. Because of the cultural difference, JBA International 
experienced difficulties early on, at the stage when the sales contracts were being 
negotiated for Changchun Pepsi. Although JBA International was recommended as a 
preferred ERP provider, a separate sales agreement is still needed for each individual 
Pepsi location. 
Communicating with local people in China requires certain interpersonal skills and a 
good understanding of social and cultural systems and one of the challenges facing 
JBA International was the availability of local support during and after the 
implementation. Although consultants from JBA can work out of Hong Kong and 
provide on-site implementation support at remote locations, this is not financially 
viable or practically feasible as some Pepsi locations are too far away from Hong 
Kong. Dial-up connection for remote access was available, but only to a limited 
extent, and its dubious reliability was always an obstacle to the consultants' aim of 
providing responsive support for Pepsi. Due to unexpected line drops, remote data 
rescue was sometimes rendered impossible. 
For effective and responsive data recovery, on-site diagnosis and fixing is always the 
preferred option, since looking into root causes demands a great deal of user 
interaction. From a user's perspective, responsive support is usually considered as a 
determinant in choosing a solution provider. Developing local presence represents a 
strategic approach to offering a responsive service. Given that support via remote 
connection is presently deemed to be unrealistic in China, establishing strategic 
partnership with local firms is therefore considered as the most suitable option for 
minimising the risk of customer dissatisfaction. Furthermore, the operating cost of 
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such an arrangement could be minimal, since skilled labour is increasingly available 
in the modern cities of China while the average direct labour cost is only one-third of 
that of Hong Kong. 
In short, `strategic partnership' is considered to be the preferred implementation 
strategy for Pepsi, as well as for any other companies that need to implement ERP 
systems in China. The hypothetical strategy [S2] in respect of adopting strategic 
partnership is therefore likely to be supported. 
8.6.2. Re-thinking Selective Outsourcing 
Being viewed as an extended aspect of strategic partnership, outsourcing is becoming 
very popular in Asia, including Hong Kong, but not necessarily in other parts of 
China. Those companies that consider outsourcing are largely concerned with 
tremendous demands for IT support service year after year. Scaling down their 
spending on IT services is a common initiative thriving outsourcing. In fact, the 
concept of outsourcing is quite new to China. Effective outsourcing depends on the 
availability of expertise and quality work, and it has always been a consideration for 
many foreign companies in China. Labour is rather cheap, which explains why most 
of the large corporations in China, especially the state-owned companies, prefer to 
employ their own resources in-house for their development work as well as providing 
maintenance support. 
Uncertainty concerning the availability of network infrastructure is another area of 
concern. Reliable information exchange and data access calls for a certain degree of 
technological competency. Without a reliable infrastructure in place, outsourcing is 
rather limited. The quality of outsourcing becomes a particular concern when the 
required skill is not evenly spread across the country. 
Outsourcing could have been made available for Pepsi provided that a mutually 
agreeable plan could be put in place ahead of the implementation. It was the original 
intent of Pepsi BU to make good use of its own resources to help individual Pepsi 
locations implement their own versions of ERP systems, along with minimal support 
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from JBA International. In return, these Pepsi locations would have to pay the BU a 
lump sum as a management fee, depending on the level of services rendered. The real 
problem with Pepsi BU was that there was only one implementation officer travelling 
around various places to work with the consultants from JBA International. This 
shortage of resources became obvious when simultaneous implementation projects 
were started in more than one Pepsi Joint Venture (JV) facility. Additionally, the 
implementation officer was not well trained prior to working with the consultants. 
The likelihood of outsourcing the project to Pepsi BU rather than employing local 
firms to work with the consultants from JBA International on the implementation 
should have worked, as long as the Pepsi BU was willing to take on the ownership of 
the project and its resource accordingly. With regard to acquiring the technical know- 
how for rolling out the ERP systems, consultants from JBA International could 
arrange to provide the BU implementation officers with relevant training. This means 
that an advisory project manager from Pepsi BU would need to be appointed to bridge 
the gap between individual Pepsi locations and JBA International. Under such 
circumstances, Pepsi facilities could be helped to deal with their concerns about the 
availability of their own resources and the cost associated with hiring and retaining a 
group of ERP specialists to provide the post implementation support. It would be 
quite efficient for Pepsi BU to take up a supporting role, as it would become less 
expensive and more cost effective for Pepsi facilities to run the ERP systems. 
Economies of scale could also be achieved. From a management perspective, it 
would be more reliable for a dedicated team of people to carry out similar support 
duties across various Pepsi facility locations. Skill transfer should become easier if 
consultants from JBA International could always work with the same small group of 
technical people from Pepsi. For effective outsourcing, it is therefore recommended 
that Pepsi BU should hire a couple of systems analysts to work closely with the 
consultants from JBA International to make sure that the continuity and consistency 
of support can be provided. As a consequence, the implementation team has to be 
properly structured so that effective communication and hence implementation can be 
supported. 
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8.6.3. Ensuring Quality Throughout the Implementation Process 
Thorough planning of support is extremely important for the preservation of 
customers' favour. Non-responsive and insufficient support could spoil the 
implementation regardless of how much effort has already been contributed. The 
concept of having an ERP system implemented for improving the efficiency of the 
new processes, first introduced by the business process reengineering, should be made 
known to all levels throughout the organisation. Prior to the final deployment, key 
users must make sure that everyone in the organisation understands the ways in which 
the ERP system will fit with the new processes and how it will help everyone to 
perform more efficiently. 
From a user's standpoint, post-implementation support is not only a concern but also a 
consideration for selecting the software vendor. No matter how flexible and scalable 
the software is, the quality of implementation support will inevitably influence the 
acceptance of the ERP system. An example that illustrates this point is Changchun 
Pepsi. In this case, consultants were sent to offer on-site implementation support and 
the implementation was completed on schedule. However, a few weeks after the 
official launch, users started to report data corruption. Fixing was arranged and done 
ineffectively; since consultants did not arrive in Changchun until a week after the 
fault report was logged. It then took more than a week to look into the problem and 
get it fixed. 
As part of the standard procedure, a service report was required to be handed in 
together with the invoice for the service rendered. It was therefore recognised that the 
fault was partly due to improper set-up of the software and database. Consequently, 
the executives of Changchun Pepsi refused to pay for the service. In other words, 
quality of work was certainly an issue as it would weaken user confidence on the 
collaboration and hence delay the project completion. 
Post implementation support is considered to be an ad-hoc service chargeable to the 
customers while the customer's expectation is that the implementation will not be 
declared successful until the entire system is operational, and not just functional. 
Therefore, quality control is deemed to be essential in terms of making sure that the 
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implementation is a success. In the new approach, the final preparation is considered 
more as a checkpoint for ensuring that the configuration is correct and reliable. From 
there, a post implementation support plan can be developed. The quality assurance 
specialist who reports to the project director is responsible for assisting the project 
manager in making sure that every checkpoint is securely validated and the required 
quality standard is achieved. The hypothetical strategy [S7] as defined to the two-tier 
adaptive model is therefore validated, due to the fact that post implementation support 
is deemed to be necessary and non-removable from the ERP implementation process. 
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9. IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
9.1. A Final Solution 
Of the identified critical factors underlying implementation success, company 
readiness remains central. Moreover, the ability to correlate the paybacks from the 
ERP implementation with company and departmental objectives is important for 
fostering a supportive organisation, which is key to project success. 
Based on the research, five general approaches towards the effective implementation 
of ERP systems are defined with respect to different environments. Implementing 
ERP systems under differentiated circumstances requires at least one or more of the 
implementation approaches to secure a greater chance of success. Each 
implementation approach carries its own characteristics and values with respect to 
successful ERP implementation. For example, within an autocratic organisation 
structure and a top down approach appears to be suitable, whereas in a democratic 
environment, a human-centric approach holds more appeal. In a highly collaborative 
environment, a project management approach is more easily to be adopted. However, 
a cohesive approach is commonly used in situations where resistance to change is a 
significant issue preventing the implementation from moving forward. 
9.1.1. Top-down Approach 
According to most of the ERP research literature and the results of this research 
survey, it is firmly concluded that management commitment is key to achieving 
success in ERP implementation, and a directive and assertive management style is 
deemed to be essential in delivering a significant contribution to the success of an 
ERP implementation. 
Being a traditional approach to making things happen, it calls for outstanding 
leadership and effective empowerment to make sure that full commitment at all levels 
is sustained until the end of the project. Particularly in China where workers in state- 
owned enterprises generally have to follow top-down instructions to do things, this 
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approach works quite effectively. However, the success of deploying a top-down 
approach in Hong Kong is much dependent on the organisation cultural where 
autocratic management is adopted. Since the communication is top-down and the 
resistance is minimal, -implementing an ERP system in a big bang approach is 
therefore quite likely to be a success. Change management is relatively unimportant 
for this approach since changes can be implemented without too much resistance. 
This therefore indicates that the top-down approach requires a relatively small effort 
to implement and manage changes to the way of doing business. 
In short, implementing an ERP system with a top-down approach is achievable only 
when the management commitment is assertive and sustainable throughout the 
implementation cycle. Leadership and empowerment are also considered essential to 
implementing an ERP system in a more effective manner. 
9.1.2. Cohesive Approach 
By nature, this is a variant of the top-down approach. It looks into creating 
dependence in addition to creating an association among the ERP implementation and 
other major business initiatives with which employees are more concerned. 
This approach can take place at one of two levels. At company level, one or more 
existing operations, ideally the KPIs, risk assessment and the reward scheme, can be 
associated with the ERP implementation in terms of functional and operational 
dependency. From there, employee contribution is measured by how effectively they 
have achieved the system integration and eventually how much they help to 
implement the ERP system. As a result, a situation emerges where employees are not 
deemed to be successful until they manage to contribute at a level that is defined at 
the initial stage of the implementation process. 
At departmental level, a direct association with the implementation of an ERP system 
is built upon one or more existing departmental systems, such as the Dispute 
Management System from within the department of Finance. This approach would 
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favour a modular implementation of the ERP system in which functional departments 
are individually contacted at different periods of time. 
9.1.3. People-centric Approach 
This approach starts with the belief that employees are among the company's most 
valuable assets, especially in a service industry environment, whereby effective 
communication is extremely important when implementing an ERP system. People 
are obviously harder to manage than technology. Organisational readiness, end user 
preparation, communication strategy, commitment, sponsorship, teamwork, cross- 
culture training, strategic partnership and reward-based strategies are the key 
components characterising a people centric approach. A number of workshops and 
training events throughout the implementation cycle, on managing the collaborative 
work aimed at creating mutual trust and motivating teamwork, are among the 
predominant factors to achieving project success. 
In parallel with full sponsorship from senior executives, leadership is inevitable for 
making effective use of the available resources. Talents are always there, but they 
need to be pinpointed and given an adequate level of training. Finally, they are 
organised in such a way that utmost efficiency can be achieved. The most effective 
leadership emerges at the senior management level. A senior member of staff with 
assertive characteristic and adequate leadership skills must be appointed to take 
charge of the implementation project. In many cases, some of the project members 
may appear to be rather reactive in terms of making strategic moves towards effective 
collaboration. Therefore, they need to be trained as well as being led to perform. 
Partnering with appropriate service providers is strategically important to the ultimate 
success of an ERP project. Flexibility should be extended to make sure that each 
major supplier is performing in a win-win situation. However, external consultants 
see things differently and often bring with them new concepts and ideas that can be 
applicable to the ERP implementation. 
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9.1.4. Project Management Approach 
Once a realistic scope, articulated milestones and clear deliverables have been defined 
and a formal method is available for measuring group and individual performance, a 
project management approach may be characterised. This is actually a variant of the 
people centric approach. This particular approach also favours a modular 
implementation, since it looks for small wins and immediate ROI. From a project 
management viewpoint, control and monitoring is key to securing project success. 
However, the experience and ability of the project manager is also critical. as is 
effective use of portal technology since an extended degree of collaboration is 
expected. 
The existence of a Strategic Project Office (SPO) is core to this approach. It manages 
all the resources and user expectations from a single point of contact. This approach 
is also sympathetic when a global or big bang implementation strategy is assumed. 
Again, alongside the enterprise portal, communication can be adequately controlled 
and hence more accurate and consistent messages can be conveyed. 
Project management is key to the successful implementation of an ERP project 
(Trepper, 2001). As part of effective project management, user expectations will need 
to be properly managed with a demonstration of the intended benefits of the 
implementation. As a consequence, a Strategic Project Office (SPO) should be 
formed with the primary function of managing the implementation towards 
satisfactory delivery of project results. Implicitly, the SPO has the role of resolving 
resource conflicts, change resistance and the organisational politics as far as the 
recognition of benefits is concerned. The SPO also plays a significant role in meeting 
the project's milestones and measuring performance. These milestones should serve 
as KPIs to help evaluate the project's success, justify its continuation and redirect it as 
necessary. In other words, measurement of progress is a continual concern for the 
entire implementation and is therefore considered as one of the most critical success 
factors. Explicitly, it has to be connected with the ROI as far as the top-level 
executives are concerned. The ROI from one project will, to a certain extent, help to 
drive the business case and justify investments in the next phase of the strategic vision. 
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In the absence of a solid commitment from top executives, an SPO can hardly 
perform effectively. The commitment is inevitably necessary in terms of defining the 
key performance indicators (KPIs) for those who are heavily involved in the project 
implementation. Strategically, the SPO aims at effectively managing and assuring 
collaboration throughout the project, as suggested in Figure 9.1. 
Managing change is another of the SPO's primary functions. Depending on the level 
of collaboration, change programs will need to be suitably designed to make sure that 
conflicts and any negative impacts generated from within the collaboration process 
can be properly addressed. Successful change programs should aim to generate short- 
term wins. For example, customers seem to want to spend no more than four to six 
weeks figuring out what needs to be done; how to do it, and what the ultimate return 
will be (Ravi and Torto, 2002). To avoid deviating from the project's objectives, 
smaller-phased projects with immediate ROI are worthwhile and suitable change 
programs will also need to be regularly reviewed and modified as necessary. 
9.1.5. Benefit-driven Approach 
Technology-driven projects are diminishing in number as business needs initiate 
technology-based projects including the ERP implementation. Through realising the 
intended benefits derived from the ERP system, functional requirements can be 
developed. In other words, an ERP project has to deliver some kind of benefit. 
Benefits therefore determine the implementation strategy of an ERP system. Regular 
reviews should be conducted for the purpose of identifying what benefits are needed. 
A showcase approach can be effectively incorporated as a management tool to 
improve user's confidence level by illustrating the experience of success, as well as to 
determine the expected benefits to be gained from the implementation. The ability to 
obtain consensus and live with the evolving changes is key to this approach. The 
communication flows upwards and the user involvement is vitally needed during the 
process of determining the benefits. 
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Figure 9.1 A Benefit Driven, SPO Managed Model 
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Specifically, a Benefit-driven-SPO-managed model is constructed and summarised as 
in Figure 9.1, where critical success factors (CSFs), interacting in a collaborative 
manner, are deemed to be valid and necessary in order for project success to be 
guaranteed. In this model, five macro-environmental factors are initially defined as 
being inter-related. For instance, a change in the price to performance ratio of 
computer hardware is not only a direct consequence of technological advancement, 
but will also generate commercial value as well as benefits. Benefits, to a large extent, 
determine the business's requirements. Inability to manage benefits will cause an 
ERP implementation to be classified as a complete failure (Manoeuvre, 2001). 
CSF-1 [Scope] 
Improve the effectiveness and usefulness of prototyping through adjustable and 
adaptable definition to the project scope. 
Many long ERP implementation projects have been unsuccessful, simply because 
milestones have not been sufficiently or clearly defined and it has thus become 
difficult to assess whether the project was meeting its stated goals (Ravi and 
Torto, 2002). Scope must be established (Rosario, 200; Holland et al., 1999) and 
strictly controlled (Rosario, 2000); while scope expansion requests are still 
possible, they need to be assessed in terms of the additional time and cost of 
proposed changes (Sumner, 1999). Not only the technology but also the business 
processes will need to be adjusted to ensure that they work together effectively 
and efficiently, both now and in the future (Ramankutty, 2003). This implies that 
the scope of work for any enterprise project must be clearly defined and limited; 
yet it should also be flexible, adjustable and adaptable. 
In today's commercial world, an adaptive approach to defining, building and 
implementing a solution is needed. Theoretically, scope must be defined in detail, 
yet remain realistic (Hendrickson, 2001) and there will be inevitable and 
sometimes even drastic change, on the condition that organisational benefits can 
be recognised. People have to cope with sudden changes in the scope of work. 
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However, changes must be managed cautiously. Ideally, frequent change to the 
scope of work needs to be avoided, but constructive changes should be adopted. 
More importantly, the potential costs and benefits to the company must be 
considered, instead of simply refusing any variation to the scope of work. This 
explains why a regular review of the benefits is important. 
In order to effectively achieve a collaborative implementation process, a 
serviceable scope of work inevitably needs to be clearly defined, agreed and 
communicated, although it might be expanded or changed at a later stage. 
However, the scope has to be adaptive to change, due to the fact that business 
decisions often impose a need to redefine the scope of work. 
The `Big Bang' approach is very unlikely to be successful with regard to 
implementing a company-wide solution in any large corporation involving 
hundreds of employees. It is therefore a rather risky option. The impact is so 
significant because this approach essentially involves changing everything in a 
day or two. For a successful changeover, a lot of groundwork will need to be 
sketched and carried out beforehand. No organisation can actually afford to take 
this risk. Instead, smaller-phased projects with immediate ROI (Ravi & Torto, 
2002) can help eliminate the risk, and this implies that a small win can help to 
secure the implementation. Defining an `as-is' model helps to determine which 
business functions benefit most from an ERP solution (Martin & Sara, 2001). 
Apparently, for Pepsi and Chubb, prototyping proved to be a consistently useful 
tool for establishing user consensus when defining an `as-is' model as well as for 
developing a future model. Therefore, in the search for a further secure way to 
carry out implementation, prototyping must always be included as part of the 
implementation process. 
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CSF-2 [Portals] 
Make strategic use of portal technology for more effective project management and 
information exchange. 
Effective communication is critical to ERP implementation (Falkowski et al., 
1998). Legitimate inputs such as user requirements, comments, reactions and 
approval should be validated and managed (Rosario, 2000). Employees must be 
informed of the objective, scope, activities and updates in advance, and 
acknowledge and accept that change will occur (Sumner, 1999). Clear 
communication is therefore needed, as it eliminates ambiguity and more 
importantly secures an initial commitment from the stakeholders. 
Communication via `portal' is becoming more popular and can be very useful as 
long as cost-effective infrastructure is available. It should also be seen as an 
innovative tool to facilitate virtual teams to work collaboratively. No matter how 
effective the communication process; success in an ERP project cannot be 
guaranteed until a well-fitted workflow management system is also exercised. In 
terms of technology delivery, major ERP suppliers such as SAP, PeopleSoft and 
Oracle have recently revamped their software. Although this variant of Internet 
technology can help implement the ERP systems, a person must be assigned to 
administer the portal and a small group of individuals should be given the 
responsibility to mobilise such a technology within the company. The portal itself 
only carries the information and the people are key to making strategic use of this 
emerging technology for effective communication. 
Effective project management is also supported by portal technology, through 
which individuals can be informed of the project's progress and strategies for 
greater efficiency. An individual or a small group of individuals must be given the 
responsibility to drive success from a project management perspective (Rosario, 
2000). Effective project management should be disciplined with co-ordinated 
training and the active involvement of the human resource department (Falkowski 
et al., 1998). Portal technology helps to facilitate co-ordination. Beyond 
communication and project management, a customer process should be developed 
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through implementing an ERP system (Rao, 2000), which means that a successful 
implementation of an ERP system relies on meeting the business's needs with 
technology. 
CSF-3 [Sponsorship] 
Inspire and reward stakeholders to work collaboratively and develop change programs 
as needed. 
Throughout the implementation process, constant support from top management is 
needed. Direct and genuine support from the operations staff is equally important. 
Until the operations staff can be truly convinced to recognise the benefits they are 
getting from the implementation, they will never be able to get on with the 
collaborative working model and move towards a successful ERP implementation. 
This new practice of doing business calls for a sketch of change programs aimed at 
coaching individuals toward adapting to an electronic platform of collaboration. In 
other words, specific workshops and training will need to be organised, especially 
when a large number of employees are involved, at the operations level. 
For example, Chubb Hong Kong, have developed a program to administer security 
services. However, the trial run result was extremely disappointing due to the fact 
that most of the security guards were not adequately informed of the changes 
beforehand. The system itself was reliable and was demonstrated to be free of 
flaws, but it was found that it was the `people dimension', that was an obstacle 
preventing successful implementation. 
Stakeholders need to be involved in up-front in consultation to identify their needs 
and concerns (Ravi and Torto, 2002). They also need to participate in developing 
suitable change management programs within which new systems can easily be 
adopted. Finally, they need to be trained on how to make use of the new systems 
and apply the new processes to do their business. For example, at Chubb, 
thousands of guards were impacted by the new system and the processes 
implemented. The manager's involvement was deemed to be adequate since 
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control and monitoring was made simple. However, the implementation nearly 
failed due to the pressure it placed on the guards, to adopt new ways of reporting 
their attendance. The system failed to demonstrate any immediate benefits and no 
attempt was made to solicit the guards' interests, in a way that would have 
encouraged them to drop their resistance. In retrospect it is clear that 
representatives from the guards should have been nominated and given some 
responsibility as well as rewards to assist with the implementation. 
CSF-4 [Partnership] 
Exercise agile partnership with external parties to cope with changing expectations 
and limited resources. 
It is necessary to define and re-define expectations on a regular basis, as the 
environment continually changes the requirements and the recognition of benefits. 
In many cases, implementation involves external consultants, such as the Big Four 
accounting firms, and the users' expectation regarding the project's benefits could 
potentially go unrecognised an unfulfilled due to inadequate involvement with the 
external parties. Partnership represents a different kind of capital to an 
organisation (Gutzman, 2001) and it can bestow a strategic advantage. However, 
it does bring risks with it, and these external risks are more difficult to manage 
than any internal constraints. 
Partnering with external parties needs to be flexible to effectively facilitate a 
collaborative working model. For example, at Chubb, for the global 
implementation of PeopleSoft, the company decided to form a partnership with 
IBM Global Services (formerly known as PwC Consulting) and PeopleSoft. This 
allows Chubb to be freed up from the delivery of a limited scope of work due to 
insufficient product knowledge. A partnership will become ineffective if it is not 
seen as a primary vehicle to create a true collaboration platform. 
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CSF-5 [Education] 
Incorporate collaboration into the corporate culture through orientations and repetitive 
training. 
As part of the change management efforts, users must be involved in the design as 
well as the implementation of business processes and the ERP system. Formal 
education and training should be provided to help them do so (Bingi et al., 1999; 
Holland et al., 1999). More importantly, education should be a priority from the 
beginning of the project, and money and time should be spent on various forms of 
education and training (Roberts and Barrar, 1992). 
There is no magic in ERP software, and its success lies in the preparation of the 
process and the people involved (Donovan, 1999). Benefits are the direct result of 
effective preparation and implementation, and the appropriate use of the system 
once it is in place. Therefore, training is key to an effective implementation for 
any organisation. However, training may vary depending on the size of the group 
to be trained. Under no circumstances can education be omitted or avoided as part 
of the implementation. Pertinent training throughout the implementation cycle 
needs to be repeated as necessary to ensure that the individuals involved are still on 
track. Effective education is not attainable until the users are able to realise the 
competitive edge that it brings, so that they become eager to be trained. Partners 
need to be included too, since they are actually part of the virtual team and will 
have to communicate effectively within the team. One of the key items on the 
agenda, during the education phase, is to address the issue of collaboration among 
the operations staff. Expectations on how the operations staff should be involved 
in the implementation of ERP systems needs to be clearly expressed. 
It is imperative that both IT and business considerations account for technical 
decisions and everyone should understand the impact of those further down the 
road (Marer, 2002). Collaboration should also start from within an organisation 
and slowly expand to encompass customers and suppliers. However, the 
collaboration must first become a reality at the business level before it can 
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effectively begin to radiate out to customers or suppliers. Again, an online portal 
should be built to help facilitate the collaboration. More importantly, collaboration 
is built upon trust; therefore, workshops and training should be tailored to help 
everyone concerned to realise the synergy of collaboration through creating trust 
among individuals and groups. 
Creating a strategic culture is therefore an important element of training. Culture 
is generally defined as the combined effect of behaviours, values, heritage, 
thinking and relationships and the way they manifest themselves in an organisation. 
When this manifestation is strategic, these cultural features are deployed to ensure 
strategic coherence, consistency and success (Freedman, 2002). Freedman also 
summarises the following key drivers to help foster a strategic culture within an 
organisation: 
" Universal and measurable belief and values, 
" Cross-functional and future oriented strategic and open minded thinking, 
" Clearly designed organisation structure, 
" Management processes and systems in support of human performance 
system, 
" Education, training and development, 
" Goal setting and appraisals, 
" Reward systems, 
" Myths, stories, legends and symbols, 
" External manifestations such as advertising, branding, image creation, 
" Different kinds of information and knowledge, 
" Visionary and risk-taking behaviours, 
" Effective communication. 
Therefore, an effective continual training program should be developed to address 
the above concerns. It should also place its primary emphasis on people. 
Fundamentally, major success in business depends on the alignment of corporate 
culture with the business objectives and a full adoption of the systematic processes, 
but again, it is the people who make the difference. Apart from a need to 
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understand the business in a factual and rational manner, IT should be trained to 
think in terms of `holding up a mirror' to gain an understanding of whether they 
are acting in a collaborative manner internally and across the business. 
In conclusion, continual education and training itself should be justified as a 
responsive and on-going process whereby employees are surveyed to see if they 
continue to perform effectively and whether the benefit expected throughout the 
implementation process, are actually arriving. 
CSF-6 [Leadership] 
Mobilise the united power of empowerment and leadership during the change 
management and system implementation. 
As with rewarding customer service, successful ERP implementation requires a 
high degree of devotion and dedication. Empowering teams has always been seen 
as an effective way to maintain the level of service. Brower (1995) suggests in 
his model of empowerment that team members have to have the authority to 
make decisions on the spot, provide instant responses to customer needs and 
account for their performance to customers. Further to Brower's model, 
empowerment also calls for alignment of direction and ability that includes 
knowledge, skills and a well-developed identity. Empowering decision-makers 
to look across the entire enterprise is a key prerequisite for the development of 
inter-enterprise collaboration (Ravi and Torto, 2002). 
Executive leadership is certainly needed to cultivate an effective empowerment 
model. Leadership is therefore complementary to empowering teams and the 
leadership within a team, or so-called distributed leadership, is equally important. 
One of the most comprehensive leadership theories is the theory of 
transformational and transactional leadership. Burns (1978) first developed the 
ideas of transformational and transactional leadership in a political context and 
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Bass (1985) further refined them and introduced them into the organisational 
context. 
Transactional leadership develops from an exchange process between leaders and 
subordinates wherein the leader provides rewards in exchange for subordinates' 
performance. Transformational leadership behaviours go beyond transactional 
leadership and motivate followers to identify with the leader's vision and 
sacrifice their self-interest for that of the group or the organisation. 
Change requires leaders and organisations to embrace paradox and process, 
ambiguity and opportunity (Fleming, 2001). Effective leaders should strive to 
create this type of change environment. Weiss (1999) has identified three 
leadership competencies: diagnosing, communicating and adapting, and Fleming 
(2001) argues that narrative can be used to sharpen each of these three 
competencies. Seizing the teachable moment is critical in capturing the power of 
narrative as a tool for communicating vision and meaning. Leaders can therefore 
communicate through narrative in two ways: by listening to stories and by 
effectively interpreting these stories to the organisation. 
While change management depends on leadership being enacted, leadership is 
also a key to an effective collaboration. Borden and Perkins (1999) identified 
leadership as one of the major components to be assessed at a company level in 
order to determine if collaboration can be effectively achieved. Sharing common 
goals and adoption of a new work relationship can sometimes be a major issue in 
organisational change. Markus and Tanis (2000) point out that even when 
organisational leadership accepts the need for change, the process of 
implementing ERP systems can go further than is initially contemplated. This 
means that it might involve considerable change in a number of aspects affecting 
the people of the organisation, such as job design, work sequencing and training. 
Previous research has linked change management with the capabilities of 
transformational leadership required to enact change successfully (Stefanou, 
2001). A transformational leadership, committed to the continuous effort needed 
for the successful implementation of ERP systems, must resolve conflicts and 
Page 190 of 239 
Implications for Practice 
properly manage resistance not only to new technology but also to new work 
relationships. 
CSF-7 [Teamwork] 
Promote a dynamic practice of teamwork through enhanced communication and 
reward program. 
Teamwork and team-composition has been widely conceived as one of the most 
important success factors for an ERP implementation (Buckhout et al., 1999; 
Bingi et al., 1999; Falkowski et al., 1998; Holland et al., 1999; Rosario, 2000; 
Wee, 2000). As part of the project kick-off agenda, individual roles must be 
clearly defined. More importantly, adequate communication thereafter should be 
encouraged and regularly reviewed. Teamwork and communication skills are 
important issues in ERP implementation. Also, as most ERP implementations are 
business driven, cross-functional project teams are usually formed. Gibson et al. 
(1999) point out that implementation can fail if decision taking times are 
excessive. Teamwork, sincere work relationships and adequate communication 
skills can sometimes, to a large extent, resolve technical issues (Stefanou, 2001). 
An effective team should understand customer requirements as well as processes 
and seek to improve communications between departments and improve morale 
and support the development of individuals (Munro-Faure et al., 1998). In such a 
way, conflicts can therefore be reduced and a chance of achieving collaboration is 
more likely. 
To be successful, teams must understand what they are trying to achieve, and 
therefore they must be trained to work together to analyse processes and resolve 
problems. Again, teams can benefit from being educated. Munro-Faure et al. 
(1999) argue that the education process should address three main areas: (1) 
generating awareness of a need for continuous improvement and changes in 
attitudes; (2) developing the abilities of everyone in the organisation to utilise 
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problem solving and quality tools and techniques so that they can analyse 
problems, identify their root causes and develop effective solutions, and (3) 
establishing the skills necessary, at all levels, to work together in teams and to 
sustain improvements. As individuals grow in competence and confidence, they 
become able to take on more responsibility and become increasingly involved in 
making day-to-day decisions. 
Further to securing success, teams need to be assigned full time to the 
implementation, and they should be given compensation and incentives for 
successfully implementing the system on time and within the assigned budget 
(Wee, 2000). In addition, teams need to have sense of ownership and be aware of 
the consequences of failure. 
CSF-8 [Measures] 
Utilise a balanced scorecard and continual review of KPIs to ensure and validate 
performance. 
While project objectives and KPIs, once set and mutually agreed, should not be 
neglected under any circumstances. Project reviews should always be conducted 
to assess whether the objectives are being met and whether the KPIs defined for 
performance measurement, are being achieved. The change programmess also 
need to be reviewed to make sure that they are still adequate and appropriate. 
Strategic use of KPIs can help inspire individual as well as improve group 
performance. 
Not only is the Balanced Scorecard widely accepted as a management tool that 
enables organisations to clarify vision and strategy and transform them into 
action; it also provides feedback around both internal business processes and 
external outcomes in a way that continuously improves strategic performance and 
results. Before an organisation can start implementing a balanced scorecard, it 
needs a clear understanding of its vision and strategy. Much more importantly, it 
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is the management's responsibility to define the vision, formulate the strategy and 
set strategic goals, regardless of a balanced scorecard being implemented. 
9.2. Gateway to Implementation Effectiveness 
Changes are unavoidable in any ERP implementation, and the change management as 
illustrated in Figure 8.7, representing a gateway into implementation effectiveness, is 
therefore vitally important, since it facilitates a smooth transition into a new way of 
doing business. Communicating change from the inside out will reduce resistance to 
change. Companies no longer see internal information as a `need to know' entity. 
The more the employees can understand the company, the more easily they can align 
themselves with the values and culture the company has adopted. 
To succeed, the content and impact of the change must first be understood and 
communicated (Barry, 2001). Implementing ERP system will give the change 
process a chance to achieve improved operational efficiency. Furthermore, business 
process re-engineering should always accompany the ERP implementation in one 
form or another, depending on the particular company environment. To avoid falling 
into a trap of confusion, it is therefore recommended that extensive test-runs of the 
changes are defined, mutually agreed and prototyped before they are incorporated into 
the ERP implementation. With an organised team structure whereby both senior 
management executives and business representatives are involved, change can be 
easily and effectively communicated upward and downward. This therefore implies 
that preparation in advance can make the integration with the business process 
improvement much easier, whereas teaming is important to the management of 
change. 
Continuous improvement with ERP-enabled processes is considered important, since 
more and more companies today are recognising that going live with ERP is just the 
beginning of a much more rewarding journey and thus have already begun to 
undertake actions that can help achieve the full capabilities and benefits of ERP- 
enabled processes (Chen, 2001). The more organisations learn about new business 
processes and enterprise systems, the more likely they will recognise that the 
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behavioural changes needed to support the new way of doing business are the most 
critical factor in providing ERP firms with unprecedented competencies. 
9.3. Implementation of Action Research 
The value of enhancing JBA Advantage lay in increasing the users' awareness of, and 
dedication to, the collaboration perspective, although this enhancement was not 
officially accepted as a final blueprint for the next version of JBA Advantage. User 
awareness and dedication were improved due to the requirement of sharing the 
ownership among key participants with the implementation of key performance 
indicators. The expansion of the Foundation Phase was operationally justified. 
Embedding custom programs into the simulation process proved to be effective as a 
direct result of reducing disputes and achieving perception alignment on the system 
delivery. 
As mentioned in earlier chapters, process reengineering was a focus in Guangzhou 
Pepsi where the managing consultant and other implementation consultants were 
assigned, and finally managed, to present a prototype with all necessary custom 
programs embedded. As a result, it took less than the expected time to obtain 
alignment between Pepsi and JBA International on how the future business operations 
should be defined. 
Again, some interactive tools, such as Microsoft Project and reusable data conversion 
programs, as recommended for more effective information exchange, were 
successfully incorporated. Since Microsoft Project was insufficient to share project 
information in real time, a web-based version of its kind (i. e., Microsoft Project 
Server 2000) was about to be launched. There was a need and also a plan to make the 
project's progress visible to authorised participants from anywhere, at any time. 
Apart from being introduced to a portal technology, within which Microsoft Project 
was incorporated, key participants were also trained to make effective use of the 
communication tool. All these arrangements were applied to Shenzhen Pepsi and 
Changchun Pepsi during the second phase of implementation. It was also recognised 
that improvement was made in terms of user acceptance and project progress as a 
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result of more accurate and dynamic management of user expectations during the 
Foundation Phase of implementation. 
With the establishment of a Strategic Project Office, where enhanced information 
flow was embraced, the system architect, key implementers and those operational 
managers who had been assigned leadership capability, were able to communicate 
with one another and perform project activities in a more organised manner. Again, 
Microsoft Project was a primary tool for effective communication within this context. 
Being adopted initially as a preferred approach to implementing ERP systems, the 
showcase remained a strategic means of minimising the resistance to changes as 
necessary. Small wins, in terms of first dividing the entire project into smaller but 
meaningful job activities and then declaring to the public that the job was complete, 
proved very beneficial in attaining management buy-in and user acceptance. The 
proposed three-tier communication flow also facilitated the collaboration process by 
clarifying individual roles in terms of expected contribution to the project. 
With regard to the strategy perspective, choosing a right implementation partner could 
also help improve the customer's responsiveness. Transforming the existing 
customer-supplier relationship into a project-based affiliation resolved the issue of 
conflict of interests between Pepsi and JBA International. Based upon a mutual 
understanding of the win-win approach, Pepsi BU acted as an implementation partner 
of JBA International, since they knew more about the consultants than anyone else at 
Pepsi. A virtual implementation support team was formed within Pepsi, with second 
tier application support from JBA consultants. User confidence was therefore 
strengthened and the implementation time was shortened. An improved negotiation 
process was facilitated and conflict of interest was also minimised. Also, support was 
no longer an issue preventing the system from being effectively implemented. In 
most cases, after go-live support was provided by the implementation support team 
from Pepsi BU, out of Hong Kong. 
Resistance to change was managed with improved teamwork and mutual 
understanding of the need for collaboration through continuous and repetitive training 
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on the recognition of project objective, operational procedures and working 
instructions. Direct and dedicated participation in the solution design allowed users to 
easily commit themselves to the project. In the early stage of implementation, ERP 
was well perceived as a tool to implement changes, but unfortunately it failed, as 
nobody in Pepsi actually recognised the benefits of implementing the ERP system. 
A benefit-driven, SPO-managed model was conceptually impressive and practically 
executable. It was generally accepted by the management team of Pepsi Changchun, 
and the model was therefore implemented. Communication was improved, as was the 
relationship with the customer. Due to the fact that a lot more compromises were 
made and less customisation work was initiated, the conflict was therefore relaxed. 
Further to the new model, ERP implementation was considered as an integral part of 
the BPR project. In other words, BPR represented a master program at Pepsi where 
ERP implementation was totally embraced. 
Any changes due to the emergence of the BPR project and ERP implementation were 
integrated and managed by the Strategic Project Office. Finally, the SPO was also 
responsible for quality management as far as the implementation support was 
concerned. The quality of work was improved as a consequence of eliminating direct 
support from JBA consultants and replacing it with a two-tier support model where 
KPIs were embedded and linked with ownership taking. 
9.4. Summary 
In summary, the critical success factors (CSFs), in conjunction with a highly 
collaborative management from a Strategic Project Office as suggested in the Benefit- 
driven-SPO-managed model, emerged from an intent to secure the stakeholders' 
commitment to the ERP implementation through demonstrating the benefits of 
operating an ERP system. As time progresses, some benefits might become irrelevant 
while new ones will come into the picture. A regular review of benefits creates a 
platform for developing change programmes as needed. 
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The Strategic Project Office is core to an effective ERP implementation. It manages 
the entire process of collaboration. The elements that exist in the collaboration 
process are sequentially interrelated, as exhibited in Figure 8.7. Both the scope and 
measures, along with other significant elements, represent the critical success factors 
which foster an effective collaborative process. 
Apart from a need for a vigorous commitment from senior executives, a truly 
collaborative involvement from the operations staff is also imperative. While 
miscommunication is invariably a cause of failure, an enterprise portal is of great help 
in closing the communication gap with an assumption that adequate `soft skills' 
training could be provided. Nevertheless, effective training cannot be conducted until 
corporate learning is well perceived as a culture. Internet-based project scheduling 
software such as Microsoft Project 2002 should be incorporated into the portal to 
improve the communication process. Alongside this, change management and 
seamless integration with business process improvement helps to reduce resistance. 
Furthermore, a determined leadership, continual empowerment, flexible partnership, 
effective teamwork and constant reviews are supplemental yet essential to securing 
implementation success. 
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10. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this research initially examined the ERP project failure at Pepsi, and 
attempts were made to identify the missing components as well as the disadvantages 
of JBA Advantage. From this point, the next generation of the implementation 
methodology was developed, in conjunction with the formulation of an overall 
implementation strategy. 
10.1. Lesson Learned 
At its upper level, the research pinpoints the observation that solely adjusting the 
implementation methodology is unlikely to improve the chance of project success 
unless an overall implementation strategy can be formulated to facilitate the 
methodology. It is therefore concluded that an implementation strategy and 
methodology representing tier-1 and tier-2 considerations respectively in the proposed 
model should always be arranged and executed side-by-side. Above all, adaptability 
and continuity are, in general, two major characteristics that feature in successful 
implementations. 
In terms of Pepsi's specific implementation of System 21, as an ERP solution, the 
non-structural approach with which JBA Advantage is embedded needs to be 
radically adjusted with respect to the following areas: readiness checks, integration 
with BPR, teaming structure (including the method of communication, strategic 
partnership and the presence of a strategic project office), project orientation and 
training, ownership taking, appropriate use of toolkits and prototyping, recognition of 
parallel testing, effective management of customer expectations, change and 
resistance management and finally strategic use of local servicing partners for pre- 
and post-implementation support. 
Furthermore, prior to implementing an ERP system, everyone involved in the project 
must demonstrate that they have clearly understood the objectives and the impacts, for 
the organisation, of implementing the change. Change management is crucial to 
securing ERP success. Replacing a legacy or manual system with a completely new 
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enterprise system requires conscientious planning and, preferably, non-radical 
execution of the change management programme, since the impacts on current 
operational practice are likely to be substantial. Instead of being considered simply as 
a tool for changing the business processes, ERP implementation should, therefore, be 
wholly integrated with the BPR project with which it is associated, if momentum is to 
be maintained. Again, it is important that appropriate change programs need to be 
gradually introduced to the implementation cycle so that resistance to change can be 
mitigated. 
Establishing a structured project organisation is also recognised as essential in 
evaluating the organisation's readiness to replace its legacy system. In Pepsi's case, 
the BU, rather than JBA International, should take on the ownership of the project and 
work closely with the consultants to define and design the implementation cycle. 
Therefore, each Pepsi location should rely, not only on the BU for advice and support, 
but should also attempt to work with the BU actively on the planning of the project. 
Ownership taking is also significant for achieving success. Participating individuals 
should be either encouraged or forced to take on their ownership as agreed during the 
planning meeting. In particular reference to the case study of Pepsi, managing 
changes should become part of the advisory project manager's responsibility while 
JBA International as an external party who did not appear to understand adequately 
the company culture was hardly possible in leading the changes. 
Breaking the ownership into levels with controls is considered a strategic move 
towards success. Apart from a clear definition of the ownership of defined tasks, 
individuals must take on the responsibility for making sure that the assigned work can 
be complete and integrated with other interrelated work. A three-tier approach (i. e. 
software vendor, middleman and software users) can obviously improve the chance of 
achieving success in implementing ERP systems. The effectiveness can be 
recognised with its rationalisation, for example, in Pepsi's case, whereby the first tier 
or software vendor is JBA International, Pepsi BU represents the second tier or 
middleman, and tier-three or Pepsi facilities are the software users. Each tier has its 
own responsibility and is supported by other groups of people. 
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Unlike other ERP vendors who adopt channel sales and support, JBA International 
used to support its product through its own consultants and resources. However, such 
distant support tends to create customer dissatisfaction and it is somewhat inefficient 
and costly to send consultants a thousand miles to provide implementation support. 
Also, in respect to the implementation projects with Pepsi, it is extremely difficult for 
ERP consultants from Hong Kong to stay in China for a prolonged period. As a result, 
the turnover rate at JBA International was becoming problematic, as its consultants 
were intolerant of the relatively poor living environment. Partnering with local 
servicing companies, especially to arrange the post-implementation support, is a more 
practicable approach. However, this approach becomes less competitive if support is 
unavailable within a short distance. 
Ideally, the consultants or engineers who provide the support should know the people 
and understand the working environment. Setting up in-house offices for support is 
hardly cost justified since the associated overheads could be huge. Strategic alliance 
is therefore an option for providing effective support services. From Pepsi's point of 
view outsourcing internally, across to the BU, should therefore become a reality, since 
external consultants are less influential in driving the changes required. This 
combination can make the implementation more manageable and effective. 
With respect to technical competency, ERP vendors should provide their customers 
with tools and interfaces to facilitate a more efficient deployment of their ERP 
systems. For example, SAP has a Business Connector to facilitate data exchange with 
other third party systems. During the implementation planning, there are always 
concerns regarding how the master data can be loaded into the new database. For 
instance, JBA International itself does not provide any form of solution for this. This 
explains why the consultants did not appear to be particularly efficient when they 
were on-site providing implementation support. Data conversion is generally part of 
the on-site implementation support process. However, referring to the 
implementation at Changchun, for example, consultants could neither produce an 
interface for capturing the master data nor help make sure that the data conversion 
was complete in a three-week period. As a remedy to this technical constraint, third 
party tools need to be introduced and properly integrated to provide a real solution. 
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Further down the road towards a project's success, the methodology should take into 
consideration a complete integration of checkpoints and quality assurance procedures. 
Firstly, the client project sponsor must make sure that the organisation is ready to 
adapt to new technological changes and operations that are compliant with the 
requirements arising from the Business Process Reengineering project. Secondly, the 
key users have to be constantly oriented to continuously drive others towards 
achieving the project goals, with which the corporate objectives are synchronised. 
Thirdly, prototyping and parallel running should be made compulsory, as 
implementation checkpoints, to ensure that key users are confident of moving the 
project forward. Finally, the schedule for after go-live support must be integrated into 
the methodology to help ensure that the entire implementation is taking place in a 
reliable environment. 
In short, the implementation methodology that JBA International had originally 
adopted was deemed to be impractical, primarily because of improper use of methods, 
tools, structure and resources. A new framework has therefore been developed in an 
attempt to address the implementation issues under investigation. This entails a 
revised model of JBA Advantage in which the validated hypotheses and expectations 
of improvements are incorporated, aiming at more effective ERP implementation. 
First, the new team structure, along with the communication flow, encourages 
management support by demonstrating the ability to facilitate an accurate 
interpretation of user requirements, a clear definition of the scope of work and hence a 
better management of the customer's expectations. Second, the ownership-taking 
approach, alongside constant orientation, makes the design of a To-Be model more 
applicable and the implementation less risky. Third, the use of prototyping helps to 
reduce the expectation gap. Fourth, selective outsourcing through partnering with 
local vendors resolves the issue of limited availability of IT support and improves the 
implementation support process (e. g. continuity of work and multiple site 
implementation). It also supports and improves the after-implementation service (e. g. 
rapid fixing of faulty programs). Fifth, the use of implementation tools facilitates the 
evaluation of readiness, continuous analysis of risks, timely reporting and regular 
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executive briefing. And finally, the adoption of industry best practice helps to largely 
avoid subsequent modifications, hence minimising the risk of failure. 
10.2. Contributions of The Current Work 
Since the boom in the demand for ERP systems in the late 1990s, primarily due to the 
millennium issue, a large number of articles and other pieces of research have been 
published with similar aims of identifying the critical success factors for ERP 
implementation. For example, hundreds of case studies have been produced to 
illustrate these issues. It is thereby noted, for example, that some success factors are 
common in many scenarios where people are often seen to constitute a primary 
obstacle to effectively implementing ERP systems. This works represents a 
continuation from such studies identifying, among the critical success factors, 
sponsorship and effective communication regardless of the implementation strategies, 
as remaining the most important ingredients throughout the implementation cycle. 
However, depending on the particular implementation scenarios, other critical success 
factor should also be considered, and distinctive implementation approaches and 
strategies should be adopted accordingly. 
A key contribution in this work was the validation of the linkage between strategy and 
methodology; this being deemed to be not only complementary but also essential. 
Being more specific, an implementation methodology must have been communicated 
before an appropriate strategy can be formulated to work alongside the 
implementation methodology. 
The research also suggests the adoption of a showcase approach for the ERP 
implementation since fear and resistance to change can be significantly reduced, by 
this means. However, although a showcase is similar to a prototype, it calls for more 
attention in planning and execution. Effective management of communication to get a 
smooth adoption of the showcase is also important. 
Also, it is not usually easy to gain full support, at the operations level, even if a 
showcase is successfully demonstrated, in situations where problematic human related 
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issues are involved. Inferior communication always lengthens the implementation 
cycle and needs to be adequately addressed. Furthermore, a participative approach is 
deemed to be far more appropriate when dealing with the operations staff, since they 
need to be cultivated to perform in a controlled environment. Above all, this 
highlights again that critical success factors are interlinked and need to be considered 
at the same time. 
Cultivating change and managing user expectation are the key areas to be addressed 
before the implementation takes place, during the course of implementation and even 
after the system goes live. Therefore, establishing a collaborative environment is 
important so that employees can take part in simulating change initiatives and work 
together toward adopting the changes. Specific steps for doing so were suggested. It 
was also recommended that an early adoption of the `Win Small Win Early' approach 
was favoured for managing customer expectations, as mutual confidence and trust 
could more readily be accumulated. Finally, a 7-step collaborative process embracing 
change management was developed and illustrated. 
Of the identified critical factors underlying implementation success, company 
readiness remains central. Based on the research, five general approaches to the 
effective implementation of ERP systems were defined. These were top-down 
approach, cohesive approach, people-centric approach, project management approach 
and finally benefit-driven approach. Each approach carried its own characteristics and 
values to the implementation of ERP systems. For example, within an autocratic 
organisation structure a top down approach appears to be suitable, whereas in a 
democratic environment, a human-centric approach holds more appeal. In a highly 
collaborative environment, a project management approach can be more easily 
adopted. However, a cohesive approach is commonly used in situations where 
resistance to change is a significant issue preventing the implementation from moving 
forward. Implementing ERP systems under differentiated circumstances requires at 
least one or more of these implementation approaches in order to create a greater 
chance of success. 
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However, it was further suggested that the benefit-driven approach represented by a 
benefit driven SPO managed model was among the most practical approach given the 
Pepsi's environment. Specifically, a Benefit-driven-SPO-managed model was 
therefore constructed in which critical success factors (CSFs), interacting in a 
collaborative manner, were deemed to be both valid and necessary to secure the 
likelihood of project success. In this model, five macro-environmental factors were 
initially defined as being inter-related. For instance, a change in the price to 
performance ratio of computer hardware is not only a direct consequence of 
technological advancement, but will also generate commercial value as well as 
benefits which, to a large extent, determine the business's requirements. Conversely, 
inability to manage benefits will cause an ERP implementation to be classified as a 
complete failure (Manoeuvre, 2001). 
Finally, reflections on the Action Research at Pepsi was that the Benefit-driven, SPO- 
managed model was conceptually acceptable and practically executable. It was 
generally accepted by the management team of Pepsi Changchun, and the model was 
therefore implemented. As a result, communication was improved, as was the 
relationship with the customer. Due to the fact that a lot more compromises were 
made and less customisation work was initiated, the conflict was therefore relaxed. 
Furthermore, in the new model, ERP implementation was considered as an integral 
part of the BPR project. In other words, BPR represented a master program at Pepsi, 
inside which ERP implementation was totally embraced. Any changes due to the 
emergence of the BPR project and ERP implementation were integrated and managed 
by the Strategic Project Office. 
Finally, the SPO was also responsible for quality management as far as the 
implementation support was concerned. The quality of work was improved as a 
consequence of eliminating direct support from JBA consultants and replacing this 
with a two-tier support model where KPIs were embedded and linked with ownership 
taking. 
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Given the situation in which many ERP implementation projects have been completed 
over the last two decades, many critical success factors have been named. However, 
some are more important than others, and vice versa, depending on the 
implementation environment. There appears little doubt that one single ERP system 
can fit all requirements. Neither does any single implementation methodology. Many 
implementation projects may be judged to have failed and in every project there was 
always an implementation methodology recommended by a single ERP vendor. 
However, it is suggested here these implementation methodologies might not 
necessarily have provided an adequate fit with the company's culture or corporate 
strategy of their customers. Simply adopting the vendor's implementation 
methodology, without any adjustment or alignment to the company setting, might 
easily spoil the project. 
A top-down approach in formulating an appropriate way to do the implementation is 
therefore important in helping eliminate the risks of project failure. The Benefit- 
driven model, as recommended in this research, represented one such way of doing 
the implementation in a better way. Technically, more rigid and interlinking 
checkpoints were built into the model to help prevent the implementation from going 
off track. 
In terms of the value of this paper and who should benefit from this research, I shall 
say whoever involves in ERP implementation should make a good use of it. In 
particular, there is an exceptional value to the ERP vendors and consultants who can 
take this chance to look at their implementation methodologies and determine how 
they should be altered to fit the customer environment. Companies who intend to 
implement ERP systems should first look at the overall strategy which should also 
embrace the preparedness for the implementation. Another derivable key contribution 
is a need for implementing or strengthening the governance within any 
implementation model. 
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10.3. Limitation of the Study 
Inevitably, upon reflection, there were some limitations identified within this research. 
Firstly, it was solely focused on improving one single methodology; namely the latest 
version of JBA Advantage. Hence other ERP vendors might not be able to fully 
benefit from this research. In fact the research did not set out to formulate a generic 
set of critical success factors as this was seen as less contributive given the many 
previous attempts, by other researchers, and also taking account of the complexity of 
real world scenarios. 
Secondly, there could still be a vendor's bias present when interpreting the course of 
actions as reported in the research since the research was taking place from a vendor's 
perspective. 
Thirdly, there were no references to similar ERP implementation projects for other 
Pepsi facilities and foreign companies in China which could, potentially, jeopardize 
the wider validity of the research. 
Fourthly, the stakeholder survey might not correctly and adequately validate the 
hypotheses formulated in this research since most of the companies returning the 
questionnaires were manufacturing organizations, whereas the focus of the research 
was a beverage company. Also, although every attempt was made to acquire a 
substantial source of survey data, the overall response rate was rather low at 8%. 
Similarly, although the internal data reliability of the constructs as defined in the 
stakeholder survey was fairly acceptable, the validity of the data may still be in 
question due to the relatively small sample size. There is also some potential concern 
that the survey questions might not have been optimally arranged, in the questionnaire. 
Finally, JBA International was acquired during the period of the research with the 
result that many of the people involved, mostly consultants, were moving about. As a 
result the people working on the research also changed and this could slightly affect 
the adoption of the newly developed model in reality. 
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10.4. Future Research 
While the implementation strategy can only represent a guideline, and the 
implementation methodology needs to be scalable, the entire implementation process 
does requires a certain level of control. The SPO was formed to assume this control 
function. However, a set of governance standards needs to be formulated and further 
study is recommended aimed at achieving this, including even more efficient tracking 
so that implementation risks can further be reduced. Future research should therefore 
aim at understanding what kinds of governance should be built into the 
implementation methodology to further improve the likelihood of project success. 
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ONLINE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
The research aims at exploring the implementation of ERP systems in China. It attempts to 
find out how to improve the effectiveness of the implementation. This represents the first 
study of its kind and it is expected that the research will help companies in Hong Kong 
understand the issues which have immediate impact on the ERP implementation process 
leading to implementation success. 
Please spend a few minutes to complete the following questionnaire. Your co-operation will 
be highly appreciated. Just tick the choice that best describes what you think or feel. There is 
no correct answer, and a quick response generally reflects what you think and feel best. All 
answers will be treated confidentially. We shall use the data in aggregate form and only for 
the purpose of research. Should you have any query in respect of completing the 
questionnaire, you are welcome to let me know. My email address is S. C. Huika)ncl. ac. uk. 
Section 1. Please tick in the space provided to describe your company business, office 
locations and available information technology resources. 
1. Your company's industry sector. Automotive []I 
Chemicals []2 
Electrical/Electronics Products []3 
Food & Beverage []4 
Services (]5 
Style & Apparel Products []s 
None of the above (]7 
2. Your company's core business nature 
for this office location. 
3. This office location. 
4. This office location a regional/corporate 
office. 
5. Other rep/branch office location(s). 
6. Production location(s). 
7. Number of employees in this office. 
8. Number of IT staff for this office. 
Logistics []I 
Manufacturing []2 
Sales & Marketing []3 
Services []4 
Sourcing []5 
Trading []e 
None of the above []7 
Hong Kong []I 
Rest of China []2 
None of the above []s 
Yes []t 
No []2 
South China (inc. Shanghai Area) []I 
North China []2 
Hong Kong []3 
Macau []4 
None of the above []5 
South China (inc. Shanghai Area) []I 
North China []2 
Hong Kong []3 
Macau []4 
None of the above []a 
Below 10 []1 
Below 20 []2 
Below 50 []9 
Below 100 []4 
Above 100 []5 
None []I 
Below 5 []2 
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Below 10 []3 
Below 20 []4 
Above 20 []s 
9. Support mode of IT function for this office. None []t 
In-house - Corporate []2 
In-house - Local []3 
Outsource []4 
Section 2. Please tick as appropriate in the space provided to describe your experience 
of the implementation of ERP systems. 
10. Source of your ERP system. Home-grown [ 
Purchased - Package [ 
Purchased - Custom [ 
Rental [ 
11. If purchase, give the name of ERP system. SAP R/3 
Oracle Applications 
BaanERP 
PeopleSoft [ 
JD Edwards World/OneWorld [ 
JBA System 21 [ 
SSA BPCS [ 
QAD MFG/Pro [ 
None of the above [ 
12. Operating environment(s). Mainframe [ 
Midrange e. g. IBM AS/400 [ 
Microsoft Windows NT Server [ 
Unix based machine [ 
None of the above [ 
13. Source of execution. Overseas [ 
Local [ 
14. Remote accesses from other countries. Yes [ 
No [ 
15. Number of licensed users. Below 10 [ 
Below 20 [ 
Below 50 [ 
Below 100 [ 
Over 100 [ 
16. Purchased/developed applications. Manufacturing [ 
Customer Services & Logistics [ 
Financials [ 
Human Resources [ 
17. Purchase of consultants' time for Yes [ 
implementation support. No [ 
18. Cost of the project. Less than HK$300K [ 
Less than HK$0.5 Million [ 
Equal or more than HK$0.5 Million [ 
More than HK$1 Million [ 
More than HK$2 Million [ 
19. Budget overrun. Yes [ 
No [ 
]1 
13 
]4 
]i 
13 
]8 
18 
19 
13 
]4 
15 
11 
lý 
l2 
]+ 
]2 
J3 
14 
]5 
]1 
]3 
14 : Ii 
]2 
]' 
]3 
14 
]5 
l1 
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20. Expected duration of the project. Less than 6 months [] 
Less than 12 months [] 
Less than 18 months [] 
Less than 24 months [] 
More than 24 months [] 
21. Project delays (if any). Less than 3 months [] 
Less than 6 months [] 
Less than 9 months 
Less than 12 months [] 
More than 12 months [] 
Section 3. Please choose a number between 1 and 5 that best reflects your level of 
agreement with the following statements. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
22_ A snecific methodoloov should be introduced 1234 
at the early stage of implementation. 
23. Generally, every project member appreciates 1 
having a methodology in place. 
24. The implementation methodology given by your 1 
ERP supplier is suitable for your project. 
25. There is always a need to modify or simplify the 1 
methodology to fit the requirements. 
26. The implementation methodology should be 1 
more scalable and flexible. 
27. Some critical project activities are missing 1 
from the methodology. 
28. A good methodology should always consider the 1 
pre-sales activities as an integral part of it. 
29. A generic methodology should be used 1 
irrespective of the type of ERP project. 
30. An experienced managing consultant from within 1 
the implementation team should come to do the 
pre-sales study before the contract is signed. 
31. It is important that the managing consultant 1 
should effectively manage the customer 
expectation. 
32. An accurate definition of the scope of work is a 1 
vital part of the managing consultant's job. 
33. Successful definition of an operational model 1 
depends on key users' acceptance of ownership. 
34. Recognition of company readiness is required as 1 
a prerequisite to implementing ERP systems. 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Strongly 
Agree 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
345 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
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35. The execution of BPR should be done separately, 12345 
ahead of implementing the ERP systems. 
36. Non-ERP business consultants should lead the 12345 
BPR project. 
37. A change to the business processes to fit the 12345 
proper use of software should be adopted for the 
easy implementation of the ERP system. 
38. Key users should receive orientation by phases. 12345 
39. Key users should be given the ownership of 12345 
solution design. 
40. 'Guanxi' or connection with government officials 12345 
makes easy the implementation of ERP systems 
in China. 
41. Change management programs for altering the 12345 
company culture should precede implementation 
of the ERP system. 
42. Prototyping secures accurate definition 12345 
of the final model. 
43. The final model should be embedded into a 12345 
simulation for effective familiarisation. 
44. Simulation facilitates effective workshop. 12345 
45. Effective use of prototyping accelerates the 12345 
implementation of ERP systems. 
46. Iterative risk assessment eliminates the chance 12345 
of project failure. 
47. Final check represents a vital step to secure 12345 
the deployment. 
48. A parallel run must take place as an essential 12345 
part of deployment. 
49. Constant review of the contingency plan helps 12345 
achieve a smooth transition to the adaptation 
of ERP systems. 
50. Inferior support during the warranty period fails 12345 
the project. 
51. Failure of ERP projects is largely due to poor 12345 
arrangement of the post implementation 
support. 
52. Delay of project completion is associated with 12345 improper adoption of implementation 
methodology. 
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Section 4-1. Please choose a number between 1 and 5 that best reflects your level of 
agreement with the following statements regarding the customer's expectations on vendor's 
services. Customers expect vendors to provide: 
53. Availability of local consultants 
54. Commissioning of managing consultants 
55. Competency of ERP consultants 
56. Continuity of work 
57. Rapid fixing of faulty programs 
58. Completion of process re-engineering 
59. Ability to integrate with process re-engineering 
60. Effective education 
61. Availability of user tools 
62. Multiple site support on implementation 
63. Timely follow-ups & reporting 
Very Very 
Low High 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
Section 4-2. Please choose a number between 1 and 5 that best reflects your level of 
agreement with the following statements regarding the vendor's expectations on customer's 
cooperation. The vendor expects customers to provide: 
Strongly Strons 
nt. s..... A. - 
64. Support from top management 
65. Recognition of corporate readiness 
66. Scope of work in accurate & clear definition 
67. Availability of internal IT support 
68. Avoidance of modification 
69. Appointment of an advisory project manager 
70. Adoption of prototyping 
71. Regular executive briefing 
72. Share of ownership among the key users 
73. Extensive training workshops 
74. Adoption of simulation 
Vv 
IJuý-w ýv flu. 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
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75. Continuous analysis of risks 12345 
76. Regular check-up of data integrity 12345 
77. Chargeability for data fixing 12345 
78. Management of changes 12345 
Section 5. Please state any o tional comments in the following spaces. 
79. What is your company name? What is your name, your job title and contact detail? 
80. Have you found any missing components from any methodology that you have ever used? 
If yes, what are they? 
81. Do you have any preferred methodology for implementing ERP systems? 
If yes, what is it? 
82. In what ways do you think the implementation methodology can be improved? 
83. Any other comments? 
- End - 
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